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Quest for Physical Theory: 
Editor’s Introduction
By George A. Reisch
After its publication in 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions quickly established Thomas Kuhn as one of America’s most influential historians 
and philosophers of science.1 But in 1950, when he received an invitation 
from Boston’s Lowell Institute to join the ranks of its distinguished lecturers, 
he had just started teaching at Harvard University and was largely unknown 
outside his circle of colleagues and friends. The incongruity was not lost on 
Kuhn. Upon greeting his audience at the Boston Public Library, he humbly 
acknowledged the “eminent scholars who have preceded me on this platform” 
and his hope to repay them “a small portion of my indebtedness.”
Since it was founded in the 1830s by John Lowell Jr., the institute had 
tasked leading scholars from around the world to promote “the moral, intel-
lectual, and physical instruction and education of the inhabitants of Boston.” 
The historians, artists, linguists, statesmen, scientists, and philosophers who 
accepted this commission enjoyed generous stipends, the opportunity to hold 
forth at great length—Kuhn was offered the choice of six or eight one-hour 
lectures—and the sustained attention of eager, self-selecting audiences. Tick-
ets were free to anyone. But they had to be requested in advance and—it 
was well known—one had to arrive on time. Doors closed promptly at eight 
o’clock and would not reopen for any whose tardiness would postpone or dis-
rupt the edification of those inside.2
In science, there had been the geologist Charles Lyell, the biologist Julian 
Huxley, the naturalist Louis Agassiz, and the astronomer Harlow Shapley. 
The British philosophers Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell 
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and the Americans Josiah Royce, Charles Sanders Peirce, and William 
James had preceded Kuhn, as well. Whitehead’s book Science and the Modern 
World and Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External World were first written 
as Lowell lectures, as was James’s Lectures on Pragmatism—a series said to 
have concluded in 1907 with a standing ovation.3 The lectures also helped to 
launch the careers of scholars who belonged to Harvard’s Society of Fellows, 
itself founded and endowed by Abbott Lawrence Lowell in 1933 upon his 
retirement as President of Harvard. The historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., for 
example, used his lectures to preview his forthcoming book, The Age of Jackson, 
for which he would later win a Pulitzer Prize at the age of twenty-nine.
When Kuhn received his invitation, he was twenty-eight years old and, 
like Schlesinger, a Junior Fellow in the Society. Despite his humble open-
ing remarks, however, Kuhn was ambitious and determined to distinguish 
himself.4 In the weeks and months before his lectures, as he outlined and 
sketched what he planned to say, he envisioned nothing less than a revolution 
in our understanding of science. His finished lectures brim with confident, 
far-reaching claims about the fundamental levers and springs of human in-
quiry, the nature of scientific knowledge, and why other theories of science 
miss their mark. Kuhn also planned to follow Whitehead, James, and Russell 
by publishing his lectures as a book—one that would transform our under-
standing of science and inaugurate a new, interdisciplinary field of research.5
Yet the lectures Kuhn delivered on Tuesdays and Fridays in March, 1951 
were not The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. They were not even published. 
To scholars thumbing through the personal files that Kuhn left to MIT after 
his death in 1996, it may have seemed natural that the famous author of 
Structure had once been so honored by the Lowell Institute. But the lectures 
themselves remind us that Kuhn’s now-classic theory of science took shape 
slowly, beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through the 1950s. 
The Lowell Institute provided Kuhn an early opportunity to systematize 
and present his emerging theory, but the resulting lectures show his ideas 
and terminology still in flux. The youthful, revolutionary confidence Kuhn 
invested in the lectures was not misplaced; but it bore fruit only later—after he 
had refined and strengthened his ideas, the terms in which he expressed them 
(notably, the “paradigms” of Structure do not appear in the Lowell lectures), 
and after his skills as a teacher and writer had matured and stabilized. From 
this wider perspective, the lectures speak to the development of Kuhn’s ideas, 
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the influences behind them, and the postwar intellectual climate in which 
they developed.
Thomas Kuhn’s Path to the Lowell Lectures
Born in Cincinnati, Thomas Kuhn was raised in New York City and attended 
preparatory schools in Pennsylvania and Connecticut. He enrolled at Harvard 
in the fall of 1940, graduated in 1943 with a degree in physics, and served 
in the second world war as a radar specialist. He subsequently returned to 
Harvard for graduate work in physics and earned his Ph.D. in 1948. 
Several factors may have helped to distinguish Kuhn in the eyes of Ralph 
Lowell, the trustee who invited him to lecture in the 1950-51 season.6 
Besides Kuhn’s membership in the Society of Fellows, Lowell enjoyed a 
working relationship with James Bryant Conant, the President of Harvard 
who had succeeded Abbott Lawrence Lowell—Ralph’s cousin—in 1933. As 
President, Conant managed the university’s longstanding relationship with 
the Lowell family, whose generations of politicians, businessmen, scientists, 
and intellectuals contributed to the industrial growth and cultural prestige of 
the Boston area. It was Conant, for example, who suggested to Ralph Lowell 
that the institute produce radio programs featuring scholarly lectures and 
round-table discussions with faculty from local colleges and universities. By 
1951, the year Kuhn delivered his lectures, the institute had created WGBH, 
which grew to become the public radio and television station it remains today.7
Ralph Lowell shared Conant’s view that postwar economic growth 
and rapid cultural change required Americans to better understand their 
world. That included modern science which was sure to shape the domestic 
and geopolitical challenges that lay ahead. Few had given these challenges 
more thought than Conant, who had helped lead the Manhattan Project’s 
development of the atomic bomb. Lecturing at Yale in 1946, Conant put it 
this way: 
We need a widespread understanding of science in this 
country, for only thus can science be assimilated into our 
secular cultural pattern. When that has been achieved, we 
shall be one step nearer the goal which we now desire so 
earnestly, a unified, coherent culture suitable for our Amer-
ican democracy in this new age of machines and experts.
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A strong, vibrant democracy, he believed, would require most educated Amer-
icans—certainly civic and institutional leaders—to have a basic understand-
ing of how modern science works. For the vast majority whose educations 
would not include advanced classes or research experience, Conant recom-
mended learning the ways of science through history—through detailed case 
studies of momentous experiments and debates of the past, such as those sur-
rounding the discovery of oxygen, of air pressure, or Copernican astronomy. 
Without setting foot in a research lab, Conant believed, they would become 
citizens better equipped to understand the complex, sometimes accidental, 
ways by which knowledge grows and “science moves ahead.”8
To spearhead this national effort, Conant initiated a new program in 
general education at Harvard that Thomas Kuhn joined as he concluded his 
graduate work in physics. Alongside Conant, Kuhn taught historical case 
studies to future bankers, lawyers, writers, and senators. He also represented 
Harvard’s program at national conferences dedicated to general education 
and techniques for teaching science to ordinary citizens. 
Whether Conant had personally recommended Kuhn to Ralph Lowell, 
or whether it was his membership in the Society of Fellows that brought him 
to Lowell’s attention, Conant prepared the ground for Kuhn’s invitation. For 
Conant had nominated Kuhn for membership in the Society shortly after 
they embarked on what would become a long, fruitful intellectual friendship 
and (at times) rivalry. In Kuhn, Conant found a protégé whose talents and 
interests complemented his plans to educate the public about science—not 
only through courses in general education for undergrads at Harvard and other 
colleges, but through semipopular books such as Conant’s On Understanding 
Science and Science and Common Sense. In his foreword to Kuhn’s first book, 
The Copernican Revolution of 1957, Conant applauded its effort to enlighten 
the educated public and chart “the road which must be followed if science 
is to be assimilated into the culture of our times.”9 In Conant, Kuhn found 
a mentor who offered him a much-desired career path outside of physics, 
whose intellectual passion for the history and philosophy of science rivaled 
his own, and who seeded many of the ideas that circulate through Kuhn’s 
Lowell lectures and later grew into The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As 
Kuhn declared in the dedication to its first edition, it was “James Bryant 
Conant/who started it.” 
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The Quest for Physical Theory:  
Foundations, Goals, and Organization
Kuhn gladly accepted Ralph Lowell’s invitation and proposed to deliver 
eight lectures about “several aspects of scientific behavior, or method, as they 
may be abstracted from the history of scientific ideas.”10 Inspired by what he 
later described as his “Aristotle experience”—a specific moment, likely in the 
summer of 1947, when he found to his surprise that Aristotle’s long-discarded 
theories of nature seemed sensible and convincing when apprehended in the 
right ways—Kuhn had been using his time as a Junior Fellow to read widely 
in several fields. The “several aspects” of science he planned to cover included 
history, philosophy, psychology, logic, semantics, and linguistics, all of which 
Kuhn enlisted to help explain how theories like Aristotle’s, coherent and 
successful on their own terms, were superseded and remembered simply as 
mistaken or false. However this process worked, it seemed clear to Kuhn 
that science did not change as textbooks and popularizations typically 
claimed—by replacing false with true theories and increasing humanity’s 
stock of knowledge. Instead, science moves forward by embracing different, 
but not necessarily better, theories. And as it does, it leaves some knowledge 
behind—like the theories of Aristotle that startled Kuhn with their intrinsic 
logic and sensibility.11
Kuhn was particularly interested in Freudian psychology and its view that 
powerful ideas and drives remain invisible and unknown to the conscious 
mind. If unconscious complexes could be brought to light through psycho-
analysis (which Kuhn himself underwent in the late 1940s), then perhaps 
methodological analysis could reveal unconscious or forgotten factors in sci-
ence that shaped its history and its understanding of its past.12 As a child and 
through his undergraduate years at Harvard, Kuhn was also deeply interested 
in politics, political theory, and—in the wake of Germany’s stunning collapse 
into totalitarianism in the 1930s—the seeming powers of propaganda and 
ideology to influence the human mind.13
Not long before Lowell’s invitation arrived, it appears, Kuhn found 
a kindred intellectual spirit in the Polish physician Ludwik Fleck. Fleck’s 
book Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftliche Tatsache of 1935, 
later translated and published as Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, 
confirmed and encouraged Kuhn’s theorizing about the social, psychological, 
and ideological dimensions of scientific thought and method.14 Fleck agreed 
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that science functioned as it did not because its beliefs reflected objective 
truths of nature, but because they supported a sociological Denkstil, or style of 
thought, and a collective “harmony of illusions” among scientists.
One illustration of Fleck’s influence on Kuhn is the title he first chose for 
his lecture series. He wrote to Ralph Lowell, “The series might appropriately 
be titled ‘The Creation of Scientific Objects’”—a title that echoes Fleck’s and 
likewise subverts ideals of objectivity and realism by promising to uncover 
the creative origins of knowledge. Kuhn soon chose a different title, however: 
“The Quest for Physical Theory: Problems in the Methodology of Scientific 
Research.”15 If this title suggests a more traditional image of research as 
discovery—as opposed to creation—of knowledge, Kuhn made it clear in his 
first lecture that this was not his intention. The objects studied by modern 
science, the facts we learn about them, and the laws that govern them are not 
passively discovered but creatively forged in the course of fruitful research.
A foundation on which Kuhn rested this insight was a notion he had 
embraced at least since his undergraduate days: the “infinite” complexity of 
experience from which our knowledge is forged.16 In his lectures, he invokes 
William James’s memorable description of infant experience as a “bloomin, 
buzzin, confusion” to argue that science becomes possible only when this 
original chaos of experience is reduced and simplified; when those parts that 
seem important, interesting, or puzzling from within some framework or 
conceptual scheme are selected and attended to—while the rest of experience 
is ignored. Readers familiar with Structure may identify these frameworks 
with Kuhn’s paradigms. But in 1951 Kuhn had not yet formulated his theory 
of paradigms. The word appears a few times, but only in its traditional 
pedagogic sense—not to explain the foundations of science and the structure 
of its historical development.17
Instead of paradigms, The Quest for Physical Theory appeals to an array 
of theoretical devices or constructs that serve to reduce and focus experi-
ence. Over the course of his eight lectures, Kuhn calls them “preconceptions,” 
“prejudices,” “theories,” “points of view,” “orientations,” “metaphors,” “mean-
ing systems,” “mental frameworks,” and “behavioral worlds.” They drive sci-
ence forward by shaping how scientists think and reason, how they perceive 
nature and events, and by organizing and reducing the welter of experience to 
help ensure that scientists are not distracted from their research by novelties.
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If all of this seemed unfamiliar to Kuhn’s audience, he reassured them 
that the ways of science are indeed quite different from what they may have 
learned in school or from popular books. As Conant had in his book On 
Understanding Science, he singled out Karl Pearson’s The Grammar of Science, 
of 1892, for its portrayal of scientists as unbiased, self-effacing recorders 
of natural phenomena. This is misleading, Kuhn explained, because it is 
impossible:
I should like to suggest that the impartial, dispassionate 
observation of nature is impossible, that there are no “pure 
facts” from which alone valid theories can be derived, and 
that the effort toward “self elimination” which Pearson pro-
poses as the scientist’s goal, would, in practice, result in the 
abolition of productive research. (Lecture I)
In fact, Kuhn explained later, research is deeply subjective and personal. 
So much so, the methodology of science is circular and self-reinforcing as 
empirical evidence and the theoretical conclusions it supports remain merged 
within these all-important “orientations” or “points of view”:
This suggests that scientific research is inherently circular, 
that it does not proceed from experimental facts to theories, 
but that facts and theories are provided together, in a more 
or less inchoate form, by scientific orientations. (Lecture V) 
Research that unfolds within the confines of a particular “orientation,” Kuhn 
explained, is “textbook science,” which constitutes a settled body of knowledge. 
This is very different from “creative science” in which these orientations 
themselves are realized and refined. Even talented scientists, Kuhn believed, 
are ill equipped to investigate and understand creative science because it is 
driven by complex, historical processes typically overlooked by textbooks. 
Only the methodologist, equipped with the tools of logic, philosophy, history, 
and psychology can discern and disentangle the factors in play.
Kuhn dedicated his first lecture to this basic distinction between textbook 
and creative science. The distinction anticipates Structure’s opening remarks 
about “the textbooks from which each new scientific generation learns to 
practice its trade” and the “decisive transformation” in store for those willing 
to consider history and the creative, sociological dynamics of research.18 In 
Structure, this distinction would become fundamental to important differ-
ences between “normal” and “revolutionary” research and the historical cycle 
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through which “normal science” is beset by “anomalies,” reaches a “crisis,” and 
is finally transformed by a new, different paradigm and accordingly rewritten 
textbooks. In Quest, Kuhn outlines a similar historical process using largely 
different terms. It is not “normal science” but instead “the classical period of a 
scientific orientation” that remains stable and well represented by textbooks. 
Then difficulties emerge that lead to a “crisis stage” and finally a revolution 
through which “some alternate orientation” resolves the issues at hand. While 
textbooks will simplify these complexities and present them as increasing 
“the stock of scientific knowledge,” scientists living through these transitions 
observe a different kind of process, for “a scientific revolution is always very 
nearly as destructive as it is constructive” (Lecture V).
To cover this material in eight one-hour lectures, Kuhn divided his lecture 
series roughly in half. The first part presents historical episodes in science that 
Kuhn had been teaching in the general education program and some of which 
would later appear in Structure. These include the history of dynamics (“The 
Foundations of Dynamics,” Lecture II), atomism (“The Prevalence of Atoms,” 
Lecture III), and theories of subtle fluids (“‘The Principle of Plenitude’: Subtle 
Fluids and Physical Fields,” Lecture IV). Inspired by his revelation from 
Aristotle, these treatments emphasize that antique theories as well as those 
more recently discarded, such as phlogiston chemistry, have more integrity 
and value than contemporary “textbook science” would suggest.
In the last four lectures, beginning with “Evidence and Explanation” 
(Lecture V), Kuhn turns to philosophy, psychology, and linguistics to explore 
the complex, “circular” process by which scientific objects and laws emerge 
from the primitive “flux” of human experience. He devotes “Coherence and 
Scientific Vision” (Lecture VI) to the psychology of perception, and “The 
Role of Formalism” (Lecture VII) to logic and his criticisms of formal, logical 
approaches to understanding science. Here Kuhn introduces a critique of 
formalist philosophy of science that he concludes in the final lecture, “Canons 
of Constructive Research” (Lecture VIII).
The Significance of the Lectures Today
Kuhn’s determination to identify and untangle the hidden sources of scientists’ 
ideas, perspectives, and creativity naturally invites questions about the sources 
of his own ideas, especially those in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
that widely influenced postwar intellectual life. Besides his momentous en-
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counters with Aristotle and Ludwik Fleck, the lectures amply document 
Kuhn’s familiarity with the writings of other historians and philosophers. 
Lecture V, for example, shows Kuhn adapting Kantian epistemology to his 
methodological picture of science. Other philosophical influences at work 
include Kuhn’s colleague Philipp Frank, an original member of the Vienna 
Circle of philosophers who also worked within Conant’s general education 
program and shared Kuhn’s interest in the sociology of science,19 and the 
philosopher W.V.O. Quine, whom Kuhn knew in the Society of Fellows. 
Quine’s critique of philosophical formalism in his classic essays “On What 
There Is” and “Truth By Convention” can be heard clearly in Kuhn’s dis-
cussions of “meaning systems” and the roles they play in research. Quine’s 
soon-to-be-famous essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” which Kuhn may 
have read before its publication in 1951, has at least two points of contact with 
Kuhn’s lectures: Quine’s own emphasis on the “flux” and “barrage of sensory 
experience” and Kuhn’s remark in Lecture V that “science is an interlocking 
fabric.”20 
In history of science, Kuhn’s lectures illustrate the style, and in some 
cases the content, of the case studies that Conant and others in the general 
education program were then developing and teaching, initially on the basis of 
Conant’s book On Understanding Science.21 Kuhn’s view that research is driven 
largely by scientists’ ideas illustrates his debts to the “conceptual schemes” that 
Conant regularly emphasized in his writings, to Annaliese Maier’s studies of 
medieval theories of motion, and to Alexandre Koyré’s studies of Galileo.22 
Kuhn’s life-long interest in psychology complemented this view of science’s 
history. In Lecture VI, he discusses the Swiss developmental psychologist 
Jean Piaget, whose research focused Kuhn’s attention on how children sort 
and compare conflicting descriptions and conceptions of natural events.23 
He also discusses experiments documenting the plasticity and theory-laden 
qualities of perception (such as those of his Harvard colleagues Jerome Bruner 
and Leo Postman) that Kuhn would return to in Structure as evidence for the 
power and priority of paradigms in guiding research.
The lectures also indicate Kuhn’s early interest in semantics, manifest as 
much in his scholarly reading of Quine and Bertrand Russell as in popular 
authors like Stuart Chase, author of The Tyranny of Words, and Benjamin 
Lee Whorf, whose writings on Hopi linguistic categories Kuhn borrowed 
in Lecture VII to argue that language influences scientists’ perceptions.24 
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It is sometimes remarked that in the wake of Structure Kuhn’s thinking 
took a “linguistic turn” toward semantics and away from the sociological 
and psychological themes within Structure. In light of Quest, however, this 
development appears more as a linguistic return to early theorizing about the 
semantics of “meaning systems” that Kuhn debuted here.25 
Debates about Kuhn’s and Structure’s significance for twentieth-century 
philosophy also stand to be informed. Kuhn’s historic encounter with 
Karl Popper and his followers in 1965 at the colloquium on philosophy of 
science at Bedford College, for example, remains itself a paradigm in Kuhn 
scholarship.26 The title of Kuhn’s anti-Popperian lecture at that event, “The 
Logic of Discovery or the Psychology of Research?” suggests a relatively 
narrow, even tentative, interest in the psychology of science. Yet the Thomas 
Kuhn that spoke at the Boston Public Library more than a decade before 
offered a panorama of considerations that offers a broader, if not stronger, 
argument against Popperianism: Popper ignores not only the psychology but 
also the semantics, logic, education, and anthropology of modern science—
simply too much for the responsible methodologist to sacrifice for the alluring 
logical simplicity of Popper’s falsificationism.
As for logical empiricism, among the most important philosophical 
movements in the United States after the war, it is often remarked that 
Structure’s first sentence—“History, if viewed as more than a repository 
for anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the 
image of science by which we are now possessed”27—was directed at logical 
empiricism’s image of theories as logical structures and of scientific research 
as applications of logic. On this reading, Kuhn made his case Trojan-horse 
style, from within the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, a project 
conceived and established by the Viennese economist and philosopher 
Otto Neurath and designed to articulate and promote logical empiricism 
widely throughout science, the academy, and modern life. After his death 
in 1945, Neurath left the encyclopedia to his coeditors Rudolf Carnap, who 
like Neurath had belonged to the Vienna Circle, and Charles Morris, the 
pragmatist philosopher who recruited Kuhn to contribute to the encyclopedia 
in the early 1950s.
Kuhn indeed saw himself as a philosophical revolutionary. He explained to 
Conant on the eve of Structure’s publication that his account of perception (in 
Structure’s chapters 6 and 10) attacked the notion that scientific observation is 
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“passive” (a notion that appears here in Lecture VI when Kuhn compares “the 
individual perceiver” to “a camera combined with a responder”). “If that no-
tion can be licked,” Kuhn explained to Conant, “the rest of the structure falls” 
and philosophy since Descartes faces revolutionary transformation. Structure 
also called for reform in semantics by denying the possibility of theory- or 
paradigm-independent observation languages (such as those taken to ground 
the unity of the sciences); in metaphysics by insisting that the world itself 
changes—at least in some vague but undeniable sense—when paradigms 
shift; and in historiography by subverting “positivist,” accumulationist as-
sumptions that newer theories absorb and preserve the fruitful insights of 
their predecessors. To those irked by Structure’s appeals to “faith” and “con-
version experiences,” Kuhn seemed to argue not only that philosophical anal-
yses had so far failed to understand science, but that scientific revolutions are 
not explicable through philosophy at all.28
In other respects, however, the Trojan legend is misleading. For Kuhn 
later acknowledged that he did not understand logical empiricism well in the 
early 1950s, especially the mature, pragmatically inflected views of Carnap 
which, it was later pointed out, are not wholly different from those Kuhn 
presented in Structure. While scholars in the 1990s debated and retheorized 
Kuhn’s relationship to logical empiricism, Kuhn himself felt a sense of tragic 
regret. For when Carnap approved Structure for inclusion in the International 
Encyclopedia and wrote to Kuhn to express his admiration for the book and 
the issues it raises, Kuhn chalked it up to expediency and politeness. Only in 
retrospect, Kuhn realized, Carnap’s letter signaled that they shared substan-
tive philosophical interests; that, as Kuhn put it, “he and I might usefully 
talk.” Prior to Carnap’s death in 1970, they could have discussed these inter-
ests, but never did.29
The Quest for Physical Theory adds to this story of missed connections and 
misunderstandings. Perhaps most striking is Kuhn’s suggestion that logical 
empiricism—represented by the philosophical “formalism” he criticizes in 
Lectures VII and VIII—aimed not just to understand science with philo-
sophical tools, but to formalize the natural, everyday language used in labo-
ratories, research papers, textbooks, and even public, nonscientific discourse. 
As Kuhn put it,
The program for the formalization of scientific language 
calls for the application of this technique to other portions 
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of science and to the language of scientific communication. 
And scientific language is for this purpose taken to be the 
entire language in which we discuss our perceptions. In ev-
eryday terms, it is the language in which we discuss facts or 
events or the relations between events. It is a language used 
not only by the scientist but, more loosely, by the layman. 
And it is this language which we are now asked to formal-
ize. (Lecture VII)
Kuhn evidently believed that logical empiricism aimed to replace natural 
language with formalized language. On this basis, he argued that this 
formalistic crusade would effectively halt scientific progress. For it is the 
ambiguity and complexity of natural language—manifest in what he calls 
“meaning fringes” around terms—that allows science to change and evolve. 
He explained, 
We do leave vague meaning fringes on scientific terms, 
and our research is always conducted within the area de-
termined by these vaguer fringes. It is in these areas alone 
that questions can arise as to established theories. . . . It is 
only in the area provided by meaning fringes that scientific 
questions can arise and that scientific exploration can oc-
cur. (Lecture VIII)
The vagueness and ambiguity of language that formalists (allegedly) aimed 
to eradicate, in other words, is itself a necessary precondition for fruitful 
research and scientific progress.
In early publications (such as the Vienna Circle’s philosophical manifesto 
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung), logical empiricists did issue bold, revolution-
ary claims about philosophy’s power to unify the sciences and to reform and 
reinvigorate culture and modern life. Linguistic reforms were a part of this 
crusade. Carnap’s essay “The Elimination of Metaphysics through the Logi-
cal Analysis of Language” and Otto Neurath’s proposal to create an index 
verborum prohibitorum—a list of prohibited words—targeted specific instanc-
es of misleading, unscientific language. But neither called for the elimina-
tion of natural language and its replacement by logically precise alternatives 
because logical empiricists understood that natural language is an essential 
foundation on which scientific knowledge grows. Carnap called it the “thing 
language” in which higher-level observations or theories can be tested and 
confirmed. Neurath frequently emphasized that our “universal jargon” or “ev-
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eryday language” facilitates the fruitful collaboration of scientists in differ-
ent fields, even from different national cultures, in ways that substantiate the 
unity of the sciences. In this sense Neurath could speak of his International 
Encyclopedia becoming “a living intellectual force growing out of a living need 
of men, and so in turn serving humanity.”30
Neurath also championed the vagueness, ambiguity, and complexity of 
scientific language. Science begins, he wrote in the encyclopedia, with what 
Germans and French might call a linguistic Ballung or grégat—“a full lump 
of irregularities and indistinctness, as our daily speech offers it.” Logical 
empiricism’s task was not to ignore or replace this indistinctness through 
formalization, but instead to exploit the resulting opportunities for advancing 
and unifying scientific knowledge. “Empiricists cannot refrain from using 
faint and blurred expressions with rather vague outlines,”31 Neurath wrote in 
1944—seven years before Kuhn lectured on “meaning fringes.”
Whether or not Kuhn was familiar with these writings, he was familiar 
with two monographs in Neurath’s encyclopedia, one by the American 
linguist Leonard Bloomfield and another by the British biologist Joseph 
Woodger, both of which Kuhn had read by the late 1940s.32 Bloomfield and 
Woodger unmistakably exalted the power of formal, logical analysis to clarify 
theories and concepts and to diagnose misunderstandings and disagreements 
occasioned by the vagaries of language. But neither aimed to replace ordinary 
language.33 How then did Kuhn come to believe that logical empiricism 
aimed to formalize the natural language of science and everyday life? One 
possibility is that he conflated logical empiricism with the general semantics 
movement and popular books that he mentions in his last lecture, some of 
which did prescribe sweeping changes in everyday habits of speech.34 
Regardless of how Kuhn formulated his argument, it echoed a continu-
ing tradition of philosophical criticism directed at logical empiricism and its 
defenders. The movement had contended with similar claims since the 1930s 
when some of its leading figures arrived in the United States as intellectual 
émigrés and some American philosophers became suspicious. This philosoph-
ical import, complete with the socialist Neurath’s new International Encyclo-
pedia of Unified Science, seemed to have a totalitarian bent not unlike dialecti-
cal materialism, the official philosophy of Joseph Stalin’s oppressive Soviet 
Union, and its attendant Great Soviet Encyclopedia of knowledge. When John 
Dewey accepted Neurath’s invitation to contribute to his new encyclopedia, 
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for example, he did so from an oppositional, pluralistic stance. Any reductive 
“attempt to secure unity by defining the terms of all the sciences in terms of 
some one science,” he wrote, “is doomed in advance to defeat. In the house 
which science might build there are many mansions.” In 1939, speaking on 
the eve of Hitler’s march into Poland, William James’s student Horace Kallen 
was sure that Neurath and his fellow editors at the new encyclopedia of sci-
ence would cultivate theoretical unity not in any democratic way; they would 
“impose it by force majeure.”35 
After the war, as American scientists and intellectuals debated govern-
ment’s proper roles in funding and organizing postwar research, Neur-
ath’s cousin and champion, the New York Times science writer Waldemar 
Kaempffert, argued that experts in science should plan and guide national re-
search projects for the public good. Earlier, Kaempffert had praised Neurath’s 
new encyclopedia as a forum for scientific coordination of this sort; and he 
now argued that the Manhattan Project itself illustrated what modern science 
can accomplish quickly and effectively when it is properly funded and orga-
nized. Absolutely not, Conant and other scientific leaders replied as they at-
tacked Kaempffert and lobbied Washington to adopt the hands-off approach 
to research that ultimately won the day. Top-down guidance of any kind, 
they argued, from would-be dictators or philosophical theories claiming to 
facilitate or advance research, would condemn science to failure.36 
That The Quest for Physical Theory culminates in lectures VII and VIII 
with Kuhn’s own warnings that logical empiricism would harm research 
suggests the extent to which Conant and this postwar debate about scientific 
method weighed on his early theorizing. It also points to what is perhaps the 
broadest significance Kuhn’s lectures have today for the history of philosophy. 
Alongside their relevance for understanding Structure, in particular, they 
offer new documentation of this formative midcentury encounter between 
American and European philosophy of science. Along with memoires and 
essays from young Americans (such as Morris and Quine) who travelled 
to Europe to learn and report about exciting new trends, and along with 
institutions such as Neurath’s encyclopedia at the University of Chicago 
Press and Philipp Frank’s Institute for the Unity of Science in Boston, Kuhn’s 
lectures illustrate the dynamic, exciting contrasts and affinities between 
American pragmatism, logical empiricism, and other programs that swirled 
around the future author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Conant 
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himself confessed to something like philosophical intoxication in this cli-
mate when he described his sensibilities as a “mixture of William James’s 
Pragmatism and the logical empiricism of the Vienna circle, with at least two 
jiggers of pure skepticism.”37 We ought not be surprised, therefore, to find 
confusions as well as revealing points of contact in Kuhn’s early theorizing 
with these two philosophical traditions.
On the pragmatic side of this encounter, The Quest for Physical Theory 
shows the young Thomas Kuhn taking for granted Dewey’s view that knowl-
edge is the fruit of social and individual problem solving, rooted ultimately in 
the exigencies of social and political life (Dewey’s Reconstruction in Philoso-
phy is listed as “read in toto” in Kuhn’s 1949 reading list). Kuhn would later 
distance himself from Dewey’s socially engaged view of inquiry, however. 
Though problem solving is central to Structure’s account of normal science, 
the problems Kuhn had in mind are esoteric, internal to professional sci-
entific communities, and isolated from political, social, and cultural pres-
sures. The influence of William James, on the other hand, arguably grew as 
Kuhn’s theorizing developed from Quest to Structure. In both projects, Kuhn 
invokes James’s insights about the “bloomin, buzzin confusion” of original, 
unorganized experience. But in Structure Kuhn would elaborate a theory of 
scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts as personal conversion experiences 
that points as much to Kuhn’s epiphany when reading Aristotle as to James’s 
The Varieties of Religious Experience—a study in the personally transformative 
power of ideas, faith, and commitment that Kuhn read in 1943 and praised in 
his notes as “A fine & truly beautiful book.”38
Why Didn’t Kuhn Publish The Quest for Physical Theory?
The Quest for Physical Theory remained unpublished for a number of likely rea-
sons. One is that Kuhn was unhappy with the lectures and later characterized 
them as “not very good.”39 It is not difficult to see their shortcomings. Besides 
some recklessly provocative and exaggerated claims, such as his remark that 
research is “inherently circular,” and dubious readings of historical episodes in 
science,40 the lectures seem poorly matched to their general audience. Those 
who attended were most likely not professional historians or philosophers but 
educated citizens of Boston. In the 1930s, at least, these audiences included a 
reliable coterie of “loyal listeners who attend out of habit, and most of whom 
were elderly spinsters.”41 If the lecturers who preceded Kuhn in the 1950-
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51 season are an indication—Charles F.O. Clarke of the British Broadcast-
ing Corporation, Langdon Warner, the Curator of Oriental Art at the Fogg 
Museum, the CIA official Cord Meyer Jr., and the Harvard botanist Karl 
Sax—Kuhn’s audience probably assumed that The Quest for Physical Theory 
would address contemporary developments in physics, much as these lectur-
ers had addressed contemporary culture and postwar geopolitics. The Lowell 
Institute’s advance publicity likewise suggested that Kuhn would discuss “the 
problems of research today.”42
Kuhn made it clear in his first lecture that this was not his goal. Among 
other reasons, he explained, the field of methodology is not well-suited to 
exploring contemporary science and technology. Still, this disclaimer is 
unlikely to have prepared loyal listeners of any age for Kuhn’s detailed 
historical surveys and his brisk excursions into epistemology, metaphysics, 
logic, semantics, and psychology.
At times, to be sure, Kuhn’s presentation sparkles, such as when he 
describes an ordinary (albeit unnerving) experience to motivate a discussion 
of epistemology and perceptual psychology: 
All of you have at one time or another awakened from a 
dream to discover a strange, threatening figure crouch-
ing in the corner of the room. Yet another look convinced 
you that the threatening figure was really the familiar easy 
chair with a quilt piled on it. Then the figure lost its threat 
and you laughed at having been fooled. But were you really 
fooled? (Lecture VI)
Just as often, however, Kuhn turns to scholarly texts, obscure historical fig-
ures, or physical phenomena with little or no introduction.43 Given his expe-
rience teaching science to nonscientists, it is perhaps surprising that Kuhn 
did not more effectively match his lectures to his audience’s expectations and 
background knowledge. He rarely and briefly circles back from the esoteric 
discussions in his later lectures to his comparably lucid and engaging intro-
duction and historical surveys; and he concludes his final lecture without of-
fering a helpful summation or condensed thesis suitable for a public audience. 
While readers today can readily glimpse the outlines of Structure in his final 
paragraphs, Kuhn left his audience with abstract and tentative remarks about 
language, experience, perceptions, and scientific research. That these rela-
tionships seemed shifting and fluid, he noted, “is the source of the difficulty 
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which we have encountered again and again during the course of these lec-
tures.”
Looking back at the lectures in the 1980s or ’90s, Kuhn may also have 
seen them as culturally anachronistic and ill-suited for publication. While 
judicious editing might have readily transformed scientists and researchers 
from “men” into “women and men,” the lectures are in other ways bound to 
the early 1950s. In this world, racial stereotypes such as, “to a Caucasian, 
most Chinese look alike”—an observation that Kuhn discusses in some detail 
in Lecture VI—were as uncontroversial as the assumption that professional 
scientists are uniformly male.
In a personal sense, Kuhn wrote and delivered the lectures during difficult 
times. He described himself in retrospect as “clearly a neurotic, insecure 
young man” who suffered from tremendous anxieties. Would he succeed in 
pioneering this new field of methodological research he described? Would he 
establish himself as a tenured professor at Harvard, as he hoped? “I was one of 
those people who was at least in real danger of breaking up because Harvard 
didn’t want them there,” he recalled apropos of his eventual failure to gain 
tenure and his move to the University of California at Berkeley in 1956. Kuhn 
wrote The Quest for Physical Theory during these years and later recalled, “I had 
a dreadful time preparing it, and I nearly cracked up.”44
The personal anxieties Kuhn associated with the lectures may well have 
been connected to the politics of the McCarthy era, as well. At a time when 
“a subtle, creeping paralysis of freedom of thought and speech is attacking 
college campuses in many parts of the country,” the New York Times report-
ed, scholars increasingly avoided controversial political issues, controversial 
words and concepts (including “liberal,” “peace,” and “freedom”), and were 
prone to “an unusual amount of seriocomic joking about this or that official 
investigating committee ‘getting you’.”45 
Kuhn seemed familiar with these worries. Weeks before his lectures com-
menced, for example, he was deeply upset by the Lowell Institute’s publicity 
suggesting that his lectures would address contemporary science. Their fly-
ers and advertisements not only failed to convey the historical dimensions of 
Kuhn’s project—they positioned Kuhn as an authority on planned, socially 
beneficial research (it is modern science, one flyer implied, on which”the fate 
of mankind may depend”). Advocates of planned research were a generally 
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Marxist tribe that Senator Joseph McCarthy and other anticommunists were 
indeed out to get.
Kuhn disavowed this advanced publicity in his introductory lecture. But 
political anxieties resurface in his fifth lecture when Kuhn briefly alludes to 
the Marxist notion that changes in science may sometimes “proceed from 
changes in economic structure which alter scientific motivation.” He then 
jokes, “Attention Senator McCarthy.” At some point, however, Kuhn drew 
a line through these three words in his typescript. He did not shy away from 
contemporary politics entirely, for McCarthyism comes up a third time in 
his final lecture on semantics (to illustrate the potential for “grave injury” of 
loose, misused words). But he evidently decided against making this public 
joke about the then-infamous senator from Wisconsin.46
In terms of Kuhn’s scholarly career, however, the most likely reason he 
did not publish The Quest for Physical Theory lay not in the 1950s but the 1960s 
with the enormous, tumultuous reception of Structure. As he noted in his 
introductory lecture, The Quest for Physical Theory was a work in progress, 
a reflection of “a continuing research program,” and not “a report on the 
outcome of a completed study.” This tentative posture affected the quality and 
consistency of the lectures, especially when Kuhn reorganizes his presentation 
midstream, seems unsure of what to conclude from certain considerations, 
or revises his terminology. This is perhaps what Kuhn meant when he later 
characterized the lectures as “not very good.” But it also places them in the 
shadow of Structure as an immature text. As he later remarked, The Quest 
for Physical Theory can be understood as a preliminary attempt to write The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.47  
The two works are similar enough for Kuhn to have reasonably expected 
that Quest ’s publication would reignite the contentious debates and criticisms 
that engulfed Structure—about what “paradigm” really means, about the very 
rationality of science, and the reality (or not) of scientific progress. Kuhn 
found these debates confused and frustrating. As suggested by his repudiation 
of the term “paradigm” at the end of the 1960s, and his scant use of Structure’s 
terminology in his subsequent book on the history of quantum theory, Kuhn 
wished to avoid these debates.48
For contemporary readers and scholars, however, Quest and its differences 
from Structure shed valuable light on Kuhn’s theorizing and his intellectual 
debts to Conant and others. Compared to Structure, for instance, the lectures 
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adopt a less sociological, more individualistic view of scientists, of the “orien-
tations” or “behavioral worlds” in which they live, and how these psychologi-
cal dispensations function to guide and shape research. The “classical period” 
in which these individuals conduct their research is also less restrictive than 
Structure’s “normal science,” in which shared educations, paradigms, and so-
ciological codes conform individuals to their professional community and its 
dogmas.49 This dogmatism lays necessary groundwork for Structure’s theory 
of revolutions as paradigm shifts and for its related claims about incommen-
surability and progress. But dogma and revolution are less conspicuous in 
Quest with its more continuous—and Conantian—picture of science that 
“moves ahead” from one conceptual scheme to another.
 To adapt Kuhn’s introductory distinction between creative and textbook 
science, The Quest for Physical Theory opens a window onto the creative back-
ground to Structure, before it became a classic text for the historical study 
as well as the popular understanding of science. Where Structure initially 
promised “a decisive transformation” in our understanding of science and its 
history, The Quest for Physical Theory may at least broaden, if not transform, our 
understanding of Kuhn and his celebrated theories of science. It illuminates 
the contexts, goals, anxieties, and historical accidents that shaped his ideas 
and may suggest new questions about how and why Kuhn’s ideas took hold 
of the scholarly and popular imagination—successfully and enduringly in the 
pages of Structure, but less so in the Boston Public Library in the winter of 
1951.
 •
The lectures are held in Kuhn’s archived papers at the MIT Libraries Depart-
ment of Distinctive Collections (collection MC-0240). Their multiple pagi-
nations in Kuhn’s hand suggests that after typing a first draft of each lecture, 
he edited and retyped individual sections, sometimes repeatedly. He addi-
tionally annotated these typed pages by hand, sometimes deleting or add-
ing words, sentences, or paragraphs. He bracketed portions of text, some of 
which he marked as optional or to be omitted if his time were running short. 
In cases where the surviving pages include multiple rewrites, I have preserved 
those revisions that appear to be final, as well as all bracketed sections. Ex-
ceptions, such as when preliminary choices of words or phrasings seem to 
be of potential interest, are pointed out in footnotes. Kuhn’s original pages 
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include short parenthetical references, such as “(Pearson 9)” that appear in 
his main text. I have removed these from the main text and placed them in 
quotation marks at the head of the editorial notes which appear at the end of 
each lecture.
Though Kuhn’s typed pages contain no graphical elements, it is clear from 
his text that he frequently directed himself to a blackboard to elaborate or il-
lustrate points for his audience. On several of these occasions I have inserted 
tables, figures, or diagrams to illustrate the relevant parts of Kuhn’s discus-
sion.
I have found no additional recordings, reports, or reviews of the lectures 
that indicate whether Kuhn read from these pages or improvised on their 
basis. With one exception, discussed below, he prepared them and referred to 
them as “scripts” that could have been read to his audiences word for word, 
complete with asides and even occasional jokes.50 If and until additional in-
formation emerges about what Kuhn did or did not say during each lecture, 
the lectures presented here can at least be trusted as authentic documents of 
his research, his theorizing, and how he envisioned presenting them to his 
audience.
The exception is the third lecture, “The Prevalence of Atoms,” which exists 
only in the form of a typed outline. Although there exists a rough outline for 
the entire series of lectures, none of the other lectures exists in outline form in 
Kuhn’s files. This suggests that he adopted a different approach to preparing 
and delivering this particular lecture. Instead of a readable script, it appears, 
this outline would guide a more extemporaneous, casual, and improvisational 
lecture. This interpretation is supported by hand-written notes on the outline, 
similar to those on his fully prepared scripts, such as “Omit if past 20 min.” or 
“read” next to important sections to be read verbatim to his audience. It is also 
supported by Kuhn’s memories of his “dreadful time” preparing the lectures. 
Speaking more generally about his teaching in the late 1940s and early ’50s, 
he contrasted two methods: he would “ just go in with rough notes—knowing 
[that] I knew the stuff—and start talking,” or he would prepare lectures 
thoroughly. Ironically, he recalled, when taking this careful approach Kuhn 
found himself “spending too much time preparing, getting very nervous in 
advance.”51 The unique form of the third lecture suggests that Kuhn vacillated 
between these two methods for his Lowell lectures, as well. After preparing 
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scripts for the first two, he resolved to be more improvisational for the third 
but reverted to his original method for the remaining five.
Fortunately, Kuhn’s outline for “The Prevalence of Atoms” contains an 
abundance of detailed information that I have elaborated and expanded into 
a readable script. This version preserves the many complete sentences and 
phrases in Kuhn’s outline and expands more telegraphic points and asides 
into complete sentences and paragraphs. For readers interested in the outline 
itself, it is reproduced here as an appendix.52
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Science and Creative Science
Mr. Lowell, Professor Lawrence, ladies and gentlemen: good evening.1 Before turning to this evening’s topic let me take a moment to express 
my appreciation of the Lowell Institute’s gratifying invitation to participate 
in this famous lecture series. My pleasure in accepting Mr. Lowell’s kind offer 
is made the greater by my consciousness of the intellectual debt I share with 
many of my contemporaries to the eminent scholars who have preceded me 
on this platform. The tradition which they have established I cannot hope to 
emulate; but perhaps I may repay a small portion of my indebtedness. With 
that objective let me proceed to my topic.
Shortly before the beginning of this century, the British statistician and 
philosopher of science Karl Pearson provided a classic statement of a point of 
view which is implicit today in much that is said and written about the nature 
of science and of scientific knowledge. Briefly stated, Pearson’s position was 
that the validity and utility of scientific knowledge derives not from its subject 
matter, but from the universal method employed in gaining it. And the basis 
of this method, from which both its power and its universality proceeded, lay 
for Pearson in the dispassionate observation and classification of the objective 
facts of the natural world. “The scientific man,” he said,
has above all things to strive at self-elimination in his judg-
ments, to provide an argument which is as true for each 
individual mind as it is for his own. The classification of 
facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative signifi-
cance is the function of science, and the habit of forming a 
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judgement upon these facts, unbiased by personal feelings, 
is characteristic of what may be termed the scientific frame 
of mind.2
For Pearson, the scientist was “the man who has accustomed himself to mar-
shal fact, to examine their complex mutual relations and predict upon the 
result of the examination their inevitable sequences . . . which we term natural 
laws . . . .” “Such a man,” he said, “. . . will scarcely be content with merely 
superficial statement, with vague appeal to the imagination, to the emotions, 
to individual prejudice; he will demand a high standard of reasoning, [and] a 
clear insight into facts and their results.3
This description of the scientist as a man who collects and classifies facts 
so that he may proceed to the prediction of inevitable sequences did not origi-
nate with Karl Pearson or in our own century. On the contrary, it is as old as 
modern science itself. One need only remember Francis Bacon’s proclamation 
of the New Method at the beginning of the seventeenth century: 
The true method of experience [. . .] first lights the candle 
and then by means of the candle shows the way, commenc-
ing as it does with experience duly ordered and digested 
[. . .] and from it deducing axioms, and from established 
axioms again new experiments, even as it was not without 
order and method that the divine word operated on the cre-
ated man.4
Similar sentiments have been expressed repeatedly since Bacon’s time, 
both by scientists themselves and by those philosophers, from John Locke to 
John Stuart Mill, who have felt impelled to account for the progress of scien-
tific knowledge. Pearson’s statement was simply the clearest and his claim of 
universality the most ambitious, so that, however much one dissents from the 
detail with which he develops and documents his thesis, one must recognize 
in it an expression of the essence of the empiricist methodological tradition 
which has dominated the discussion of science since Bacon’s day.
Twentieth-century methodology has achieved a subtlety of analysis nei-
ther dreamed of by Bacon nor realized by Pearson. But the basic premise of 
empiricism, that the scientist, or at least the ideal scientist, proceeds from ob-
jective experimental facts or meter readings to the unique laws which govern 
them, still underlies the most sophisticated methodological discussion. And 
this same conception of the godlike objectivity of science infects our very 
language. To be scientific in an argument or an analysis is to be something 
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worthy of praise; nothing annoys us more to be told that our pet theory is 
“unscientific,” for this we take to mean biased or based on personal prejudice. 
Even though our contemporary disillusionment has deprived us of our image 
of the scientist as a messiah, we preserve our symbol of the scientist as the 
man in the highly starched, gleaming white coat who, in the laboratory as 
in the dentifrice ad, abandons all prejudice so that he may proceed first to a 
dispassionate analysis of all the facts and then to the formulation of the im-
mutable law which governs them.5
Now I think that this picture of the scientist, and the correlated descrip-
tion of the method by which the scientist reaches his conclusions, is alto-
gether wrong. In saying this, I do not mean simply to point out that of course 
scientists are human and that since “to err is human,” they can seldom mea-
sure up to the rigid standards set by their methodological canons. Such indi-
vidual human failures are of course both inevitable and trivial. Their existence 
cannot detract from Pearson’s description, if that description is taken to be 
an ideal toward which the individual scientist must strive if he is to succeed 
in his research.
I mean rather to deny even the normative validity of Pearson’s canons. 
And, as an alternative, I should like to suggest that the impartial, dispassion-
ate observation of nature is impossible, that there are no “pure facts” from 
which alone valid theories can be derived, and that the effort toward “self 
elimination” which Pearson proposes as the scientist’s goal would, in prac-
tice, result in the abolition of productive research. In short, I believe that the 
elements which, on Pearson’s description, can only be called prejudice and 
preconception are inextricably woven into the pattern of scientific research, 
and that any attempt to eliminate them would inevitably deprive research of 
its fruitfulness.
Much of this lecture and of the seven which are to follow will be devoted 
to a description of the evidence which has led me to so radical a conclusion, 
but I hope that these lectures may also serve a more constructive function. For 
I was trained as a physicist; I have done research; and I am committed to the 
belief that scientific knowledge is good knowledge, that it is useful knowl-
edge, and above all that it is cumulative knowledge. I believe that the work 
of scientists has resulted in an increasingly detailed and an increasingly far-
reaching understanding of the operations of nature, and that this progress can 
be objectively described so that a seventeenth-, eighteenth-, or nineteenth-
4 The Quest for Physical Theory
century scientist would, without reluctance, admit that science had proceeded 
a long way since his own day.
Therefore, in denying the possibility and the desirability of dispassionate 
neutrality on the part of the individual scientist, I do not at all mean to deny 
an objective sort of validity to the products of the scientific profession, and 
it will therefore be a second and more basic task of these lectures to provide 
an alternative description of the method employed by the scientist, and to 
show how science conceived as a body of cumulative knowledge can proceed 
from this alternate description. In the broadest and most fundamental sense, 
the objective of these lectures is then to provide a preliminary description of 
scientific activity and to discover the relationship of this, the activity of the 
working scientist, to the products of his profession, to science as a body of 
human knowledge.
For this purpose I urge the utility of separating sharply in our minds two 
distinct meanings of the word “science.” In the first of these science is con-
ceived as an activity, as the thing which the scientist does. In its other mean-
ing science is knowledge, a body of laws and of techniques assembled in texts 
and transmitted from one scientific generation to another. These are the two 
meanings distinguished in the title of this evening’s lecture as Textbook Sci-
ence and Creative Science.6 And it is the search for the relation between these 
two which will constitute the primary objective of our study. To the extent 
that we are successful we may hope to learn something of the nature of sci-
entific knowledge.
* * *
If any of you happens to have followed closely the advance notices of this se-
ries of lectures, you may have remarked that the topic just described bears very 
little relation to one announced in some of the flyers prepared by the Lowell 
Institute’s copy writer. That topic was, I believe, described under a banner 
head reading: “What Are the Problems of Scientific Research Today?”7
I can scarcely imagine a more fascinating question; I should gladly at-
tend a series of lectures devoted to it. Except that I doubt whether any serious 
student of science or scientific method would consider himself equipped to 
address such a subject. Therefore, with apologies for any confusion that the 
misrepresentation may have created, I should like to announce that I do not 
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intend to deal with any of the problems raised by that question at any point 
in this series of lectures.
My own topic is quite ambitious enough, and the goal I have set is a very 
distant one. Actually the description with which I have thus far provided you 
is a description of a continuing research program of a rather unusual, though 
not unique, sort, and these lectures are intended to serve as an introduction, 
a Prolegomenon, to this new field of research rather than as a report on the 
outcome of a completed study. And even so the program is too broad, so I 
should like immediately to introduce two further restrictions of the subject 
matter with which I intend to deal.
In the first place, on the grounds of personal competence, I shall restrict 
my attention to that part of science generally described as physical, that is, to 
those sciences which deal with the workings of inanimate nature, particularly 
physics, chemistry, and astronomy. I should of course like to suppose that 
the remarks I will make apply equally well to other sciences. I should be less 
concerned with the field of study if I did not suspect that it had far reaching 
implications. But my own conclusions are drawn from a study of the physical 
sciences, and the judgment of their applicability to other fields must finally be 
left to the man working in those fields.
Second, even within the body of physical sciences, our attention will be 
directed toward only that portion of scientific research which eventuates in 
new conceptions about the material world. We shall be concerned with the 
sort of research the led to the Newtonian laws of motion, not with the manner 
in which these laws were applied in building new machines or instruments. 
We shall be concerned with the work of such men as Boyle and Dalton, in-
sofar as this led to a new understanding and a new set of laws governing the 
formation of chemical compounds, but we shall not be concerned with the 
manner in which these laws, once arrived at and confirmed, were applied to 
the production of dyes, explosives, or plastics. Of course the importance of 
science lies at least as much in its application as in the fundamental insights 
it provides into the workings of nature, but if we are to reach any conclusions 
our concern must be restricted, and I have chosen to direct your attention and 
mine to the conceptual rather than the tangible aspects of scientific progress.
Finally I should like to introduce at the very start a further and very im-
portant qualification of our subject matter, a qualification which concerns 
the extent to which we shall be dealing with the theories of contemporary 
6 The Quest for Physical Theory
science. The sorts of methodological conclusions I wish to draw are of pri-
mary significance only to the extent that they apply to contemporary physical 
science. Nevertheless, in drawing these conclusions and in supporting them, 
I shall make use of historical material drawn almost entirely from scientific 
developments before the twentieth century. I believe that the historical unity 
of science, or more accurately the historical unity of scientists, permits the 
picture of science which we shall derive in this matter to be applied without 
significant alteration to contemporary science, and I trust that before we are 
through you too will discover that this must be the case. Illustrative material 
drawn from contemporary science would undoubtedly provide more complete 
evidence, but there are two considerations which override my desire to com-
plete the case for you.
Modern physical science is a highly abstract and highly technical field 
relatively unfamiliar to most of you. To attempt to discover the manner in 
which scientists arrived at the conclusions contained in the theories of quan-
tum mechanics or relativity would require our first determining what these 
conclusions are, and since the historical or genetic approach is neither the 
clearest nor the briefest manner of presenting scientific conclusions, we would 
almost certainly lose our way.
But there is another far more significant reason for refraining from a 
close examination of contemporary science, a reason which is rooted in and 
which displays the nature of our objective. For we are concerned to explore 
the way by which scientific theories come into existence and to discern the 
relationships between particular mental and experimental processes and the 
finished conceptual schemes to which they give rise. This is particularly hard 
to achieve in dealing with the science in which we happen to believe. For the 
theory in which we believe is necessarily and uniquely characterized by the 
apparent inevitability of its relation to the facts from which it arose. Our be-
lief itself represents a commitment to the double position that only this theory 
will account for the facts which we know and that this theory will account 
for all the relevant facts. We may admit that in the future there will be other 
facts and other theories, but for the moment we cannot conceive these, so the 
appearance of the inevitable connection remains.
In dealing with older scientific theories we gain a great advantage. We are 
committed neither to these theories nor to the mode of thought which gave 
them birth, and so we may at least hope to find answers to such questions as: 
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“Why did this set of experimental findings lead to this theory, rather than to 
the alternate one we hold today?” or “Why didn’t this ‘fact’ appear relevant to 
a test of the validity of that theory?” It is in answering such questions that we 
shall trace the progress of the mind in its pursuit of scientific theories, and it is 
in this pursuit that whatever may properly be called scientific method is to be 
found. Accordingly, you will hear very little about twentieth-century physics 
during the course of these lectures.
This discussion leads us back to the point from which we started. For I 
should now like to suggest to you that the dominant empiricist methodologi-
cal tradition, whose principal tenets we described earlier, gains its eternal 
plausibility because it is drawn from an examination of contemporary science, 
or the science which its author believes. Put more precisely, I believe that 
Pearson’s methodology and many of the others which resemble it are drawn 
from a study of the finished products of scientific research, that is, from the 
study of textbook science. For if we turn our attention for the moment from 
the procedures of the working scientist to the form in which the final prod-
ucts of the scientific profession are delivered and transmitted, we find again 
the insuperable division between the immutable law and the objective dispas-
sionate experiment which confirms the law, and it is just this division which 
characterizes all empiricist methodologies like Pearson’s.
In a textbook we are presented with a law governing the behavior of cer-
tain aspects abstracted from nature, and we are made familiar with certain of 
the rules of logic and of mathematics by which we may deduce particular con-
sequences of the law. These consequences may be tested by a set of operations 
also prescribed in the text to see whether or not they in fact correspond with 
the operation of nature. Finally, we are given, usually in tabular or graphical 
form, the result of such a series of manual operations and a corresponding se-
ries of deductions from the law, and we are asked to judge whether the agree-
ment between the two is sufficiently close to justify our holding to the law. If 
it is a good textbook our judgment is always in the affirmative.
This is the way we write up the products of our research, and this is the 
way we teach scientific theory to our students. We report to them that Galileo 
stated the law that the distance traversed by a body falling from rest is equal 
to one-half the acceleration multiplied by the square of the time during 
which the body has fallen and that this holds for all bodies regardless of their 
weight. More briefly, we tell our students that s = 1/2 at2, the famous law 
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which causes so much trouble in elementary physics courses. If our students 
refuse to take our word for this, we build or order from the nearest physical 
supply laboratory an apparatus which will demonstrate it quite convincingly. 
One excellent piece of equipment which I have used for this purpose employs 
an electromagnet which releases an iron bob at a prescribed instant, and an 
electrified timer which activates a spark gap and thus causes the falling bob 
to mark its position on a specially chemically treated paper tape every tenth of 
a second during its fall. Galileo, of course, had no such equipment. But that 
is not relevant to our attempt to validate his laws.
If our students are still skeptical and say that this law is fine but that it 
holds only for heavy metal bodies and would not hold for a scrap of paper or a 
feather, we remind them that air resistance enters into these phenomena, and 
we build, again with considerable trouble and expense, an elaborate air pump, 
in the vacuum provided by which we can drop a lead weight and a feather. As 
predicted, these two then fall with the same speed.8
This is perfect textbook or pedagogic procedure: we give the student a 
law—s = 1/2 at2; we show him how to measure s with a meter stick or a ver-
nier; we tell him, or we show him how to determine, the value of the accelera-
tion a; and we teach him, or assume that he knows, the laws of multiplication 
which will enable him to compute the product of one-half times a time t 
squared, t of course being the time. We then let him work out the values of s, 
the distance fallen, for a variety of values of t, the time, and then demonstrate 
with our prepared apparatus that in fact the body actually falls according to 
the results which he has computed for himself. At this juncture, if he is not 
already asleep, he believes us and goes home happy.
As a student, setting out to learn the presently accepted laws of physics, 
he is well advised to credit our demonstration. For excluding the weight of 
our authority which is probably and unfortunately the true source of his be-
lief, we have no other means to produce conviction. If our student chooses to 
doubt the validity of our tests, and he may have good reasons for doing so, we 
can go no further; as proofs for accepted laws the scientist can provide only 
observation and experiment—there are no ulterior tests. I doubt that there is 
any generalization about science of such universal validity as the one which 
states that any scientific law or theory which has borne the stamp of approval 
of the profession for a number of years has among its consequences predictions 
which can be thus exposed to experimental test. Further, these experimental 
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tests are such that they can be performed by any man willing to assemble the 
necessary equipment.9
I believe that the validity of this generalization about textbook science 
is the true source of the empiricist methodology which we examined at the 
beginning of this lecture. And I would like to suggest that the error made 
by the empiricist lies in his plausible and implicit assumption that what is 
true of science in one of its meanings must be true of it in another. Because 
textbook science, which is the science that we know, proceeds from the state-
ment of laws to the description of objective experimental tests of these laws, 
we are vulnerable to the belief that the creative science which lies behind the 
textbook must have pursued the reverse route, must have proceeded from the 
objective experiment to the law. We assume that the structure of knowledge 
in the textbook, the structure which we give to scientific knowledge for its 
transmission and preservation, provides a substantial clue to the nature of the 
creative process by which we gained that knowledge. And it is from this as-
sumption that I should like to dissent.
There are a number of quite distinct reasons for this dissent: reasons drawn 
from logic, from the study of language, and from psychology. We shall touch 
upon a few of those this evening, and upon more of them later in these lec-
tures. But at the moment I should like to concentrate particularly upon what 
might be called the historical reasons, for it is primarily by an examination of 
scientific practice as exemplified in the history of science that we may hope 
to get a more nearly correct notion of the procedures of creative science. But 
in turning to history as a source of data for the reconstruction of scientific 
method, we must be particularly careful. For the history of science is a rela-
tively recent field of scholarly research: it has scarcely yet been awarded the 
mantle of academic respectability. And much of what currently passes as his-
tory of science belongs more properly to mythology—a mythology which has 
been created by reading history backward, by assuming that the man who 
first enunciated a particular law must have derived it from much the same 
evidence which we should now employ in documenting it.10 
It will both reinforce my point and illuminate the problems with which 
we must deal if we now examine an example of such a fable. May I therefore 
introduce you once again to a story with which I am sure you are all familiar, 
to the story of Galileo whose experimental study of the motion of heavy bod-
ies is said to have broken the stranglehold of Aristotelian dogmatism and to 
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have paved the way for the great Newtonian generalization of the motions of 
terrestrial and celestial dynamics. It is particularly suitable to begin our study 
with the work of so great a scientist.
The usual version of Galileo’s accomplishment is one which you all know. 
It was Galileo who, by dropping two bodies of different weights from the 
Leaning Tower of Pisa, first showed the world that two bodies of different 
weights, if dropped simultaneously from a high place, reach the ground to-
gether. It was again Galileo who first undertook a careful investigation of the 
way in which bodies actually do fall—an investigation in which by a stroke 
of the greatest genius he made use of the inclined plane—and it was Galileo 
who thus discovered the law which we’ve already discussed, the law s = 1/2 
at2. Again it was Galileo who, by experiment, determined the important 
properties of the pendulum, and who thus made possible the development 
of the first accurate timekeeper, the pendulum clock, and the consequent de-
velopment of accurate astronomical and navigational techniques. Galileo has 
thus been referred to again and again as the father of experimental science, for 
according to this version of his work it was he who for the first time decided 
that the true question for science to examine was how physical bodies actually 
behave, and accordingly it was he who first went out to make actual measure-
ments of their behavior.
I do not want to detract from the fame so deservedly associated with the 
name of Galileo, but there is something very wrong with this plausible and 
generally credited account of his method of research. In the first place, it is 
very bad history. We possess, for example, a number of accounts of Galileo’s 
experiment from the Leaning Tower of Pisa, accounts which describe in great 
detail the size, shape, and material of the bodies which he dropped and which 
provide as well the names and number of the disciples who accompanied him 
on his pilgrimage to the altar of truth. But most of these accounts were writ-
ten in the last hundred years, and we know them to be fabrications.
Galileo, we now believe, did not perform this experiment at all. Although 
his works are filled with references to experiments (some of which he could 
not possibly have performed), there is no reference to this one either in his 
work or in that of his friends and contemporaries at Pisa. Our only seven-
teenth-century source for the story is a brief account provided sixty years 
after the presumptive date of the experiment by Galileo’s disciple Viviani, 
who himself was born thirty years after the close of Galileo’s residence in 
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Pisa. And even though we should like to credit this lonely and inadequate 
scrap of evidence, we cannot. For during his stay in Pisa, at the time when the 
experiment is supposed to have been performed, Galileo wrote a treatise On 
Motion in which he stated views about the behavior of falling bodies which 
are incompatible with his having performed the experiment.
This passage deserves further attention. In it Galileo discusses two fall-
ing bodies, one of lead and one of wood, released simultaneously from a high 
tower. Of these he says:
Experience shows . . . [that] in the beginning of its motion 
the wood is carried more rapidly than the lead; but a little 
later the motion of the lead is so accelerated that it leaves 
the wood behind; and if they are let go from a high tower, 
precedes it by a long space; and I have often made a test of 
this.11 
Here is a passage which could refer to an experiment from the Leaning Tow-
er, but then how can we interpret its outcome? The result Galileo quotes is 
not compatible with his famous law: he says the heavy body gets way ahead. 
And unless the laws of motion have changed since Galileo’s day, this was not 
the case. So presumably Galileo is here referring to an experiment which he 
never performed, or which, if by any chance it was performed, did not yield 
results compatible with his law.
The scientist ought not, I think, be very much surprised at these historical 
discoveries, for he should know that an experiment like that from the Lean-
ing Tower of Pisa is a peculiarly bad one with which to demonstrate the truth 
of Galileo’s law. If you drop two bodies of roughly the same size and shape 
but of quite different weights, from a low height, say something less than six 
feet, the two will hit the ground at about the same time. They will, in fact, 
strike so nearly simultaneously that it will be impossible without a photo-cell 
and a camera to tell which struck first. But this is a pretty crude experiment. 
The time of fall is so short that it does not allow differences in the speeds of 
the bodies to become apparent. And besides, these differences, if they exist, 
are much smaller than the differences due to the inevitable human failure to 
release the bodies quite simultaneously. Sound conclusions can only be drawn 
from the results of an experiment involving a longer fall. But if you carry the 
two bodies to a great height and drop them from, say, the Leaning Tower of 
Pisa, you discover that although the two bodies seem to fall together at the 
start, the heavier one gradually gets ahead and hits the ground first. When, 
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in 1641, a Pisan correspondent of Galileo’s actually tried the experiment from 
the Leaning Tower, he got just this result: the lead always beat the wood to 
the ground.
Today we know that the apparent difference between the results of the ex-
periment at great heights and that at small heights is caused by the resistance 
of the air, which, ceteris paribus, acts more strongly upon the lighter body; as 
historians we may even suspect that it is this difference between the results of 
the two experiments which was responsible for the confusion already noted 
in the early work of Galileo (and in that of his sixteenth-century predeces-
sors) about the differences in the behavior of a falling body at the beginning 
and the end of its motion. But these modern subtleties do not touch the real 
problem presented by the historical investigation of the story of Galileo and 
the Leaning Tower.
For neither the experiment from the Tower nor the experiment on the 
ground could show more than that Aristotle was wrong—that the time re-
quired to reach the ground did not vary in proportion to the weight of the 
body. And this fact was already known: it was probably known in antiquity; 
it was certainly known to two important commentators on Aristotle who 
worked in the sixth century of the Christian era; and it was widely circulated 
in Europe from at least the thirteenth century on. This was not Galileo’s 
original contribution—he almost certainly learned it in school. His own con-
tribution was the statement of a new law, the law that the time of fall does not 
depend on the weight. And this law he did not get by an experiment from the 
Leaning Tower. For in the first place, he almost certainly performed no such 
experiment, and, secondly, if he had performed it carefully, it would not have 
confirmed his law.
We meet a similar difficulty in examining Galileo’s experiment with the 
inclined plane, the experiment with which he is supposed to have discov-
ered that the distance through which a body falls or rolls is proportional to 
the square of the time consumed by rolling. The law is true, and the experi-
ment was almost certainly performed by Galileo. But he knew the law before 
he performed the experiment. And if he had not known it, the experiment 
would not have provided it, for the equipment available to him was too crude. 
Father Mersenne, the French Franciscan friar whose correspondence played 
so large a part in spreading scientific knowledge through Europe in the sev-
enteenth century, attempted to repeat Galileo’s experiment using a carefully 
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constructed duplicate of Galileo’s equipment. His results diverged so far from 
those quoted by Galileo and from those which would have been predicted by 
Galileo’s law that Mersenne was finally forced to “doubt whether Galileo had 
performed the experiment at all.”12 Mersenne’s doubt is not shared by most 
present-day historians. Galileo probably did perform this experiment. But 
when he did so he did not confirm his law with the accuracy of which he tells 
us, an accuracy which, in his own words, was “such that the deviation never 
exceeded one-tenth of a pulse beat.”13
The inclined plane can be made to yield Galileo’s result. In fact we have 
recently built such an inclined plane at Harvard for use in demonstrations 
in the elementary science program. Our inclined plane, in contrast to Mer-
senne’s and Galileo’s, gives the “right” result; but its construction required 
several months of careful thought, the operation of the best modern machine 
tools, and the expenditure of something over five hundred dollars. Galileo 
would not recognize his equipment in our form, and he did not arrive, and 
could not have arrived, at his conclusion with his own.14
I wonder whether there is any need to continue the enumeration of ex-
amples of this sort. For we started this examination of the “fable of Galileo” 
not in order to correct misconceptions about the work of Galileo, but in order 
to document a conclusion and to raise a series of questions which will be of 
fundamental importance throughout these lectures. The conclusion is the one 
which I suggested at the start: the mythology of science shows a remarkable 
resemblance to textbook science;15 that is, in the present case, the fable of 
Galileo displays its hero deriving his laws from exactly the experiments which 
we should now use to validate them.
But since I have already suggested that textbook science is the source of 
empiricist methodology, of the methodology of Pearson et al., our conclusion 
leads us directly to a central question: can we salvage the empiricists’ meth-
odology by examining the true history of science? If Galileo did not get his 
laws from the experimental facts which we should use in validating them, 
are there some original experiments from which he did derive them? And on 
this point Galileo’s own testimony is not without significance. In one passage 
he states that “in order to be able to demonstrate to my opponents the truths 
of my conclusions, I have been forced to demonstrate them by a variety of 
experiment, though to satisfy myself alone I have never felt it necessary to 
make many.”16 Or again, in a passage from the Dialogues which more clearly 
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reveals the essence of Galileo’s method, the author’s spokesman declares to 
an Aristotelian opponent: “I, without having made an experiment, am certain 
that the effect will follow just as I have described it, for it is necessary that it 
do so. Furthermore, although you pretend the contrary, you too know that it 
could not happen in any other way. But I am such a good midwife of the mind 
that I will force you to confess the truth of what I say with all your heart.”17
These evaluations with their dialectic tone and their clear statement of the 
supremacy of the intellect over experiment and manipulation are not, I think, 
typical of science in general. But they are entirely typical of Galileo and sci-
ence has never ceased to use the method which he so profitably employed. 
What this method was, how Galileo actually arrived at his laws, is a ques-
tion whose answer I shall reserve for the next lecture. But we are already in 
a position to recognize that whatever the method, it was not primarily based 
upon original experimental discovery. As we shall find, the experimental and 
observational basis of Galileo’s laws had, with the exception of the obser-
vation of the pendulum, been available to all scientists concerned with the 
problem of motion since antiquity. And this strongly suggests that we will not 
be able to salvage empiricist methodology. Galileo, if a poor and frequently 
irresponsible experimenter, was one of the greatest scientists the world has 
ever known. Yet he was not, to revert to Pearson’s phrase, a “man who has ac-
customed himself to marshal facts, to examine their complex mutual relations 
and predict upon the result of this examination their inevitable sequences.” 
For there were no such “facts.”18 19
So far I have attempted to indicate the sort of evidence with which I think 
the history of science can supply the methodologist. And this turns out to be a 
point requiring considerable proof, for it has not normally been conceded that 
history and methodology have any grounds of mutual reference. Certainly 
our case for the use of history is still far from complete. We have, this eve-
ning, seen history only in a negative, a destructive, role. My homicidal attack 
upon the fable of Galileo was not calculated to produce final or permanent 
conviction. I merely hope that you have found it suggestive.
In the three lectures that follow this evening’s we shall deal in consider-
ably more constructive detail with selected portions of the history of physical 
science. And this less-destructive examination of science will, I trust, provide 
material from which during the last four lectures we can begin to construct 
an alternative picture of creative science. But in this latter part of the series we 
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shall utilize not only historical techniques but also those drawn from logical 
and psychological criticism. And it may well round out this evening’s intro-
ductory remarks if I attempt to give a preliminary indication of the applicabil-
ity of such nonhistorical techniques to our problem. Here once again I shall 
touch in brief and destructive terms upon a subject to which we will turn with 
more constructive detail later in the series.
The suggestion from which I should like to proceed is that we ought not 
be surprised that a naive empiricism stands up so badly when applied to the 
examination of creative research. For, as I indicated earlier, how could one 
set out to make the pure and dispassionate observations for which a naive 
empiricism calls? Doesn’t one require—at the start and throughout the re-
search—some guiding principles? Suppose, for example, that I am directed 
as a scientist to begin observations of this rostrum in order to make some 
scientific discovery about it. I am directed, we’ll say, to look for the laws of 
the rostrum. The very existence of this directive raises a difficulty. For why 
should it be supposed that there are any such laws? Why should I examine 
the rostrum rather than the platform, the lighting circuit, or the people in 
this auditorium? Since in my lifetime I will not be able to study them all, the 
decision to examine the rostrum implies a judgment that there are laws to be 
discovered there and that these will be useful laws. And this judgment must 
have been made prior to the beginning of my examination.
Well, suppose that there is a basis for such a judgment. Suppose that 
there is reason to think that there will be new laws produced by my examina-
tion, laws which are not already in the body of science. What observations 
or experiments should I then make? I might start out by finding how much 
the rostrum weights. I bring in a scale and begin the usual determination of 
weight. And immediately another question arises: Will the normal weighing 
operation be adequate? Is it sufficient for my purpose to know the weight of 
the rostrum to the nearest pound, as though I were going to send it some-
where by Railway Express? Or will the discovery of a valid scientific law re-
quire the utmost of accuracy? Will I need to know the weight to within a few 
one hundred thousandths of a pound? If the latter is so, I shall have to design 
and construct a special sort of scale, and I may also require an air pump which 
will enable me to do the weighing in a vacuum. All this will take a great deal 
of time, trouble, and expense, and since my useful lifetime as a discoverer is 
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limited, these can only be spared if they are likely to prove worthwhile. Once 
again a decision, a judgment is called for.
An even more serious problem obtains with respect to my next step, for 
I now wish to observe the dimensions of the rostrum. Again I must decide 
what accuracy, what instruments are required. But even with this decision 
made my problem is far from solved, for I don’t know which dimension to 
take. Will the height, the length, and the breadth be sufficient for my pur-
poses or must I measure the various diagonals. Can I describe the edges of 
this panel as being straight, or must I carefully measure the deviations of each 
edge from a mathematically straight line? The process of obtaining complete 
measurements of the size can never be completed. I must make a selection.
But perhaps I need not investigate the dimensions at all. Perhaps they are 
not relevant to the discovery of new scientific laws. Perhaps what I need is a 
microscopic examination of the grain structure of the material from which 
the rostrum is made; or, would I be better employing my time applying to my 
problem the tools of qualitative and quantitative chemical analysis? May I not 
require knowledge of the proportions in which the various chemical elements 
enter into the construction of the rostrum? Or ought I rather be measur-
ing the strengths of the materials of which it is built? And any one of these 
choices raises the old problems of accuracy and of selection.
At this point I am struck by a truly horrifying thought. Perhaps none of 
these techniques of modern scientific measurement is the one required to 
yield the law of the rostrum. Perhaps a new sort of measurement is required in 
this case. And indeed science is continually proving the fruitfulness of here-
tofore unimagined techniques of observation. But then how shall I go about 
discovering these? It seems hopeless. And now I am so puzzled and confused 
by the attempt to regulate my research procedures in conformity with the 
canons of pure empiricism that I give up the attempt entirely. Instead I will 
take up cooking. There at least one has a cookbook.
But, of course, in science one has a cookbook, too. The choice of a prob-
lem, the selection of tools, the decision as to which aspect of the object should 
be abstracted for scientific consideration, all of these require evaluation and 
a judgment before beginning research. And as the investigation proceeds, 
similar decisions are called for: what variables must be controlled, and which 
may be ignored? What aspect of the experimental result is fortuitous; what 
portion due to the operation of the law for which we are searching. Answer-
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ing such questions requires a guide, a cookbook, and this guide is normally 
provided by the scientific and extrascientific knowledge the investigator has 
already compiled, in school or in his research.
But such guides, although science cannot proceed without them, may also 
be blinders. For they are undoubtedly just such elements as those Pearson 
labels prejudice and preconception. They are as likely to direct the scientist’s 
attention away from the fruitful observation as toward it. They represent habit 
and conservatism. Yet they cannot be dispensed with. For scientific observa-
tion is always a process of abstraction. One abstracts the length, the color, the 
texture from a natural object which always provides an infinity of alternate 
abstractions. Some choice is demanded, and the choice must ultimately rest 
upon personal prejudice.
I began this evening’s lecture by indicating my conviction that elements of 
this sort are absolutely essential to the fruitfulness of creative research. And 
I hope that in concluding it I have provided a preliminary indication of the 
sources of this conviction. But if they exist, and if, as I suppose, they provide 
both direction and structure to every creative research effort, then the study 
of these preconceptions should itself be an important part of the study of 
scientific method. For their existence raises problems that the methodologist 
cannot ignore.
Is there some one set of preconceptions, some one criterion which is pre-
eminently scientific? Should we train scientists in this one and this one alone? 
Is it strict adherence to his set of preconceptions which truly constitutes the 
“self-elimination” in judgment, which for Pearson characterizes the scientific 
man? Or can any set of preconceptions prove fruitful? Is the creative scientist 
actually the man who most strongly displays his individuality of judgment 
by proceeding from preconceptions different from those of the majority of 
his profession? And if so what are the sources of these new prejudices? How 
complete is their domination of research; by what can they be altered?
On Pearson’s methodology these questions do not exist, or if they do exist 
the answers to them do not illuminate the nature of science. If this evening’s 
lecture has cast doubt upon the utility of so pure an empiricism, if it has 
evoked in you any prejudice in favor of this alternate direction of research, 
then it has more than achieved its purpose.
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The Foundations of Dynamics
Toward the end of the last lecture, I suggested that an examination of the fable of Galileo presents us with the problem of determining the 
manner in which Galileo arrived at his novel laws, and I mentioned that the 
particular interest and difficulty of this problem lies in the fact that Galileo’s 
novel laws were produced without any correspondingly novel observations 
or experiments. It is to this problem that I should like to address myself this 
evening. Why did Galileo see one set of laws implicit in a set of observations 
from which his predecessors had derived another?
This question in turn cannot be answered without an examination of the 
manner in which scientists before Galileo had rationalized these observa-
tions, for Galileo, genius or not, did not approach the problem of motion 
without education. And this education provided a set of opinions about mo-
tion which had satisfied a number of learned men but which Galileo rejected 
in favor of his own novel laws. And we will have to ask what these opinions 
were and why he found them inadequate. At least we will have to ask this 
question if my last lecture convinced you of the fallacy of the usual answer: 
that Galileo rejected Aristotelian physics because he discovered by experi-
ment that it did not work.
The single most difficult thing to grasp about the problem of motion in 
ancient and medieval thought is that it was not the same problem to which 
we and Galileo apply the term. The problems which we label as problems of 
motion or dynamics were for Aristotle simply a special subgroup of the larger 
set of problems presented by the existence of change. For the perception of al-
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teration raised for the Greeks and still raises for some modern philosophers a 
dialectic problem of the greatest difficulty—a problem rooted in the dilemma 
of analyzing flux in terms of logical categories which are themselves outside 
of time. In philosophical terminology this is the problem of retrieving “being” 
in a world primarily characterized by “becoming.”
Before Aristotle’s time, the Greek philosopher Heraclitus had pointed out 
that all perception is perception of a continuous alteration, and had reached 
the Bergsonian conclusion that since all is change there can be no permanent 
entities. The philosopher Parmenides had adopted the opposite alternative, 
and had argued that nothing which does not exist can come into being and 
that no existing entity can pass away. From this dialectic he had concluded 
that alteration observed in the world is but appearance, and that reality is but 
one and is changeless.
Neither of these solutions which avoided one horn of a logical dilemma 
only by grasping the other with acute discomfort was satisfactory to Aristotle, 
whose essential objective was the reconstruction of the commonsense world. 
But though he rejected these conclusions, he could not reject the problem, 
and the effort to find a satisfactory solution for it conditions a large part of his 
thought and that of his medieval successors. We can here ignore the dialectic 
portions of Aristotle’s solution, but we must deal with the manner in which 
it affects his analysis of motion. And the first and most important of these 
effects is that Aristotle treats a motion as a change analogous to all other al-
terations of the physical world. The word motion, for him, embraces changes 
of color and size and form as well as those of position. In his own phrase: “The 
fulfillment of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially, is motion, 
namely, of what is alterable qua alterable, alteration; of what can be increased 
and its opposite, of what can be decreased, increase and decrease; of what can 
come to be and pass away, coming to be and passing away; of what can be 
carried along, locomotion.”1 
Now if all changes are thus considered to be analogous behaviors, if 
change of position is like change of size, then one must search for laws which 
will apply to all these sorts of change together. And the primary aspects of 
nature to be abstracted in the analysis of any one alteration are accordingly 
just those which all alterations have in common. It is in these terms that Ar-
istotelian analysis proceeds.
In the first place all motions or changes can be divided into two mutually 
exclusive categories: they may be natural alterations, changes which follow 
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from the nature of the object moved and which do not perturb the normal 
processes of the physical world. Or they may be violent motions, produced by 
an external force which disrupts the natural course of events. The growth of 
the acorn into an oak is a natural motion; the destruction of the oak by the 
woodsman’s axe is a violent motion. The upward course of fire when, freed 
from the imprisoning log, it leaps upwards to its place in the heavens is a 
natural motion; when the fire is constrained by a chimney or roof the motion 
is violent.
This classification may be applied equally successfully to the phenomena 
which we call dynamics or the movements of heavy bodies. Natural motions 
are the motions which occur automatically in the absence of a restraining 
force. The typical natural motion is that of the falling stone which, after its 
release from the restraining hand, rushes to regain the natural position of a 
heavy body near the center of the universe. Violent motions are those which 
require an external force, a shove or a push. They are typified by the move-
ment of a stone raised from or dragged along the ground, or by the flight of a 
projectile hurled from the hand or a sling. And these, like other violent mo-
tions, are disruptive. They deprive the heavy body of its natural state which 
is the state of rest, close to or at the center of the universe. In the dynamics 
of Aristotle and the early scholastics these two sorts of motion are always 
separated. They cannot occur simultaneously in the same body, and they do 
not normally obey the same laws.
It is worth noticing that this distinction between natural and violent 
changes is one given directly in everyday experience, and that it is a distinc-
tion which we still apply to many of the subjects which Aristotle discussed 
under the single rubric motion. The terms violent and natural are of course out 
of style, but in daily life and in many sciences it has again and again proved 
profitable to distinguish the normal from the abnormal or pathological, and 
to adopt different modes of thought and different techniques of analysis in 
approaching these two aspects of experience.
But though the distinction is founded upon experience and has been 
pragmatically justified by the fruitfulness of its application in many fields 
of research, it turns out to be a block to progress in the study of the motion 
of terrestrial objects. And we are going to examine the manner in which it 
was removed. But first we must note another consequence of the Aristotelian 
analogy between motion and change. And this may again be approached in 
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Aristotle’s own words: “Every change,” he says, “is from something to some-
thing, as the word itself (metabole) indicates, something after something else, 
that is to say, something earlier and something later.”2
To paraphrase this in a somewhat more leading form, every change is to 
be understood as a change from some initial state to some other final state. 
Any particular change is completely categorized by the difference in magni-
tude between these initial and final states, and when the speed of a change 
is discussed, it is taken to be the total amount of change divided by the total 
time taken to produce the change. Thus, to return to locomotion, if a body is 
moved from one end of this rostrum to the other, its speed is taken to be the 
total length of the rostrum divided by the total time it has taken to cross it; or 
if a body falls from the edge of this platform to the floor, the speed of its fall 
is again the height of the platform divided by the time which the body has 
taken in traversing the distance from the platform level to the floor. This, of 
course, is the figure which we should call the average speed.
The assumption that the important characteristics of any motion are the 
distance between its endpoints and the total time required to traverse this 
distance lead, when applied to everyday experience, to a number of qualita-
tive laws of motion and indirectly to similar quantitative laws. For example, 
to move a block of wood from a position at rest at one side of this rostrum to 
a position of rest at the other, an external force is required; for this is a violent 
motion. If the force is greater, the time required for the transfer will be less. 
If the body to be moved is lighter, the force required will be smaller. And if 
the resistance to the motion, due either to friction or to the medium through 
which the motion is effected, is greater, then the time required to complete 
the motion will also be greater.
These are general qualitative laws about the forces required to move real 
bodies through particular intervals in definite times. They are not in the least 
arbitrary; on the contrary, they provide an accurate description of facts with 
which we are all familiar. It is easier to shove an empty trunk than a loaded 
one across the floor; in either case, the movement is easier when the floor 
is smoother. And this is the qualitative content of the Aristotelian laws for 
violent motion. They are accurate, and they are complete. That is, they are 
complete, if a motion is a change, if it is a transition between fixed endpoints.
But they are not quantitative laws, and since it is in their quantitative 
form that they are most often subjected to criticism, we shall now have to 
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observe the techniques employed by Aristotle in strengthening them so that 
they specify the amount of time required for the motion of a particular body 
of a particular distance under the influence of a particular force. The quantita-
tive laws are not of much importance in the totality of Aristotle’s thought. He 
introduces them almost as asides, in forms which are not always either clear 
or consistent, and he never applies them. Nevertheless we cannot ignore them 
as he so nearly does, for they display an important type of scientific thought 
and they provided a point of departure for Aristotle’s scholastic critics.
The essence of Aristotle’s quantitative procedure lies in assuming the sim-
plest sorts of quantitative relationships between the variables he has already 
isolated, that is, in assuming the simplest quantitative relationships which 
will supply the qualitative behavior already contained in the old laws. For 
example, since the time required to complete a particular motion decreases 
as the force increases, Aristotle supposes that this decrease in time is directly 
proportional to the increase in force. He says that if the force on a body to 
produce a particular motion is doubled, the time required for that motion will 
be cut in half. And similarly, he says that if the force remains constant but is 
applied to a body with only half the weight, then only half the time will be 
required for the motion. The resistance of the medium is treated in the same 
manner: if the medium is half as dense, then the motion of the same body 
under the same force will be twice as rapid.
These quantitative laws are of course invalid. If we were to test them with 
modern laboratory equipment, we should not get the predicted results. But 
one would get qualitatively correct results which is as much as anyone could 
get with Galileo’s laws before the middle of the seventeenth century. And 
Galileo’s laws predict results which we can today confirm. In any case no such 
quantitative tests were applied. The laws were criticized not for lack of agree-
ment with the experiment, but because of logical difficulties which arose in 
the attempts to apply them to motion considered purely abstractly.
But what of the procedure by which the quantitative laws were arrived 
at—the assumption of the validity of the simplest quantitative relationships 
which would yield the correct quantitative behavior? By modern standards it 
is highly irresponsible. But it cannot be rejected out of hand as unscientific, 
and it is identical with a procedure Galileo used in arriving at correct laws of 
motion. But for Galileo motions meant something else, and we shall have to 
see how this change occurred.
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So far I have said nothing about natural motion. All the laws discussed 
so far are laws for violent motions; they do not apply to the case of the falling 
stone. Indeed, about the problem of free fall, Aristotle himself had nothing 
explicit to say. Some of his followers seem to have assumed that if, in this 
natural motion, the acting force were equated with the weight of the fallen 
body, then the laws for violent motion would apply. And in this case it would 
follow that if a 10 pound weight and a 1 pound weight were dropped together, 
the heavier would reach the ground 10 times more quickly than the lighter. 
But Aristotle did not say this, and I am not sure that any philosopher or 
scientist ever believed it. This law seems to have been attributed to Aristotle 
primarily by his critics.
This was all that Aristotle had to say about the motion of terrestrial bod-
ies. These laws covered for him what were in his day the important character-
istics of this sort of alteration. But it was not all that he had to say about phys-
ics, and we shall not understand the way in which his laws were overthrown 
unless we know how closely they were associated with a set of views about the 
cosmos which were rejected together with his laws during the latter portions 
of the middle ages. For Aristotle’s laws, like all scientific laws, did not stand, 
or fall, alone. They were an integral portion of a larger fabric of natural phi-
losophy for which they provided support and by which they were supported.
This evening we can only touch upon two isolated features of this larger 
cosmology: the Aristotelian universe was a small universe, and it was a full 
universe. At its outermost edge it was bounded by a crystalline sphere in 
which the stars were set. Within this sphere and concentric to it were some 
40 smaller spheres, set surface to surface like the layers of an onion. These 
spheres carried the planets, and their interlocking rotary motions accounted 
remarkably well for the major astronomical observations of the day. At the 
very center of this nest of crystalline spheres, at the mathematical center of 
the universe, was set the spherical earth, and the space between the surface of 
the earth and the innermost sphere which carried the moon was filled by the 
elements air and fire.
Both psychologically and scientifically it was a satisfying model. Until 
Galileo turned his telescope on the heavens at the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, the important features of this cosmos were confirmed by the 
bulk of observational evidence. And the model had tremendous psychological 
consequences for the study of motion. In the first place, every moving body 
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moves through a space which is already full; if it moves in the region between 
the earth and the moon, it moves through air or through fire. And the medi-
um through which it moves inevitably resists the motion, just as water causes 
a drag which slows the motion of a boat. So any student of motion must con-
sider both of the forces active in producing it: the moving force of the pusher 
and the resisting force of the medium. One might discuss the ideal case of 
movement in a vacuum—Galileo of course does just that—but since in the 
Aristotelian universe there cannot be such a thing as a vacuum, the discussion 
of a motion which was not impeded by a material medium seemed without 
practical or theoretical significance. The abstraction to motion through the 
void was an unreasonable abstraction. It is as though a modern physicist were 
asked to study the fate of a cannon ball fired with the velocity greater than 
that of light.
In the second place, the very small size of the sublunar region in which 
terrestrial qualities could move gave the problem of motion an aspect quite 
different from that of motion in an infinite Newtonian universe. The notion 
of an infinite continuing motion, except for circular motion of the heavenly 
bodies, was, in so confined a space, another unreasonable and impractical 
abstraction. Every motion must be a motion from one place to another place. 
And the particular places involved were themselves important.3 For this 
bounded sublunar region in which the terrestrial motions occurred had the 
psychological aspect of a room or a hall with whose furnishings the philoso-
pher was familiar. The physical bodies which filled it were its furniture, and 
each had its own unique natural place of rest. A natural motion was a motion 
toward this place, as that of a stone toward its place in the center of the uni-
verse. And it followed from this understanding of space that important char-
acteristics of a natural motion were determined by the natural position of the 
body moved, by the particular endpoint toward which alone this particular 
natural motion tended. So that once again the endpoint, the final state of rest, 
was an important determinant of the motion of terrestrial bodies.
The Aristotelian doctrines relating to motion represent the highest devel-
opment of this facet of antique thought. Further progress, which had in fact 
commenced, was cut off by the series of wars which brought Hellenic civiliza-
tion to its close. But coincident with the reintroduction of Aristotelian writ-
ings into Europe in the thirteenth century developed a tradition of Aristote-
lian criticism known as scholasticism, a critical tradition which immediately 
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introduced important modifications of the Aristotelian theory of motion. It 
was in this modified Aristotelian tradition that Galileo was trained, and if to 
us he is usually portrayed as the first modern student of motion, he may with 
equal justice be viewed as the last of Aristotle’s scholastic critics. For Galileo’s 
work is not a beginning but a turning point. Implicitly it was within the scho-
lastic tradition, but its outcome so completely modified the tradition that his 
successors were able to break with it altogether.
The scholastic contributions leading to Galileo were the products of two 
independent critical traditions, one logical and the other physical. Those who 
criticized Aristotle on physical grounds attacked not the foundations of the 
theory but incidental remarks which Aristotle had made about two special 
problems, the problem of the projectile and the problem of the falling body. 
Aristotle had said that every violent motion requires a pusher. And this led 
to the greatest difficulty when he considered the problem of the stone hurled 
with the hand or from a sling. Obviously such a projectile continues to move 
after it has left the hand, so one may legitimately ask, what is pushing the 
stone?
The difficulty was recognized by Aristotle, who produced an answer to 
it which was universally unsatisfactory to his critics. After the stone has left 
the hand, he said, the air through which it moves continues to push it along, 
and he supplied two possible mechanisms for this continued motion. Neither 
of them was intrinsically impossible. Either could have been subjected to a 
consistent and coherent logical development. But they appeared unreason-
able, both to Aristotle’s contemporaries and to his scholastic followers. For 
the air is at best a clumsy intermediary, and it seems superfluous. If the hand 
can store up a continued push in the air, why can’t it store the same push in 
the projectile itself. It was in fact this suggestion which, revived in the thir-
teenth century by Albertus Magnus, was erected into a new science of motion 
by the Parisian Nominalists in the century which followed. This new science 
received the name of the impetus theory, for it is held that during the initial 
motion of the hand an impetus, an internal moving force, is stored in the 
body, and after the projectile leaves the hand, this impetus continues to push 
it along. In this continued pushing the impetus is itself exhausted until finally 
the body falls to the ground.
The new theory explained a great many things. A body can be thrown 
farther from a sling than from the hand because it is in contact with the sling 
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for longer, so that more impetus is stored up in it. Or again, a heavy body, a 
stone, can be thrown a great deal farther than a lump of parchment, for the 
heavy body can receive more impetus from the hand than can the lighter one.
But these limited insights into particular problems of motion were not 
the most important consequences of the impetus theory. Far more significant 
was the reorientation which it produced toward the nature of the problem 
presented by terrestrial motions. The impetus theory concerned itself with 
the fact of continued motion, and its concentration upon the manner in which 
impetus is stored in the body and is exhausted during the course of the mo-
tion directed attention to just that aspect of motion which the Aristotelian 
theory had ignored. It directed attention to what goes on during the course 
of that motion.
Motion for Aristotle was simply change, and as change, it was represented 
by its initial state of rest and its final state of rest. Position was for Aristotle 
a quality of the object, and a motion, a change in position, was a change of 
quality comparable to a change of color. But with the development of im-
petus theory, the impetus itself became a quality stored in the body. It was 
compared with sound, stored in a struck bell, or with heat stored in a warmed 
metal. And motion thus ceased to be a simple change of quality, and became 
very nearly a quality, a state of the object. To be in motion, as to be yellow, 
was to be possessed of a quality. To study motion was to study a continuous 
process, not merely endpoints.
This transition in the attitude toward motion was not completed in the 
medieval period. It was first fully formulated in the seventeenth century by 
Descartes, who was also the first to announce its physical corollary, the con-
servation of linear velocity, or the law of inertia. But the impetus theory, 
proceeding from the limited criticism of the Aristotelian explanation of the 
motion of the projectile, represents a major step toward the modern view, for 
by forcing attention to a previously irrelevant aspect of the motion, it sepa-
rated the problems of dynamics from those of qualitative change, and it forced 
medieval philosophers to introduce a new set of categories applicable to loco-
motion alone.
The effects of this new conception of a motion as a state rather than as a 
change are clearly seen in the position taken by the scholastics with respect 
to the problem of the falling body. On this problem too, the position at-
tributed to Aristotle had been subject to criticism almost from the time it 
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was enunciated. The scholastics now suggested that this sort of motion could 
be explained by the impetus theory: a body commences to fall because of its 
weight—weight which was now regarded as producing an internal force like 
impetus. But since the weight acts not only at the beginning of the motion 
like the hand, but throughout the motion, the body in falling must continu-
ally acquire more and more impetus. Thus its speed increases as it falls.
Some fourteenth-century thinkers, pursuing this line of thought, noted 
that since the impetus must increase uniformly during the motion, it was 
probably that the velocity increased in the same manner, and they thus came 
very close to the law of uniform acceleration with which Galileo is credited. 
Some of their writing can be interpreted as a literal enunciation of this law, 
but scholastic thought on the problem is by no means clear.
For us this priority question is of no importance. What we must not miss, 
however, is4 that the impetus theory had directed attention for the first time 
to the existence of such a thing as acceleration. By studying motion as a state 
of existence, the new theory had brought about the recognition of changes of 
this state. Aristotle, who was a shrewd observer, can scarcely have been un-
aware that a body moves more rapidly as it falls, but nowhere does this obser-
vation appear in his Physics; for it was not a relevant characteristic of motion if 
motion was considered to be change between positions of rest.5
The impetus theory, then, led to a concentration upon new aspects of an 
old problem. But this does not exhaust its importance. Equally significant is 
the way in which it blurred distinctions which had previously been important. 
Note in particular the manner in which the difference between natural and 
violent motions has disappeared. Both of these are now accounted for by the 
common quality of moved objects—impetus. A stone flung vertically gradu-
ally loses the initial impetus upward, impressed upon it by the hand, and 
simultaneously gains impetus downward due to the continuing effect of its 
weight. It thus loses speed until it hangs stationary at the top of its trajectory 
after which the impetus downward dominates the motion, and the body falls 
with a constantly increasing velocity.
Here the violent upward motion and the natural motion downward appear 
completely symmetrical. Gradually it was recognized that the impetus gained 
on the way down will be just the same as the impetus lost on the way up. The 
body hits the ground with the same velocity with which it left the hand. In 
the sixteenth century such considerations were applied to more complicated 
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trajectories, particularly those of canon balls, and before the time of Galileo 
some military engineers had realized that not only must natural and violent 
motions be considered as one problem, but that the two motions could be 
combined to produce a continuously curved trajectory. For Aristotle, you’ll 
remember, natural and violent motions were incompatible; they could not 
coexist. Nor, for the same reasons, could curved and linear motions be com-
pared. They were all different sorts of changes, as different from one another 
as from changes of color.
Finally the impetus theory did a great deal to suppress the importance of 
what in Aristotelian physics had been absolute place. All of Aristotelian space 
was a position for something, and the character of at least a natural motion 
was largely determined by the place toward which it tended. But for a scho-
lastic defender of the impetus theory, the characteristics of the motion were 
primarily determined by the amount of impetus put in at the beginning. A 
motion characterized by the same initial impetus and by the same rate of gain 
or loss of impetus would proceed in the same way regardless of the position in 
the universe in which it was executed. Thus, in the impetus theory, position 
relative to the point at which the impetus was delivered, rather than position 
in absolute space, became the important characteristic of a motion. And in 
the application to the freely falling stone this transition made the important 
variable this distance through which the stone had fallen, rather than the 
distance between the stone and the earth. This, of course, is just the transition 
required to give the law of free fall a mathematically simple form.
Thus the impetus theory produced a small but important step toward what 
we should now call the relativity of inertial motion, and this trend was very 
much reinforced by the astronomical speculations which occurred during this 
and later periods. From the fourteenth century on, a number of important 
scholastic thinkers suggested, normally on a speculative or mystical basis, 
that the earth was like the other planets and that it moved, and these devel-
opments provided a conceptual basis for the technically more complete astro-
nomical revolution proposed by Copernicus in the sixteenth century.
But if the earth moves, then the motion of a falling body is toward the 
earth rather than toward the center of the universe. The motion may no longer 
be explained by the body’s preference for some particular point in an absolute 
space but must depend on the body’s position with respect to the earth or with 
respect to the source of its motion. Similarly, if, as the Copernican theory 
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insists, the universe is much vaster than Aristotle thought, or if it is infinite, 
as many followers of Copernicus suggested, then much of the psychological 
force of absolute position is lost. For the notion that every point in space is 
specifiably physically distinct from every other point is psychologically tied 
to the belief that the total amount of space available is rather small, and that 
the totality of space can be grasped rather like the totality of space in a room. 
Again, in so large a universe, it will make sense to talk about an infinite mo-
tion in a straight line and thus to arrive at the abstraction generally stated as 
the law of inertia. In an infinite universe which, by Galileo’s time, was a sub-
ject of common speculation, an infinite motion in a straight line is a reason-
able abstraction, while to Aristotle it had appeared inherently contradictory.6
Thus the impetus theory, which by the end of the sixteenth century had 
replaced the older Aristotelian theory in most of the major educational cen-
ters of Europe, provided a new conceptual framework within which terres-
trial motions were considered.  A motion had become new sort of conceptual 
entity; its important characteristics were no longer the same as they had been 
for Aristotelians. And the transition had occurred against a background of 
new cosmological speculation and of radical astronomical theory which re-
inforced the new viewpoint. By the end of the sixteenth century the very 
meaning of the word had changed. In the fourteenth century as in antiquity 
the word motus meant change or alteration, but when Galileo at Pisa writes 
a treatise called De Motu he addresses himself to a field which only began to 
exist in the fourteenth century—the field of terrestrial dynamics. Many of the 
attacks which he directs at Aristotle from this new vantage point miss entirely 
the point of what Aristotle had to say. He is talking about a different problem 
and using the same words in different senses.
And by Galileo’s time two7 other important changes had occurred. The 
first of these concerns the role played by the medium in terrestrial motions, 
and we shall have more to say of the sources of this change in the next lecture. 
Here we need only note that by the sixteenth century a number of philoso-
phers and engineers had grown very dubious about the logical impossibility of 
a vacuum, and that some, including Galileo, thought that a vacuum might be 
produced in nature by a finite force. Thus motion through a vacuum became, 
for some thinkers, a possible abstraction and a significant ideal case.
The second development is the one I referred to earlier as the logical criti-
cism of Aristotle. It derived not from the consideration of particular motions 
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but from the apparently separate problem of the logical categories to be ap-
plied to the analysis of any change, and it was carried on independently of the 
physical criticism of the impetus school. It originated at Oxford after the start 
of the impetus school on the Continent, and although it was occasionally ad-
vanced by men who also made important contributions to the impetus theory, 
particularly by one Nicholas Oresme, the relevance of the logical problems of 
the Oxford school to the physical problems of the Parisian school was scarcely 
noted before the time of Galileo.
As we have already noted, there are sound psychological reasons for sup-
posing that the essential character of any alteration is given by a knowledge of 
these two endpoints of the change; we shall see later that many children han-
dle problems of alteration in exactly this manner. But to convert this sound 
insight into a logical doctrine and to say, as Aristotle does in many parts of 
his writing, that the change is identical with the two endpoints or with the 
final endpoint of the alteration, assimilates the essential characteristics of a 
change to those of a state of rest. And this creates internal contradictions in 
any attempts to analyze a particular motion. For as the paradoxes of Zeno had 
indicated in antiquity, the consideration of a change as a succession of states 
or rest demands the analysis of an infinity of such states, and the Aristotelian 
categories were not well suited to treat such a problem.
The new logical categories developed were both obscure and abstract in 
the highest degree. Even the preceding statement of them contains simplifi-
cations which depart from the spirit of the medieval problems. But if we can-
not follow its detail we can note that the outcome of continued fourteenth-
century attention to the logical analysis of change was the creation of a new 
set of logical and mathematical tools which could be applied to problems of 
change in general and of motion in particular. For example, fourteenth-cen-
tury scholars solved a number of problems of this sort: if a body starts from 
rest with a velocity of one mile per hour and maintains this velocity for an 
hour, and if it then travels for the following half hour at twice this velocity, 
and for the following one-eighth of an hour with eight times this velocity and 
so on, how far will it have gotten at the end of a two hour period?
And among the problems treated in this manner was the problem of a 
body which starts from rest and travels for a limited time with a velocity 
or speed which increases uniformly and continuously during this time. This 
is the problem which we should now call the problem of uniform accelera-
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tion, and the fourteenth-century logicians arrived at the modern solution: a 
body starting from rest and proceeding with uniform acceleration, covers, in 
a given amount of time, the same distance as that covered by a body travelling 
with a uniform velocity equal to one half of the final velocity of the acceler-
ated body.
Here I am guilty of an overly modern statement of the outcome of scho-
lastic research. Their problems are problems of change in general, not simply 
problems of motion, and the notion which we should now describe as that of 
instantaneous velocity is by no means explicit in their analysis. That notion is 
not even clear in the work of Galileo, who three centuries later borrowed quite 
literally the fourteenth-century analysis made by the scholastic Oresme. And 
a glance at the confusions, inconsistencies, and misunderstandings which so 
often characterize these medieval logical analyses leaves no doubt of why this 
brilliant but incomplete work should have waited almost three hundred years 
for its fruitful application.
But whatever its inadequacies and confusions, the work did make abun-
dantly clear certain logical aspects of the problem of motion without which 
the modern analysis, or even Galileo’s analysis, of motion would have been 
impossible. It led, for example, to the recognition that a number of motions 
which cover the same total distance in the same total time may accomplish 
this single transition by an infinity of different processes. Thus it demonstrat-
ed that analysis of motion requires a knowledge of the intensity of the motion 
at each instant of the transition, that is, demands an understanding of what 
we should now call instantaneous velocity. And the new logical school cre-
ated graphical and algebraic tools which permitted this newly isolated vari-
able to be studied. It was in the application of this new logical understanding 
and these new logical tools to the qualitative physics of the impetus school 
that Galileo made one of his principal contributions—a contribution whose 
ultimate outcome was of course to destroy totally the impetus school itself. 
Which brings us to the work of Galileo. An almost trivial example of the 
way Galileo applied the new logical and physical insights is presented by his 
enunciation of the law that the distance through which a body falls from rest 
is proportional to the square of the time during which it falls. This law had 
been proclaimed earlier, at least by the Spaniard De Soto in the sixteenth 
century, but Galileo’s independent development of it was more complete 
and more widely circulated, so that it was to his work that all his succes-
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sors referred. And the secret of the new solution was his new statement of 
the problem. With the benefit of his training in the impetus theory Galileo 
grasped the problem of free fall as that of describing the motion of a body in a 
continuous state of motion travelling away from an initial point of rest with a 
velocity or intensity of motion that increased uniformly throughout.
With the problem stated in this new manner, a new solution presented 
itself almost immediately. Galileo described the process as follows: 
When therefore I observe a stone initially at rest falling 
from an elevated position continually acquiring new incre-
ments of speed, why should I not believe that such increas-
es take place in a manner which is exceedingly simple and 
rather obvious to everybody? If now we examine the matter 
carefully, we find no addition or increment of velocity more 
simple than that which repeats itself always in the same 
manner. [. . .] Thus we may picture to our mind a motion as 
uniformly and continuously accelerated when, during any 
equal intervals of time whatever, equal increments of speed 
are given to it.8 
But this uniformly accelerated motion was simply a special case of the 
more general sorts of change considered by Oresme. And it is from Oresme 
that Galileo borrowed both the demonstration and the result that a uniformly 
accelerated motion produces a displacement that is proportional to the square 
of the time of that motion. At a later date, perhaps in order to satisfy his crit-
ics, he devised the inclined-plane experiment to confirm this law, but the in-
clined plane could do no more than to show that the motion of a rolling body 
was more or less of the sort which Galileo had described. It showed that the 
distance was not proportional to the time as Aristotle would have supposed, 
but that in fact it increased rather more rapidly. The law itself, with all its 
precision, Galileo derived by supposing that the actual motion must obey the 
mathematically simplest law which would provide the observed qualitative 
characteristics of free fall. But this was exactly the method which Aristotle 
had employed in arriving at a different sort of law, and the phenomenon had 
not altered in the interim. What had changed was the scientific view of the 
phenomenon: motion had ceased to be a change between fixed endpoints and 
had become a quality of the moved body, a quality whose intensity was ob-
served to increase throughout the motion.
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A similar dependence on the scholastic reorientation toward motion is 
observed in Galileo’s derivation of the law that the rate at which bodies fall 
is independent of their weight. Here again he employs experience only to tell 
him that Aristotle was wrong, a fact which had been noted at least occasion-
ally in the European literature since the sixth century. And again he reaches 
the correct law by a mental rather than an experimental argument.
It is an argument of the greatest ingenuity. If, says Galileo, we consider 
the fall of two identical bricks released simultaneously from a high tower, 
we know that since the two bricks are the same they must fall side by side. 
But since they fall exactly together, it will not affect their motion at all if we 
tie them together to make a single brick. This new brick will be just twice as 
heavy as either of the original two taken alone, and it will fall at the same rate 
as either of the others. A similar argument will hold for three bricks or four 
bricks or any number of bricks, so that finally Galileo is led to the conclusion 
that any two bodies, at least any two bodies of the same material, will fall at 
the same rate regardless of their weight.
The extension of this derivation, which applies only to bodies of the same 
density, to the more general case, in which bodies of different densities are 
considered, is an intricate one made even more difficult by the errors Galileo 
committed in tracing it. But for present purposes we need only examine the 
first step already sketched, for although it sounds completely convincing to 
us, it contains a hidden premise which made it totally inadmissible to anyone 
regarding motion from the Aristotelian viewpoint. For the statement that ty-
ing the two bricks together cannot affect the motion is logically valid only to 
the extent that the motion is governed by a force independent of the size and 
shape of the body on which it acts. To the extent that the medium exerts an 
appreciable effect on the motion, joining the two bricks may alter its character 
entirely. The air will no longer rush through them and will therefore exert a 
larger resistance. If the air serves the additional function of a pusher as it does 
for the Aristotelian projectile, the two bricks combined will present a larger 
area to push. These two effects might cancel each other; Galileo’s statement 
might be valid. But whether or not the result is correct, the argument is not, 
except for a person who already believes that the primary forces governing 
the motion reside within the body, and this point of view is of course foreign 
to Aristotle.
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It is therefore no surprise to discover that arguments almost identical with 
Galileo’s had been applied to the problem and rejected before his time. The 
critics examining them had declared that they were valid only to the extent 
that the motion of the body was governed by the body’s weight, but that since 
for any actual motion, many other factors, particularly the medium, were 
important, no such conclusion would hold for real bodies in the real world. 
Again, Galileo’s argument is dependent upon a new point of view about the 
essential characteristics of an old phenomenon.
Finally, let us turn our attention to the observations and discussions in 
which Galileo’s greatest genius is displayed, the discussions of the pendulum. 
Here we are confronted with a totally new insight, one which is not, so far as 
I can determine, even hinted at in any of the previous scholastic discussions.
Galileo first discovered the important property of the pendulum, when, as 
a young medical student, he spent some time during a lengthy church service 
in watching the motion of some lamps suspended from the roof. By timing 
each swing with his pulse, he noted that even when the swings were small, 
they appeared to take the same time as the larger swings which had preceded 
them, and that when the wind again set the lamps in more violent motion, 
the oscillations were still performed at the same rate. He then, so the story 
goes, applied the pendulum to the determination of the pulse-rates of his 
patients, and presumably in the course of this work discovered that the period 
of oscillation is also independent of the material of which the bob is built.9 
He discovered that the time taken to complete a swing depends only on the 
length of the suspending cord.
On this occasion he let the argument from simplicity lead him astray. He 
reported that the time required for an oscillation was independent of the am-
plitude of the swing not only for small amplitudes but for very large ones as 
well, and this is not even approximately true. But even the error is of extreme 
significance. If Galileo had been a more careful experimenter he would not 
have committed it; but if he had been more careful and less intuitive he would 
probably not have thought significant the original crude regularity observed 
with the aid of his pulse in the windy church. And if he had observed the true 
complexity of the pendulum’s motion, he would have been less apt to unify 
conceptually the motion of the pendulum and the motion on the inclined 
plane. For his mental unification of these two cases was dependent upon his 
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seeing in them identical sorts of simplicity. And it is from this unification that 
Galileo’s most fruitful contribution to dynamics proceeds.
The error was actually useful, for the importance of the observation is 
not that it provides a new quantitative law about the pendulum, but that it 
illuminated for Galileo the regularities of all terrestrial motions. It provided 
not a new law so much as a new sort of insight. And this, I think, helps us 
to understand why the observation was first noted and recorded at the end 
of the sixteenth century. If we ask, why it was Galileo who first made the 
observation, we can only receive the impenetrable answer, because Galileo 
was a genius. But if we revise the question and ask why the observation had to 
wait until Galileo’s time, why it was not made by Aristotle, Roger Bacon, or 
Leonardo da Vinci, then I think we can supply a more illuminating answer. 
All of these men had seen suspended lamps swaying in the breeze; all of them 
had proclaimed the crucial importance of careful observation; but for them 
the important characteristics of the motion of the swaying lamp were not the 
same as they had become for Galileo.
For an Aristotelian the motion of a pendulum illustrates the manner in 
which a heavy body displaced from its natural position regains that posi-
tion, closest to the center of the earth. It is a motion from a state of rest to a 
state of rest. It is just one of a large number of such motions, and in itself it is 
trivial. It supplies nothing new. For Galileo the oscillations of the pendulum 
are themselves a state of being. And the state is characterized by the con-
tinual repetition of the same oscillation. And this is a new phenomenon. The 
Aristotelian’s observation is more nearly correct—the pendulum does in fact 
come to rest; it never repeats quite the same path—but Galileo’s idealization 
is more revealing.
I therefore think it appropriate to conclude that these particular idealized 
abstractions, which alone are the abstractions which make the pendulum sig-
nificant and worth recording, were more likely to be made by a genius at the 
close of the sixteenth century than by a genius in antiquity, for the motion 
meant something new and different to the later figure. For by the end of the 
sixteenth century the motion of the pendulum had acquired a significance 
which it could not have possessed until motion was considered a state, and 
until curved and linear motions were considered to be part and parcel of the 
same underlying phenomenon.
This difference in the meaning or significance of the same observation 
to our two geniuses, one from antiquity and one from the Renaissance, is, 
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I think, borne out by the manner in which Galileo puts his observations to 
work. For in spite of remarkable exceptions which we shall have occasion to 
examine in future lectures, it is usually true that a new observation, which 
is recorded and becomes a fact with which future scientists must deal, is ob-
served and recorded by a scientist whose interests and training equip him to 
appreciate its significance, and Galileo certainly appreciates and exploits the 
significance of the pendulum.
From the remark that the pendulum regains the same height on each 
swing, Galileo proceeds to the observation that when a peg is placed verti-
cally below the point of suspension of the bob, the pendulum still reaches the 
same vertical height on both sides of its swing, even though the length of the 
suspending cord is different on the two sides. Since for Galileo, as for other 
members of the later impetus school, the curved path of the pendulum is 
produced by forces of the same sort as those which produce the linear motion 
of a body rolling down an incline, Galileo suggests that this characteristic of 
the pendulum law be extended to the inclined plane. He suggests that a ball 
rolling down one incline and immediately going up another will, like the bob 
of the pendulum, reach the same vertical height on both planes, and by an 
elaboration of this argument he concludes that the velocity of a body rolling 
down an incline is dependent only on the vertical height of the plane, not on 
its angle of inclination or on its length. And this leads him finally to the con-
clusion that if the plane is perfectly flat and is not inclined a ball that is started 
on it with a certain initial velocity will continue rolling in the same direc-
tion with the same velocity forever. With this remark Galileo comes within a 
hair’s breadth of the principle of inertia, the principle which, as Newton’s first 
law of motion, has totally transformed physics.
It is by thus interrelating the properties of the pendulum with those of 
motion down an inclined plane and by applying the laws thus arrived at to 
limiting cases in which the plane is horizontal and the velocity is conserved or 
in which the plane is vertical and the body falls freely that Galileo made his 
most important and most original contribution to the study of motion. And 
it was on the firm foundation provided by this truly brilliant piece of research 
that Newton and his contemporaries were able to build a totally new science 
of motion from which all Aristotelian elements were finally eliminated.
With this approach to modernity, we may appropriately close this eve-
ning’s lecture.
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The Prevalence of Atoms
In our last lecture we studied the transition in the attitude of Western scien-tists and philosophers toward a single problem, that presented by the study 
of the motion of terrestrial bodies. More precisely, we examined two different 
points of view toward the problem of motion and we saw how inadequacies 
in the first of these had led to a complete reformulation of the problem of 
motion and to a new set of laws. Tonight I should like to attack our subject 
differently. Instead of a single problem, we shall examine the application of a 
single approach to a variety of problems. We shall see, that is, the manner in 
which one metaphysical notion about the structure of the world has provided 
new insights to science and scientists. 
This notion, commonly called Atomism, is the belief that the world is 
made up of an infinite number of microscopic particles that are in constant 
motion in an infinite void. This idea about the structure of the world is one 
we owe, at least historically, to the Greek philosopher Leucippus and his stu-
dent Democritus who flourished in the Greek colony of Abderra in the fifth 
century, B.C.
I say “at least historically” for I should like this evening to find a middle 
ground between two extreme views which have been held regarding the rela-
tion of modern scientific atomism to the atomism of the ancient Greeks. The 
first is the truly absurd view that the Greeks, by sheer power of mentation, 
anticipated many or most of the conclusions reached by the combined efforts 
of nineteenth- and twentieth-century scientists. The second view, equally 
absurd, states that the resemblance between Greek and modern atomism is 
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purely fortuitous; that it’s simply a rather disagreeable accident that a lucky 
guess about the nature of the world by some obscure Greek philosophers 
should seem so similar to the totally different theory that emerged from care-
ful experimentation and mathematical research during the past 150 years.
I should like to suggest as an alternative approach that this question is 
misphrased. For since the beginning of the seventeenth century, science has 
believed in and made use of a number of different atomisms. For there is no 
one scientific atomism. There are several versions and different fields of science 
have occasionally employed incompatible versions of atomism at the same 
time. But these various atomisms have evolved as they were employed in new 
scientific contexts. And through this evolution the basic notion of an atom 
has itself been changed. 
So atomism has not been unaltered in its various contacts with science. 
But the same is true of science itself. This continued historical association of 
science and atomism has been fruitful. And if we trace the matter back, the 
first philosophical atomism to which science owes an important debt is the 
atomism of the ancient Greeks.
Greek atomism is in large part a product of the same set of dialectic prob-
lems that we examined in the beginning of the last lecture. Parmenides, you 
will remember, believed that everything which exists is eternal and change-
less. From this it follows that the vacuum, whose very name implies the ab-
sence of all being, cannot possibly exist. For how can nonbeing exist? So there 
must be only one thing that exists—the real universe that is completely full, 
self-contained, and eternally changeless. This theory is the first philosophical 
monism that is of historical importance.
Aristotle responded to Parmenides’s monism, you recall, by agreeing that 
there is no such thing as a void and that the universe is full. But, Aristotle 
recognized, this fullness of the universe does not imply an absence of change. 
Change and motion are still possible in a world without empty spaces as is 
illustrated by the motion of fish which move through water despite there be-
ing no spaces void of water; or the continued motion of a projectile which 
continues its motion through air because the displaced air itself, according to 
Aristotle’s clumsy theory, pushes the projectile along as it rushes around to 
fill the void that threatens to appear in the projectile’s wake. Aristotle’s view 
dominated thought in Europe well into the sixteenth century—and this is 
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not surprising given that this view of motion is built into Aristotle’s system of 
knowledge and gives us a commonsense view of the world.
But Aristotle’s was not the only way of understanding and preserving the 
reality of change from Parmenides’s onslaught. Another way to understand 
change was available even before Aristotle and was contained in Leucippus’s 
denial of Parmenides’s reasoning that the very notion of the void was self-
contradictory. On the contrary, Leucippus believed, the void exists, and so do 
little bits of microscopic matter that move about in it. It is the motion of these 
corpuscles that gives rise to the entire flux of experience.
What these corpuscles are brings us closer to understanding Greek atom-
ism. For dialectic reasons similar to those which led Parmenides to conclude 
that the world was unitary, indivisible, and changeless, Leucippus and other 
early atomists held that these individual particles were similarly eternal and 
indivisible. Thus they were called atoms, where atom means undivided. In 
this way, on the basis of Parmenides’s monism they made what can be called 
a monadology.
This atomistic view of the nature of reality had a number of logical and 
psychological consequences that were of great importance for later scientific 
thought. For one, there were now holes in nature because a genuine vacuum 
can exist. At the same time, it became clear that the universe must be infinite 
and extend forever in all directions. This conclusion followed logically from 
the first, for if there existed a boundary to the universe it would necessarily 
consist itself in corpuscles moving in the void. If we think there might be 
some area outside that boundary where nothing exists, then that area is sim-
ply a vacuum which is now granted to exist as a part of the atomistic universe. 
This is of course very different from the Aristotelian universe that I described 
in the previous lecture and which was understood to be finite and to consist 
in a set of concentric crystalline spheres. The earth was at the center of this 
system and the outermost boundary was thought to be a rotating sphere in 
which the stars were set. 
More important for our present purposes, however, is the consequence of 
atomism that all the changes, all of the variable qualities that we observe in 
nature are produced by the changes in positions and relative motions of these 
fundamental particles. As the later atomist Epicurus said,
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We must suppose that the atoms do not possess any of the 
qualities belonging to perceptible things, except shape, 
weight, and size, . . . For every quality changes; but the 
atoms do not change at all, since there must needs be some-
thing which remains solid and indissoluble at the dissolu-
tion of compounds, (something) which can cause change; 
. . . changes affected by the shifting in position of some 
particle, and by the addition or departure of some other.1
This is a very interesting statement, for the ideas which it expresses have been 
a continuing source of two fundamental ideas about the universe which have 
continued to be a source of both inspiration and trouble for later sciences. This 
is partly because Epicurus’s atoms are sensuously neutral. They possess only 
size and shape; that is, extension. As a result, to understand the variety and 
sensory luxuriance of the world exhibited to our senses we must not study our 
sense impressions, for they are scarcely trustworthy. We must instead search 
for the arrangements and motions of the corpuscles that underlie these ap-
pearances. This leads us to one fundamental idea, the tremendously important 
distinction between primary qualities which belong to the corpuscles them-
selves and the secondary qualities that we experience through our senses.
An even more important fundamental idea is that of the world as a ma-
chine operating behind our descriptions of the world whose parts are made 
of the same sort of stuff. Once the atoms are given their initial motions, they 
go on moving by themselves through the void and colliding with other atoms 
according to their own laws, not unlike the parts of a clock that, once wound 
up, continue to move of their own accord. Thus the universe itself could be 
seen as a giant machine, a piece of clockwork.
This idea is frequently thought to be a consequence of the Newtonian 
philosophy which dominated eighteenth-century thought. Newton himself, 
then, is often regarded as having single-handedly given the world this me-
chanical image of the universe. In fact, Newton did not entirely believe in 
this image himself. But as far as the popularity and influence of this notion is 
concerned, this claim about Newton is not misleading. This idea of the uni-
verse as a clock-like machine was nothing less than a dogma which influenced 
not only science and philosophy, but also politics and art.
For many working scientists, however, this notion of the universe as a 
machine is three quarters of a century older than the publication of Newton’s 
Principia. And in this older idea we see an unequivocally Greek source. For 
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at the beginning of the century Francis Bacon had written a defense of the 
works of Democritus and other Greek atomists. One of the main tasks of 
the new science, Bacon insisted throughout his life, was to study the primary 
motions which underlie the secondary qualities present to our senses. This is 
illustrated in Bacon’s research, chiefly into heat, and which offered examples 
drawn from the Roman atomist Lucretius.
Soon after Bacon, René Descartes, the French philosopher whose work 
greatly influenced the continental science of the seventeenth century, provid-
ed a complete model of the world as a machine governed by invariable, God-
given laws. The building blocks of Descartes’s universe were little corpuscles 
moving through space and acting on each other only by impact. Descartes’s 
views were so similar to ancient atomism that he was in fact accused of simply 
cribbing his philosophy from the Greek atomists. I could name others who 
were so influenced but will point out here only that the very name given to 
the major scientific tradition of the seventeenth century—“the New Philoso-
phy” or “the Mechanical Philosophy”—seems in large part to have denoted 
an attempt, with the aid of experimentation, to reduce all phenomena to the 
motions of elementary corpuscles. Robert Boyle, in many ways the leader 
of the movement for the New Philosophy, was admittedly indebted to the 
Greek atomists. In his writings Boyle describes the universe as “a self-moving 
engine” and “a great piece of clockwork.” Boyle’s major work is an attempt to 
apply these notions to chemistry.
So far, we have dealt with atomism as a purely speculative cosmology that 
was drawn by the free, creative power of the human mind from the consid-
eration of logical or pseudological problems. You may wish therefore to deny 
the name of science to this enterprise, and you may wonder why I am going 
into it in lectures devoted to the study of problems in scientific method. But 
I think you’d only be partly correct to deny the name of science to this mate-
rial. I will discuss my reasons for this in the fifth lecture and should not like 
to argue this point now. Here I wish only to point out that whether or not it is 
science, it has had important effects on areas of research that are indubitably 
scientific, as we shall now examine.
The first of these examples is drawn from material in the last lecture, The 
Foundations of Dynamics. I should like to point out an important effect upon 
the study of motion of the recovery of a limited portion of the atomistic view-
point. Aristotle, you will recall, conceived of a universe that is full, so that 
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motion is always through a plenum. As a result of this, there were always two 
forces involved in any motion: a pusher and a medium. This view was broadly 
held until the sixteenth century, at which time scientists, while not fully em-
bracing the atomism of Democritus, increasingly came to reject Aristotle’s 
plenum. Instead, many scientists came to believe on philosophical grounds 
that there exist tiny vacua in things. These vacua accounted for phenomena 
like condensation and rarefaction. Very light substances like air, on this view, 
are highly rarefied and consist almost entirely of vacuum.
This means that motion through air is more like the motion of Dem-
ocritus’s atoms through the void, which offers no resistance to motion, than 
Aristotle’s motion through a plenum which requires the constant efforts of a 
pusher. On this view, it became profitable for scientists to think about mo-
tions in which there is no resistance to the moving force. Motions caused by 
one force, in other words, became a worthwhile abstraction. This is the back-
ground for the acceptance of Galileo’s new argument about the two bricks 
being tied together and falling at the same rate as the two bricks not so con-
nected. When the medium was thought to play a different and important role, 
this argument was more readily rejected than it would be when the role of the 
medium came to seem less important.2
But the effect of this new attitude toward the void is not only felt in dy-
namics. The idea that vacua exist and that their size can be altered by finite 
forces suggested a new problem that was presented by an old phenomenon: 
the problem of pumps. It was known for more than a century before Galileo’s 
time that pumps in mines would not raise water to great heights. Generally, 
they could not raise water more than 30 feet. This was not surprising given 
the materials and techniques available at the time. Pump shafts were made 
of wood, for example, and boring techniques were crude. On paper, however, 
engineers continued happily to design pumps that will raise water hundreds 
of feet. The idea never arose that there is an inherent limitation here. On the 
contrary, given the belief that there can be no vacua in nature, it followed that 
if a plunger is drawn up water must follow it (in the absence of leaks, and leaks 
certainly existed).
Faced with this situation today we’d eliminate most of the leaks and dis-
cover that these improvements scarcely increase pump effectiveness. This path 
was not available to Galileo because leak-proof tubes thirty-five feet in length 
could not be fabricated in his day. But even without them, his belief that a 
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vacuum could conceivably be made by a finite force allowed him to suggest 
that this is what is happening in the pumps when the water fails to rise as far 
as it otherwise should. Water is breaking away from the plunger under the 
force of its own weight and leaving behind a vacuum.
As in the case of Galileo’s observations of pendulums, what we have here 
is a new point of view changing the significance of an old, well-known ob-
servation and aiding the creation of a new problem. Galileo does not do this 
single-handed, for several generations of attempts to improve pumps were an 
important factor. And this development doesn’t solve the problem at hand for 
Galileo’s account was in fact wrong. The correct explanation awaited Torri-
celli and his experiment with a mercury barometer. But Torricelli was a pupil 
of Galileo and his experiment was made possible by the way Galileo isolated 
this problem.
But we need not restrict ourselves to examining these ways in which as-
pects of Greek atomism came to influence later thinking and research. One 
might even argue that since none of these effects involve the fundamental, 
indivisible nature of basic particles, they ought not be called atomism at 
all. Nonetheless, the effects of Democritus’s complete view of the world are 
equally clear at this time. Galileo, for example, had suggested that a ball roll-
ing on a smooth, horizontal plane will continue with a constant velocity in 
a straight line forever. This is very close to what we now call the principle of 
inertia, but it misses it nonetheless. For it holds only for motion on a hori-
zontal plane.
Nor is this surprising, for one can’t get this notion of inertia from experi-
mentation. While balls rolling on horizontal planes do go on for some time 
compared to those rolling up or rolling down inclines, they do not go on 
forever because of the inevitable effects of friction. The law, that is, is an ideal-
ization and an unlikely one for Galileo to believe in because he is still in many 
respects an Aristotelian. He has rejected the distinction between natural and 
violent motion, but horizontal and vertical motion still seem different. They 
are as different as up and down versus sideways motions understood, impor-
tantly, relative to the earth. In an atomistic universe, however, there are no 
ups and downs. For the elementary corpuscles swimming in an infinite void, 
there are no directions because an infinite void has no directions.
It was the atomist Descartes who first enunciated this principle in its full 
generality, and in a way that led Galileo to his limited version. Atomism led 
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Descartes still further and provided him with an entirely new sort of dynami-
cal problem. This is the problem of impact. Since all changes in the motion 
of elementary corpuscles are brought about through the impacts or collisions, 
scientists had to study those impacts and ask, for example, What happens 
when two elementary particles collide? Or, How is motion transmitted from 
one to the other? The laws Descartes claimed to find in these collisions were 
bad and were later corrected in a way that led to the law of the conservation of 
momentum. But this study of impact was itself new and could not have been 
found in the scientific literature before. Now, it is almost the pre-eminent dy-
namical problem—the problem of billiard balls. But it arose not in that form, 
but rather under the influence of the atomistic view of nature.
There are many more examples of this influence. Besides these and other 
cases in dynamics, they occur in the study of heat, of light, and of chemistry. 
Instead of listing these in more detail, let me remark on the extent to which 
these developments culminate in and are given a new form by the work of 
Isaac Newton. I have already suggested one sense in which atomism provided 
a motive and a direction for Newton’s research, the sense in which the entire 
world can be understood as a machine. On this view, again, the universe is 
like a watch, composed of the same material throughout, and whose parts op-
erate in essentially the same manner everywhere. This conception, as much as 
watching the apple, lay behind Newton’s search for a “universal gravitation” 
that would describe the same force acting on the moon as well as an apple.
But the adjective “universal” has another meaning which is, I think, even 
more thoroughly atomistic. This meaning concerns universal gravitation un-
derstood as an attraction inversely proportional to the square of the distance 
between the center of any two bodies. Newton himself, however, was dissat-
isfied with this formulation. He demanded and then found a proof that if all 
the little particles within a body acted this way the resulting effect would be 
as though the entire mass of any body were concentrated at its center.3 This 
demand was new. Kepler and others working in this area were quite content 
to consider forces acting between bodies without so conceiving them as mas-
sive points. Newton’s insistence that laws of force be understood in this way 
as acting between corpuscles and therefore also between bodies is therefore 
new and I think its source lay in the notion of an atomistic world machine. 
Descartes, whose system was not successful had imposed the same demand, 
but I know of nothing which parallels it before the popularity of atomism.
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Newton’s fruitful application of atomism was not however restricted to 
dynamics. Newton was able to account for Boyle’s law on the basis of repulsive 
forces acting between particles and in optics, including reflection, refraction, 
and simple diffraction, he was able to make progress on the basis of atomistic 
ideas. After Newton, everyone was an atomist. But this was a new sort of 
atomism not the same as that of Democritus or Leucippus. This was not just 
atoms moving in the void but elementary particles moving under the influ-
ence of forces acting between them. This notion of forces acting at a distance 
was new and radical, as well. For until this time the only thing affecting the 
motion of elementary particles were impacts. The methodological importance 
of this was a shift in the aim of physicists: to discover new sorts of forces be-
tween bodies and to determine the effects of such forces. Not all, but much 
of the science of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was motivated and 
directed by this new kind of atomism which emerged from the Newtonian 
synthesis.
Since Newton’s day there have been too many fruitful applications of at-
omism and too many modifications of atomism to permit our undertaking 
even a superficial sketch. There is too much to cover and it is largely too 
technical. I will however reserve for the end of the hour a few more general 
remarks on the subject of modern atomism. For now, I should like to illustrate 
in a more detailed way how atomistic ideas can suggest new significances to 
old data, and of the manner in which atomism itself is modified by the ap-
plication.
For this purpose one could scarcely find a more central or typical figure 
than the English chemist John Dalton, whose work at the beginning of the 
last century brings genuine atomism into chemistry. It is perhaps better to say 
that Dalton’s work shows the fruitfulness of atomism for chemistry, because 
even before Dalton’s time a number of influential chemists believed that sub-
stances they studied were built up of atoms. This was an atomism borrowed 
directly from the physicists of the period. And its use was to explain those 
properties of natural substances that we should now call physical.
Consider Dalton’s pile-of-shot model of matter:4
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“View of a Square Pile of Shot,” from Dalton’s essay “On the Ab-
sorption of Gases by Water and Other Liquids.”
Each shot is an atom and the pile of them fill space, while the individual par-
ticles are themselves composed of two substances—the Core, which accounts 
for the weight and the nature of the substance, and an outer sheath of Caloric, 
a weightless fluid or jelly in which the particles are set. The Caloric sheath 
provides the forces between the individual atoms.
This model is useful in several ways. It accounts for the difficulty in com-
pressing matter, but also accounts for the expansion of objects or gases by 
heat. Caloric, after all, is just heat. This includes the way objects expand in 
all directions upon heating and it also includes changes of state (as atoms of a 
solid become a liquid, for example) and the different heat capacities of differ-
ent substances. These are admittedly not quantitatively useful features of the 
model, but they illustrate how it reduced and ordered different and seemingly 
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unrelated phenomena. That said, these are not chemical phenomena, either. 
There is no notion here that these particles enter into reactions with each oth-
er. It gives us a way to understand different kinds of substances—Hydrogen 
particles, Oxygen particles, and Water particles—but this is a static model 
that does not illuminate chemical changes of state.
These feature of Dalton’s thinking are perhaps best explained by the fact 
that he was not a chemist but a physicist, one who was deeply influenced by 
Newton’s atomism. To be more precise, his work was mostly in meteorology 
and the study of heat. As a meteorologist, though, he was much concerned 
with a chemical discovery that he made when he was in his teens. It was the 
discovery that air is not simple but compound. It consists of two gases, oxygen 
and nitrogen, plus some water vapor.
This itself raised some serious difficulties that Dalton tried to understand. 
One, the two gases are different in weight. But why don’t they form strata, 
with oxygen, being heavier, at the bottom? Another problem concerned gas 
absorption and the puzzle of why some, but not all gases could be absorbed by 
water. Dalton attempted to solve these puzzles by considering different ways 
of stacking atoms, different sizes for the caloric sheaths, and different kinds 
of force laws that might be operating. Through this he convinced himself that 
no one force law could possibly account for the lack of stratification of mixed 
gases or absorption phenomena. But he also concluded that a force law could 
be worked out satisfactorily only if the atoms, with their sheaths, were of dif-
ferent sizes and weights. There is no point in our examining the details of this 
theorizing, partly because it was bound not to work and was in some ways 
unusually absurd. The important point was that it directed Dalton to a new 
research problem: to find the sizes and weights of the ultimate corpuscles in 
the substances he studied.
It was Dalton’s great genius to point out that once certain assumptions 
were made, this could be done on the basis of existing chemical data. The 
assumptions in question were that that substances were made of atoms and 
that all atoms of a given substance are identical. (If they weren’t, we’d have 
two or more kinds of oxygen, for example, which complicates the situation 
unnecessarily.) On the basis of these assumptions, Dalton then found that 
one can compute the relative weights and sizes of the fundamental particles. 
For example, we know that 8 parts by weight of oxygen combines with 1 part 
by weight of hydrogen to form water. If this combination involves just two 
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atoms, then the weight of oxygen atoms is 8 times the weight of hydrogen 
atoms. It could of course be a combination of two hydrogen atoms to every 
oxygen atom, in which case the weight relation would be sixteen to one. But 
Dalton wisely refused to complicate the situation more than was required and 
proceeded to determine the weights of other kinds of atoms as well as the 
relative volumes of the atoms or corpuscles. He was able to do this because 
knowing that atoms are space filling, and knowing the relative densities and 
relative weights of the fundamental particles involved, you can discover their 
relative sizes. In this way he created a list of the relative weights and relative 
sizes of the atoms. The sizes were different and he convinced himself that 
his mechanism for understanding the atmosphere would work out. Dalton 
himself was delighted.
Now, if this was all that there was to Dalton’s theory, no self-respecting 
chemist would have paid any attention. The puzzle over atmospheric mix-
ing was not seen as a big problem, and it took very little perspicacity to see 
that Dalton’s theory of forces between particles would not really account for 
anything. In addition, the notion of atoms uniting with each other to form 
new kinds of atoms was speculative and did not seem to explain why it was 
that atoms should unite as they do. Why should it not involve 2 oxygens to 
one hydrogen, two hydrogens to one oxygen, or 7 to 11, or something else? 
Dalton’s theory provided no answers.
But it turned out that however much Dalton’s speculations were useless for 
solving the problems that interested him, they were of potentially great use 
for chemists. There was at this time, for example, great debate among chem-
ists about whether substances can combine in any proportion whatsoever. 
While hydrogen and oxygen show only one proportion, it remained that cop-
per and oxygen seem to combine in almost any proportion you may choose. 
If Dalton was right, there were only certain proportions in which elements 
could combine, which meant that other seeming combinations must instead 
be mixtures of elements. Dalton’s research thus introduced a clear criterion 
for distinguishing chemical from physical combinations of elements and this 
was of very great importance.
Another striking consequence of Dalton’s work for chemists concerned 
reactions of elements that combine in more than one ratio to form different 
compounds. Dalton suggested that in such cases one compound must be bi-
nary and two must be ternary. In the case of a nitrogen and an oxygen atom, 
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for example, the two can form nitrogen monoxide, NO, or three atoms can 
combine to form either the ternary nitrous oxide, N2O, or nitrogen dioxide, 
NO2.5 (The same is true for the carbon oxides, carbon monoxide, carbon di-
oxide, and dicarbon monoxide.) Thus emerged Dalton’s law of multiple pro-
portions, according to which a given amount of one element will combine 
with weights of a second element which bear to each other simple whole num-
ber ratios. Interestingly, this data had been available for years, and in Dalton’s 
time a number of chemists were planning to announce the existence of this 
regular pattern for a few particular compounds. But Dalton superseded them 
by showing the mechanism at work and its generality (with the result that 
many of these other chemists did not even publish their results).
So we see here how a new law entered chemistry, a new guiding principle 
to be used for all chemical manipulations, which came from a completely 
irrelevant source. For the gas problems with which Dalton was concerned 
were not relevant to chemists. And the central parts of this discovery from 
the point of view of the chemists were mere asides for Dalton. Searching as 
he was to understand the forces between fundamental atomic particles, the 
ratios in which elements combined had relatively little significance for Dal-
ton’s research. 
Just how irrelevant Dalton’s considerations were is perhaps shown by an 
immediate sequel to his discovery—a sequel which actually destroyed its 
theoretical underpinning. In 1809, just two years after Dalton announced 
his theory, the French chemist Gay-Lussac discovered another regularity in 
chemical reactions, the Law of combining volumes. This law states that vol-
umes of gases, for example, combine among themselves in very simple pro-
portions as ratios of whole numbers.
This result was immediately accepted with rejoicing by all chemists, who 
saw it as a beautiful proof of the atomic nature of their substances and their 
reactions. But Dalton could not believe it. He doubted not only the general-
ity of the law, but he accused Gay-Lussac of twisting his figures to produce 
the apparent regularity. This is not as strange as it may seem, because Dal-
ton’s insistence upon differences in volumes meant an insistence upon differ-
ent numbers of particles per unit volume. But the simplest interpretation of 
Gay-Lussac’s result was that there were equal numbers of particles, or at least 
whole number ratios of numbers of particles, in the volumes of gases. And 
this would not fit Dalton’s data at all. Within two years of his proclamation 
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of his theory it was destroyed. But Dalton held out until the end of his life. As 
far as these chemists were concerned, however, Dalton’s theorizing was not 
fully destroyed, for they were not committed to his theory of forces or to his 
computation of sizes of the different elements. They simply rejected the part 
of Dalton’s theory that he held on to while drawing great profit from those 
parts useful to them.
This does not mean, however, that the chemists were out of difficulties.6 If 
you consider, for example, the reaction where oxygen and hydrogen combine 
to create water, the fact that two volumes of hydrogen combine with one of 
oxygen seems to mean that the resulting compound is H2O. But this raises 
the question of where the extra oxygen atoms come to form the extra volume 
of steam? There are two ways of solving this problem. One is to suppose that 
there exist only half as many water particles per unit volume. This is plausible, 
but it gives a certain arbitrariness in chemical formulae. The same might be 
true of hydrogen, in which case water is not H2O but HO.
A better method was suggested by the Italian physicist Avogadro two 
years after Gay-Lussac’s discovery. Avogadro believed that equal numbers 
of particles exist in equal volumes of gas, but that these particles are not 
ultimate. They can be broken down in chemical reactions. So when water is 
formed by combining two volumes of hydrogen and one of oxygen, these sub-
stances are dissociating and recombining. This view solves the problem, but 
it’s absurd. For if an atom means “undivided,” then it means these atoms of 
oxygen and hydrogen are not really atoms at all and only more questions must 
be addressed. If they can be broken in two so as to form water, for example, 
then why not into three, five, or a hundred fragments? At this point, you may 
ask, what good is the very notion of atoms?
Because of these confusions, Avogadro’s proposal was scarcely even taken 
seriously for almost fifty years. This is a long story that I can’t retrace here, 
but I would like to note for future reference that this rejection of Avoga-
dro’s proposal caused great difficulties. For the proposal effectively linked 
atomic weights to measurable volumes, thereby establishing a standard for 
the weights of elements. But without that, different chemists wrote atomic 
weights and molecular formulas differently. What was the formula for wa-
ter and what was the weight of oxygen? Different answers caused very seri-
ous difficulties for all of chemistry. By midcentury, as the number of known 
compounds proliferated, the situation became almost unbearable. Different 
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chemists could not read each other’s papers without having in hand a table of 
the atomic weights used by the author in question. 
The difficulties were so acute, it almost led chemists to abandon atomic 
theory itself. As it happened, however, with the atomic theory shaken to its 
foundations, it became a great deal easier for chemists to eventually relinquish 
the traditional conception of atoms as indivisible and inviolable and to return, 
by 1858 and under the leadership of the Italian chemist Cannizzaro, to the 
modern view which finally provided chemists unanimity in their tables of 
weights and of formulas. This required, of course, a new sort of atom—one 
that could be broken; one that did not fill space like a pile of shot; and one 
without the caloric sheaths that once explained some physical properties so 
nicely.
To conclude then, we see that these chemical atoms emerging at the end 
of the nineteenth century were different from any we’ve met so far. They were 
not all made of the same kind of stuff, as were Democritus’s atoms. They 
could be split in certain ways during chemical reactions. And they did not 
have any function in explaining the physical properties of the substances into 
which they entered. The function of explaining these physical properties were 
at this time taken over by a different sort of atom developed by the physi-
cist—the atom of the kinetic theory of gases. Here the atoms are very small 
compared with the space they occupy. And they are in continuous, rapid mo-
tion as they move through this vast empty space. Each is like a hard little ball 
that rebounds with perfect elasticity when it hits another atom.
In fact, the possibility of reconciling these two sorts of atom seemed so 
remote that there was at the end of the century a widespread rebellion against 
atomism in general. Some admitted that atoms may be useful devices in terms 
of which to think. But it was said that science itself had shown that the notion 
of fundamental particles from which the universe is constructed is absurd. 
And to have believed in them, we were nearly as bad as the Greeks who 
indulged in similar kinds of futile speculations. However useful atoms may 
have been, it was said, the science of the future should purge itself of such 
notions.
Fortunately, this movement was not successful. In the last twenty-five 
years—and only then—we’ve successfully reconstructed an atomism which 
accounts for both the physical and chemical properties of atoms. It even tells 
us a good deal about the qualities of atoms in an aggregate. Again, however, 
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we are dealing with atoms of a new kind. This is the planetary atom, with 
electrons spinning around a hard nucleus which itself can be split into an 
increasing number of different sorts of particles.
What our notions on the subject will be fifty years from now is almost 
impossible to predict—but they will be different. The new ideas about fun-
damental particles will be achieved by the only tools we know how to use, 
namely our existing and inadequate gained from our examination of the plan-
etary atom. For just as in the earlier reshaping of atoms from those of Leu-
cippus to those of Dalton, it is in the course of applying our old tools to new 
problems that discoveries will be made which will again reshape our notions 
of atoms and of the nucleus.7
1. The quotation comes from Epicurus’s Letter to Herotodus and appears in Epi-
curus: The Extant Remains, trans. Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 31.
2. Kuhn notes here that the next three paragraphs may be omitted if the lecture 
is running long.
3. Kuhn neglected to write “the square of” in this formulation of Newton’s law 
of gravitation.
4. Kuhn’s outline directs him to draw Dalton’s “pile of shot” model on a black-
board. I inserted this illustration from Dalton’s essay “On the Absorption of Gases 
by Water and Other Liquids,” Memoirs of the Literary and Philosophical Society of 
Manchester, Second Series 1 (1805), 271–87. 
5. Kuhn’s outline instructs him to illustrate these reactions for his audience on his 
blackboard.
6. Kuhn marked this discussion of Avogadro as “omit if necessary.”




“The Principle of Plenitude”: 
Subtle Fluids and Physical Fields
In the last lecture we examined some aspects of the rise of the atomic or cor-puscular philosophy during the seventeenth century, and we noted certain 
new scientific insights and abstractions which an adherence to this underly-
ing metaphysical scheme had facilitated. Finally, we illustrated with the work 
of John Dalton the manner in which successive modifications of the atomic 
philosophy in the period from the publication of Newton’s Principia until our 
own day have accompanied the development of new and fruitful scientific 
theories.
The historical coincidence of the reign of atomic theories with the reign 
of science has led some philosophers and historians to identify science with 
the study of the behavior of fundamental particles moved by mathematically 
describable laws of force. The atomic picture of the world, together with the 
correlated notion of the world machine running throughout eternity under 
the dominion of immutable laws, has normally been labeled materialism, and 
science has been both lauded and vilified for the materialistic view of nature 
thought to be implicit in its methods and in its results.
I do not wish to involve us now in a discussion of the ethical correlates 
of science, ancient or modern. But I should like to dwell upon the historical 
fact that the progress of science has not been inevitably correlated with the 
atomistic philosophy, that there are other fruitful modes of scientific thought, 
and that atomistic thought has on some occasions retarded scientific progress 
in one field of research at a time when it was facilitating investigation in an-
other. In particular I intend to devote the bulk of this evening’s lecture to the 
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discussion of an example of the fruitful use in science of an alternate mode 
of thought.
This alternate manner of regarding the behavior of the external world is 
loosely described in the title of this evening’s lecture by the phrase “subtle 
fluids.” Unfortunately I know of no one definition of a subtle fluid adequate 
to cover all the occurrences of some such notion in the history of science and 
philosophy. I shall not therefore even attempt a precise definition, but will be 
content with a vague description of the idea. The notion will I believe become 
clear enough as we consider further examples of particular subtle fluids dur-
ing the course of the lecture. We must, though, understand from the start, 
that the notion of a subtle fluid is not, like the notion of an atom, correlated 
with a complete metaphysical picture of the structure of the world. Subtle-
fluid thinking may enter into a cosmology, but it is not itself a complete cos-
mology. On the contrary, except in the most ancient and perhaps in the most 
recent times, subtle fluids have been applied to the explanation of particular 
phenomena, of particular limited aspects of nature.
In its most general sense, the concept which I have labeled that of a subtle 
fluid is the concept of a corporeal or incorporeal substance which resides in 
matter and is responsible for some or all of the qualitative properties and 
the effects of that matter. The subtle fluid is a principle which bears quali-
ties. Historically it is very narrowly associated with the medieval concept of a 
substantial form. It is a thing in the sense that its effect, its behavior, can be 
described. But it is normally not corporeal in its pure form. You cannot pick 
up or collect a cubic foot of subtle fluid and perform experiments on it.
Technical variants of the subtle fluid are clearly visible in modern physics, 
but the notion is better illustrated by reference to commonsense examples of 
which science has made great use and from which it has now departed. Most 
everyday thinking about heat, for example, employs the notion of a subtle 
fluid. Heat is the fluid associated with the quality temperature. The stove puts 
heat into the pan of water, thereby raising its temperature. When the pan 
cools, the heat flows from it to the surrounding air or to the cool table surface 
on which the pan has been set. We shout, “Close the icebox door before the 
heat gets in.” But you can’t pick up heat, collect it in a measuring cup, or talk 
about its shape and color, and the same is true of the popular notion of elec-
tricity.1 It flows in wire, lights our lamps, or charges an electroscope, but you 
can never handle it in a pure form.
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Like the idea of an atom, the notion of a subtle fluid is very old. In one 
of its important forms, it was the ethereal fluid which filled all space and 
prohibited the existence of a vacuum. Variants of the space-filling fluid occur 
as Plato’s anima mundi and as the pneuma of the Stoics. In this last modifi-
cation, the subtle fluid becomes a vital principle, a form of the soul, and as 
such it was closely involved with theological controversy during the middle 
ages. In various guises then, the notion of a subtle fluid can be traced from 
the Greeks through medieval philosophy and theology into the early science 
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. And here again the form of the fluid 
appears as a medium which fills all space. It is, of course, the elimination of 
this notion of a full universe which paved the way for Galileo’s laws of motion 
and for the discovery and explanation of the barometer.
But having illustrated in previous lectures the manner in which underly-
ing metaphysical notions can in the course of their development facilitate or 
retard particular scientific insights, I should like this evening to omit con-
sideration of the historical continuity of the development of the idea of a 
subtle fluid in favor of a more detailed examination of one of its more recent 
applications. In particular I shall omit all further remarks about that aspect 
of subtle-fluid thinking referred to in the title of this lecture as the principle 
of plenitude.
Instead, let us now turn to a consideration of the role of subtle fluids in the 
development of chemistry during the hundred years between 1670 and 1770. 
Chemical theory, or perhaps more accurately the intellectual rationalization 
of chemical practice, was during the first half of the seventeenth century, as 
during much of its previous history, dominated by subtle-fluid thinking. Ac-
cording to a simplified, unified, and overtly coherent version of this rational-
ization there were four basic elementary principles: Earth, water, air, and fire. 
These were considered to be four different substantial forms which could be 
imposed upon neutral or base matter. And the characteristics, the qualities of 
that matter, were then determined by the amount of the relative proportions 
of the various principles residing in it. 
The various earths found in nature contained a superabundance of the 
principle, earth; water, or oils, or liquids generally were composed of base 
matter whose primary form was determined by an abundance of the ele-
ment water and whose more important differences were to be accounted for 
by varying proportions of the other three elements. Chemical changes were 
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explained as processes by which the relative abundance of the four elementary 
principles were altered. Some chemists believed in addition that it was, under 
extraordinary circumstances, possible to convert one of these principles into 
another, that is, to perform a true transmutation. But many other chemists 
regarded transmutation as a process in which one dominant principle was 
driven away from raw matter by the action of fire and another principle was 
substituted for it. Transmutation was, on this more prevalent theory, simply a 
particularly striking case of a chemical reaction.
The chemistry of four elementary principles which carried with them all 
the complex qualities of terrestrial bodies was, viewed in retrospect, incred-
ibly simple-minded. And, as a scientific theory, it was virtually useless; in 
this period the art of chemical practice immeasurably transcended its theo-
retical substructure. But as a rationalization of crude observations it was far 
from implausible. Three of the elements, earth, water, and air, corresponded 
to the three states of aggregation which are still recognized in all scientific 
literature: the solid, the liquid, and the gaseous state. These are certainly the 
most striking differences between natural substances. And, if you apply to a 
naturally occurring substance, particularly to an animal or vegetable product, 
the most usual tool of seventeenth-century chemical analysis, that is, distil-
lation, you do observe that during the disintegration of the wood or the plant 
that fire leaps up to the heavens, that smoke is given up which dissipates into 
air, that tars and liquid juices are squeezed out of the plant or wood being 
analyzed, and that the final residue is an ash which crumbles into fine dirt or 
earth. Most natural substances contain all four elements.
Furthermore, you do have in this very elementary and inadequate form 
of chemical theory the germ of some very important modern scientific no-
tions. At least implicitly, we are confronted in this antique chemistry with 
the modern idea that the great complexity of naturally occurring objects is 
produced by the combination in various proportions of a rather small number 
of elementary substances or elementary principles and that, by the application 
of appropriate chemical techniques, these complex bodies can be uniquely 
reanalyzed into the elements which originally gave them birth.
In the second half of the seventeenth century this whole notion of chem-
istry based upon the analysis of compound bodies into enduring elementary 
principles came under violent attack, particularly from Robert Boyle, the 
leading exponent in this period of the application to chemistry of the cor-
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puscular or atomistic philosophy of the day. On balance, the effects of the 
attack were highly salutary, for they pointed out the glaring inadequacies of 
previous chemical theory. Boyle, for example, emphasized the tremendous 
differences between the various substances lumped together as forms of earth, 
or of water. Again he pointed clearly to the difficulties raised by the fact that 
small changes in the distillation procedure could produce large changes in 
the products of the chemical analysis. And he questioned the grounds of the 
belief that distillation separated a substance into pre-existing parts, because 
it seemed always impossible to reassemble the products of a distillation in 
such a manner as to recreate the original substance. Generally he asked what 
grounds there could be for believing in the validity of the four Aristotelian 
elements. Perhaps, he said, more elements were needed, perhaps fewer; but in 
any case the ones in use at this time were, he said, totally useless. And most of 
his criticisms, which were by no means unsympathetic, were entirely justified.
But Boyle was constructive as well as critical. He called for the application 
to chemistry of the corpuscular philosophy which had led to so many fruit-
ful results when applied to physical problems. And these positive theoretical 
contributions, had they been taken more seriously, would have led chemistry 
into a blind alley, for the corpuscular philosophy as it was developed in the 
second half of the seventeenth century did not provide a propitious climate 
for chemical progress.
Boyle, you remember, believed that there was only one form of matter, 
that this was divided into innumerable small corpuscles, and that most if not 
all of the properties of substances which existed in nature were to be account-
ed for not by the nature of the fundamental particles which composed it but 
by the arrangement of these corpuscles and the manner in which they moved.
This is a perfectly logical point of view. It could perfectly well have been 
true, but it was not. And because it was not, adherence to it carried potentially 
disastrous consequences for chemistry. For any chemist who believes that all 
natural substances are made of the same sorts of particles, and that the dif-
ferences between these substances are produced by differences in the arrange-
ment of these common particles, must doubt with Boyle the very existence of 
any such things as chemical elements.
In The Skeptical Chemist Boyle provided a classic definition of an element, 
a definition to which most modern chemists would be glad to subscribe. And 
some historians who have examined this definition out of context have won-
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dered why it exerted so little influence on the subsequent development of 
chemistry. But to ask such a question is to misunderstand Boyle’s purpose 
and meaning. The definition is proposed argumentatively and dialectically, 
and Boyle proceeds from it to a demonstration that one must doubt, on the 
evidence, whether such a thing as an element exists. Certainly, he says, the 
empirical evidence for them is extremely limited. And besides, why should 
there be any such thing? If all the qualities of natural bodies can be accounted 
for by the motions and arrangements of the particles which make them up, 
and if all the particles are themselves made of the same sort of stuff, then it 
should be possible by suitable manipulations to transform any body into any 
other body. So, there are no permanent elements or principles.
Boyle was not quite this categoric. “I would not say,” he wrote,
that anything can immediately be made of everything . . . 
yet, since bodies, having but one common matter, can be 
differenced but by accidents, which seem all of them to be 
the effects and consequents of local motion, I see not why it 
should be absurd to think, that . . . by . . . an orderly series 
of alterations, disposing by degrees the matter to be trans-
muted, almost anything may at length be made anything.2 
On this view there are neither elements nor are there unique chemical analy-
ses. Any substance found in nature can in principle be broken down into 
an arbitrary number of other substances, and these new substances can, if 
the appropriate techniques are known, be transformed at will into any other 
substances.
But chemical reactions, unlike nuclear reactions, are not of this sort, and 
the effect of the point of view was to direct the attention of Boyle and his fol-
lowers in the corpuscular school to a series of experiments, which, although of 
great interest in themselves, contributed very little to the progress of chemis-
try in that or the next century. For Boyle was led to devote himself particular-
ly to the sort of chemical and physical changes in which it appeared that the 
arrangement of the particles of some one substance is altered by the action of 
some external agent. Thus he discussed the way in which the white of an egg 
is altered by the heat of the sitting hen to provide the various tissues which 
make up the newborn chick. And he considered the way plants transmute the 
pure water on which they are fed and fabricate from this water their own tis-
sue. Again, on the more strictly chemical level he examined the changes that 
can be produced by dissolving a substance like camphor in a number of dif-
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ferent liquids and then recrystallizing it. And, at this time, these experiments 
did not contribute appreciably to chemistry.
It is tempting to ascribe to the prevalence of the corpuscular philosophy 
in the seventeenth century the lag of a hundred years which occurs between 
the revolution which produced modern physics and the revolution which pro-
duced modern chemistry. But the evidence will justify no such far-reaching 
conclusion. We can, however, point out with some certainty, that the atomis-
tic view which was so major a facet of seventeenth-century thought contrib-
uted materially to the physical revolution of that century while providing at 
best a sterile soil for chemical progress.
Chemistry in any case continued to advance in terms of a revised system of 
elementary principles. Only a hundred years later, when the nature of a chem-
ical element had been clearly stated and illustrated by a number of examples 
was the chemist in a position to absorb physical atomism. And in adopting 
atomism, the chemists changed it by insisting on the radical differences be-
tween the fundamental particles of different elements. Atoms ceased to be 
made from the same sort of stuff.3
We cannot here survey the development of chemistry from the time of 
Boyle to the chemical revolution of Lavoisier, but much of it can be read as 
an extension of the chemistry of qualitative principles which we have already 
examined. But these principles were no longer the old principles. Following 
the biting criticisms made by Boyle and his contemporaries, chemists begin to 
speak of principles of acidity and principles of causticity or alkalinity. Again 
we discover in the literature of this period reference to a fossil salt which 
underlies all the chemical salts found in nature, and we find again the earthy 
principle, but now much restricted to apply only to the metallic ores. These 
classifications are still a long way from those of modern chemistry, but they 
have a decidedly familiar sound: acid, alkali, and salt. Air remains the only 
principle capable of producing a gas until the time of Lavoisier himself, but 
an increasing number of essential modifications of the gaseous principle are 
recognized.
Gradually during the century the number of principles multiplied, and 
natural substances were grouped more and more into categories recognizable 
by reproducible experimental criteria. Gradually the gross qualitative criteria 
like color were abandoned in favor of chemical tests like those we use to-
day to register acidity. As these categories multiplied and stabilized and as 
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skepticism mounted about the possibility of transmuting a substance in one 
category into a substance in another without the intervention of some third 
material, the notion of an elementary principle was replaced by the notion 
of an element. And these elements satisfied exactly the definition provided 
earlier by Boyle, who had not thought there could be such a thing. In many 
cases the transition from a chemistry of principles to a chemistry of elements 
was so gradual that the change was scarcely noticed, either by the chemists 
themselves or by the historians of chemistry. For the change in terminology 
involved no change in chemical theory. Once transmutations had been de-
clared impossible, there was no way of distinguishing base matter inhabited 
by a given chemical principle from the corresponding element.
The mode of transition is particularly clearly seen in an examination of 
the subtle fluid, phlogiston, which served the eighteenth century as a prin-
ciple of combustibility and metallicity. First proposed by the German, Johann 
Becher, in 1669, the new principle was named and given its final form by an-
other German, Stahl, thirty-five years later. No one of the numerous chemi-
cal principles which directed eighteenth-century chemical thought was more 
readily or more generally accepted by the chemists of the period, and, though 
today it is customary to sneer at the phlogiston theory, it was in its own day 
an extremely fruitful conceptualization.
At its birth, the subtle fluid phlogiston was little more than a new form 
for the old elementary principle fire. Phlogiston was the intangible fluid given 
off whenever a substance burned. Anyone who has ever watched the flame of 
a candle knows that there must be some such substance given off. Watch the 
way the flame leaps away from the wick. Something formerly imprisoned in 
the body of the candle is surely escaping. And any other substance which will 
burn must be in possession of the same principle, phlogiston.
Perhaps this sounds like the merest superstition, but observe the scientific 
structure than can be erected on this base. It is well known that if you burn 
a candle in a confined space it gradually flickers, grows dim, and finally goes 
out. The air that is left will not support respiration. Apply the standard test, 
imprison a mouse in this air, and the mouse will die. The air has been spoiled, 
lost its vitality, because it has been saturated with phlogiston. And once it has 
been so saturated it will support neither life nor combustion. It is dead air; it 
has been corrupted.
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That the two phenomena, life and combustion, should be so correlated 
was one triumph for the theory. It was generally known in this period that 
human beings and animals live by burning combustible fuels, the grains and 
grasses which they eat. And this combustion was thought to be the source of 
the body’s heat. What more natural than that the phlogiston given off in the 
process of internal combustion should saturate the air which we inhale and 
that this air should be exhaled in its dephlogisticated or spoiled form, just as 
though a candle had been burned in it.
The air thus functioned as a sponge for phlogiston. Its natural function 
was to absorb the foul effluvium given off by fires and animal respiration. And 
when saturated with phlogiston, the physical characteristics of the air were 
changed. Normal air is a highly elastic fluid. It can be compressed, and it will 
then regain its own volume, just as a spring will. But if a candle is burned 
in air until it goes out, the volume of the air is permanently decreased. The 
spring of the air, like that of a metal, has been spoiled in the process.
So far we have seen the elementary principle phlogiston as a principle 
common to all combustible substances and as a subtle fluid which poisons 
the air that absorbs it. But the utility of the principle by no means ends here, 
and it is in its third role that phlogiston achieves its historically most impor-
tant function. Charcoal, as you know, is a substance which burns particularly 
completely. It leaves only the smallest residue of ash. So it must follow that 
charcoal itself is almost pure phlogiston. It is in fact a compound composed 
predominantly of phlogiston plus a small amount of ash.
Now for centuries it had been common metallurgical practice to reduce 
earths, that is, metallic ores, to metals by heating them in the presence of a 
large amount of charcoal. This process could now be explained in terms of 
the phlogiston theory. In the reduction of an ore to a metal, a process which 
uses up a large amount of charcoal, the elementary principle phlogiston was 
transferred from the charcoal to the earth. And the addition of phlogiston 
converted the earth to a metal.
That all metals should contain a common principle was itself to be ex-
pected. For all the known metals were very similar in appearance: they were 
all shiny, they were all heavy, they were all malleable, they were all excellent 
conductors of heat. On the other hand the ores from which they were derived 
were very widely different in appearance. Some were red, some were black, 
some yellow and gray; some were hard, heavy, rock-like, while others were 
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fine powders. What more natural than that the entry of some common prin-
ciple into these very different elementary earths should produce a greater una-
nimity of properties, should make them all metallic? And so the single fluid 
phlogiston acquired a third function. It became the principle of metallicity.
The phlogiston theory thus provided a conceptual framework within 
which the oxidation and reduction of metals could be studied in detail, and 
historically this proved its most important role. For these reactions were par-
ticularly suited to provide fruitful clues to the research chemist. They were, 
in the first place, simple reactions, although this could not have been recog-
nized until later. The metals and their earths or oxides are chemically simple 
compared to the animal and vegetable matters to which so much previous 
attention had been devoted. Again the substances involved in these reactions 
could be readily obtained in a pure form, so that the reactions in which they 
were involved were more nearly reproducible than most of the reactions stud-
ied previously. And finally, these reactions were reversible. The metallic ores 
could be reduced with phlogiston from charcoal to yield the pure metals, and 
these metals could then be returned to their ores by heating them in the pres-
ence of air. If the air in which they were heated was confined, it was observed 
to lose in volume and to be spoiled by the phlogiston emitted when the metal 
rusted. And so the cycle could be repeated again and again, and its mecha-
nism could be studied in detail.
In short, the phlogiston theory was in its own day an eminently useful 
theory based on sound observation. It was economical in the sense that it 
permitted a large number of phenomena formerly thought to be distinct, to 
be treated as the effects of a single natural principle, and it thus measurably 
reduced the conceptual complexity of a portion of chemistry. And it was sci-
entifically fruitful. For it directed attention to the study of metallic oxides by 
which, as it happened, great progress could be made, and it suggested new 
sets of problems to eighteenth-century chemists in the investigation of which 
they made valuable additional discoveries.
For example, since both respiration and combustion were known to vitiate 
the air necessary for life by dephlogisticating it, the theory naturally suggested 
the question: what agency is constantly purifying the air? It was known that 
the total supply of air was limited, and yet there was no evidence that it was 
gradually deteriorating. The English chemist, Joseph Priestley, searching for a 
means to dephlogisticate the air discovered, after a long series of experiments, 
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that growing a plant in foul air would purify it, and thus started a whole new 
chain of investigations which by the beginning of the nineteenth century had 
led to an almost modern understanding of the elements of photosynthesis and 
plant nutrition. Again, the Swedish chemist Scheele discovered oxygen by a 
chain of reasoning based upon the phlogiston theory.
Furthermore, the theory adapted itself to new discoveries made by other 
means. Priestley, who discovered oxygen independently of Scheele and who 
noted very quickly that it supported combustion even better than ordinary air, 
labeled it dephlogisticated air, air which was even freer from phlogiston and 
therefore more capable of sustaining fire. When hydrogen was identified as 
an apparently new sort of gas, it was immediately taken to be pure phlogiston, 
for it would burn in air and it would reduce metallic ores even without the 
collaboration of charcoal.
I do not know what else can be demanded of any scientific theory. The 
phlogiston theory unified conceptually a group of apparently disparate phe-
nomena; it suggested new experiments which in turn in the investigation of 
which they made valuable additional discoveries, and these new discoveries 
could be handled within the theory; and it explained very neatly a variety of 
discoveries made without the aid of the theory. Nevertheless, the theory was 
wrong, and the manner of its overthrow deserves attention, for it illustrates 
many facets of the mechanism by which science advances.
It had been one of the great strengths of the phlogiston theory at the be-
ginning of the eighteenth century that all or most of the gases then known 
could be understood as modifications of common air by varying degrees of 
phlogistication. For at that time very few distinct gases were recognized. Al-
most no techniques for collecting gases were known—the pneumatic trough 
itself was a product of the eighteenth century—and gasses were more nor-
mally tested only for their “goodness,” their ability to support combustion 
and respiration.
But during the course of the century the technique of collecting gases 
over water and mercury was introduced and with it came several very much 
improved tests which made it possible to distinguish between gases that had 
been previously thought identical. Some of the gases thus distinguished fit-
ted the framework provided by the phlogiston theory nicely—oxygen and 
hydrogen, for example—but others could be fitted to the theory only with the 
greatest difficulty. Carbon dioxide and nitrogen ought, for example, to have 
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been identical, for one was a product of the combustion of charcoal and the 
other was left as a residue when a metal was burned in a limited amount of 
air. Both should have been phlogisticated air, and since both were transparent 
and inert, they were easily confused. But they could be distinguished and they 
were during the course of the century. There were a variety of ways of han-
dling the problem presented by the distinction. Some chemists just managed 
to ignore the distinction or to blame it on some additional character of the 
experiment. Others decided that carbon dioxide was a gas entirely distinct 
from air, that nitrogen alone deserved the title of phlogisticated air. Still oth-
ers managed to preserve a consistent theory by saying that while nitrogen was 
pure phlogisticated air, carbon dioxide was phlogisticated air plus water. But 
there was no unanimity in the matter.
Another grave difficulty which the phlogiston theory faced increasingly 
during the course of the eighteenth century derived from the observation that 
metals actually gain in weight when they give up their phlogiston and become 
earths. In this reaction the loss of the subtle fluid was invariably accompanied 
by a gain in weight, and it is this apparent incongruity which makes it so dif-
ficult for modern critics to understand how anyone could ever have taken the 
phlogiston theory seriously. But this again is a misunderstanding, a part of 
the mythology of science which obscures the nature of research.
The fact that metals gain in weight when they lose phlogiston or when 
they rust had been known for centuries before the phlogiston theory was even 
proposed. Yet it was not initially considered to present a difficulty either for 
chemistry or for the phlogiston theory. For, in the first place, the change in 
weight was quite small. It was normally less than twenty percent, and was 
not nearly so striking as the change of color or the change of texture. It was 
an incidental, not a primary, characteristic of the reaction, and it could be 
ignored, at least until the more important aspects of the phenomenon were 
better understood.
Today, of course, even the smallest changes in weight are considered of 
vastly greater significance than immense changes in qualities like color. And 
the fact that, until the middle of the eighteenth century, a change in weight 
could be ignored while a change in color seemed important is symptomatic 
of a basic difference in the attitudes toward weight of seventeenth- and eigh-
teenth-century chemists.
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To the seventeenth-century chemist, weight, like color and texture, was a 
quality. Therefore, like color, it could be imposed upon base matter, and, like 
color, it could change during a chemical reaction. And this change of weight 
did not violate the principle of conservation of matter. For matter itself, pure 
base matter devoid of qualities, was conserved in all chemical reactions. That 
had been a basic principle since antiquity. But that matter and weight were 
uniquely associated, that the same amount of matter must have the same 
weight in all its possible modifications was explicitly denied, both in antiquity 
and in much of the seventeenth century. There was and is no a priori reason 
why the conservation of matter should imply the conservation of weight. 
It was actually the work of Isaac Newton that made weight an intrinsic or 
primary quality of matter, that made weight a measure of mass, and it was 
largely through the spread of Newton’s influence in the eighteenth century 
that the weight changes which occur during chemical reactions achieved more 
than incidental importance. And since it achieved importance its conserva-
tion was taken for granted. The fundamental principle of all modern chem-
istry, the principle that the weight of the substances entering into a chemical 
reaction must be equal to the weight of the products, was first enunciated by 
Lavoisier one hundred years after the publication of Newton’s Principia. And 
Lavoisier enunciated it, not as a principle derived from experiment but as an 
axiom, which by the end of the eighteenth century all chemists were prepared 
to take for granted—once it was pointed out to them.
After Lavoisier, the study of weight changes became a fundamental tool in 
all chemical analysis. But between Newton’s time and Lavoisier’s, the attitude 
of most chemists toward weight relations was decidedly equivocal. Some of 
them did not consider the gain in weight when phlogiston was emitted to be 
important. Others held that fire particles entering the metal during its oxida-
tion would account for the change. Still others believed that air was absorbed 
by the porous earth formed during the oxidation process and that this would 
account for the change. Again there was no unanimity.
Now the interesting thing about all these difficulties with phlogiston the-
ory (and I’ve mentioned only a few) is that they did not lead to the abandon-
ment of the theory. In the 1760s and 1770s the theory became more and more 
complex and more cumbersome. New experiments called for new modifica-
tions and distortions of the theory, and though individual chemists adopted 
appropriate distortions to fit the theories to the new facts, there was a com-
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plete lack of agreement as to the particular manner in which the theory ought 
to be modified for a particular application. As a result, by 1775, when the 
theory was first publicly attacked, there were really a number of phlogiston 
theories. Everyone believed the phlogiston theory, everyone used it, but no 
one could agree on just what it was. And the overthrow of the theory pro-
ceeded not from this apparently negative experimental evidence but from a 
bright idea advanced by a man new to the field on the basis of his repetition of 
some experiments which had already been performed by others.
Antoine Lavoisier, frequently known as the father of modern chemistry, 
appears first to have turned his attention to chemistry shortly before 1770. 
Among his first experiments were two involving the combustion of phos-
phorus and of sulfur in limited amounts of air. These turn out to have been 
particularly propitious choices, for in contrast to the experiments on the com-
bustion of metals, sulfur and phosphorus in combustion display weight in-
creases of over 100 percent and produce large and immediate contractions 
in the volume of the air in which they are burned. Lavoisier found these 
experiments tremendously suggestive and he leapt to the conclusion that the 
process of combustion is one in which part of the air is absorbed by the sub-
stance which is burned. Both the volume reduction and the weight increase 
could, he thought, be accounted for in this manner. And he was so convinced 
of the truth of his explanation and its applicability to all processes formerly 
understood with the aid of the subtle fluid phlogiston, that he immediately 
deposited a sealed note describing his conclusions with the Secretary of the 
Academie des Sciences. Then and only then did he proceed to a careful exami-
nation of the other combustion experiments on which earlier chemists had 
based the phlogiston theory.
All of these experiments were, he found, compatible with his original 
idea. When appropriately performed all combustions reduced the volume of 
air and yielded a product weighing more than the original starting substance. 
But this was not much improvement on the phlogiston theory. It explained to 
be sure the increase in weight, but that could be handled although in a more 
complicated manner with the phlogiston theory too. And the new theory 
failed to explain many things which the older theory had made very clear. 
Why were some substances combustible and others not? Again, why, if air 
enters into metal during combustion, does the process stop before the air is 
exhausted? And why is the residue incapable of supporting combustion or 
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respiration? Or why do the metals show such uniform behavior if they are 
more different in composition than the earths? Lavoisier’s theory in this form 
had advantages only for a man who, like Lavoisier, thought that achieving 
constant weight relations was the chemist’s first responsibility.
Actually the suggestion that air is absorbed or “fixed” during combustion 
was an old one. It had been advanced by several English chemists during 
the seventeenth century, and it had been ignored or rejected in favor of the 
phlogiston theory. The weight relationships were simply not that important. 
And the reasons for the ultimate success of Lavoisier’s theory lay partly in the 
new attitude taken toward weight in the eighteenth century and partly in an 
improvement which he was able to give to the theory.
This improvement was the recognition that air is not a simple substance 
but a mixture of two distinct gases, oxygen and nitrogen. And the experi-
mental ground of this recognition, which had not been a part of Lavoisier’s 
first statement of his new theory, was provided again by an experiment first 
performed and differently interpreted by a believer in the phlogiston theory, 
Joseph Priestley.
Priestley discovered that red oxide of mercury, unlike other metallic 
earths, could be turned into a metal at moderate heats without the interven-
tion of charcoal, and that in this process a gas was liberated which supported 
combustion better than normal air. He called the gas dephlogisticated air, 
and thought of it as completely freed of phlogiston. For Priestley the discov-
ery represented a new triumph for the theory.
Lavoisier repeated this experiment with a measured amount of the red 
oxide. He carefully collected and measured both the gas and the mercury 
produced by the decomposition. Then he heated the mercury in an atmo-
sphere consisting entirely of the new gas. The red oxide or earth was formed 
again, and this time there was no residue of gas. Priestley’s dephlogisticated 
air would support combustion until it was entirely exhausted.
This gave Lavoisier the modern answer—the new gas was oxygen, and it 
was part, but only part, of normal atmospheric air. Normal air was a mixture, 
and only the oxygen portion of it would support combustion. It was this gas 
which was absorbed during combustion, and it was the absorption of this gas 
that accounted for the reduction in volume of the air and for the increase in 
weight of the resulting earth. The earths were compounds, the metal elemen-
tary.
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The new theory was a good theory, produced by one of the great geniuses 
science has known. A modern student comparing it with the phlogiston the-
ory immediately recognizes the greater simplicity of the new scheme. But it 
was not immediately accepted by Lavoisier’s contemporaries. The phlogiston 
theory could be and was revised to account for all the phenomena explained 
by the new theory. The revision was cumbersome, but quite adequate to fit the 
facts. And for its adherents it had two great advantages: it explained combus-
tibility, why things burn, and it explained the common appearances of the 
metals. Chemists who accepted the oxygen theory had to conclude that the 
explanation of these phenomena was no concern of chemistry’s, and modern 
investigations have shown them to be wrong, for today we can account for 
these properties.
During the twenty-five years between Lavoisier’s announcement of the 
new theory and the end of the century more and more chemists switched 
their allegiance from phlogiston to oxygen. By the end of the century Joseph 
Priestley, whose experimental discoveries had done so much to create the 
oxygen theory, was almost the only major chemist to oppose it. And this op-
position he maintained until his death.
So by the nineteenth century, chemists had finally readjusted to the large 
number of new experimental discoveries made during the preceding hundred 
years. But even this readjustment, modern as it sounds to us, had by no means 
banished subtle fluids or the chemical principles from an active role in chemi-
cal research. For Lavoisier, oxygen itself was still a chemical principle; it was 
the principle of acidity. The presence of this principle oxygen gave to a liquid 
its acid properties. This was certainly reasonable, for most acids do contain 
oxygen; but it was also quite wrong, as the subsequent analysis of hydrochlo-
ric acid was to show. Nitrogen, Lavoisier suggested, was probably also a prin-
ciple, the principle of alkalinity. And these principles, nitrogen and oxygen, 
were not the gases that we call by these names today. On the contrary, the 
gases were themselves compounds of the principles nitrogen and oxygen with 
the subtle fluid caloric.
For it was really caloric, not oxygen, that replaced phlogiston during the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Caloric was the substantial form of heat, 
and perhaps also of light. It was this fluid, you remember, which held the 
small particles of elementary substances apart and which, by its emission dur-
ing chemical reactions, accounted for the heat and the light evolved.
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Just as a major virtue of the fluid phlogiston had been its ability to unify 
under one conceptual scheme a group of apparently disparate phenomena, so 
it was the virtue of caloric to permit the explanation of phenomena as diver-
gent as the expansion of matter when heated, the emission of heat in chemical 
reactions, the different capacity of different substances to absorb heat, and the 
common physical properties of the known gases.
Phlogiston and caloric are but the beginning of a long list of subtle fluids 
which have played an important and fruitful role in the development of sci-
ence. In the seventeenth century, the actions of magnets had been explained 
in this manner. Newton, despite his general adherence to the corpuscular 
philosophy had employed a subtle fluid filling all matter in his mathematical 
explanation of the colored rings formed by thin films, and he had suggest-
ed that the same fluid was responsible for the observed effects of refraction 
and reflection. For many years he had tried unsuccessfully to describe a fluid 
whose properties would account for the action of gravity, for in spite of the 
impression to the contrary, he was never satisfied with the notion of action at 
a distance.4 And for many years he sought a subtle-fluid explanation for it.5 
In the eighteenth century, electricity and heat join the chemical principles 
in the list of subtle fluids guiding the direction of scientific research, and in 
the nineteenth century many of these reappear in modified form. Subtle flu-
ids vanish from chemistry entirely in this period and are replaced completely 
by the chemical elements. With this transition chemistry is, as we pointed 
out in the last lecture, in a position to profit from atomism; but this of course 
was a new sort of atomism, an atomism which admitted many different sorts 
of fundamental corpuscles.
Heat had a somewhat similar history. During the reign of philosophical 
atomism in the seventeenth century, it was normally taken to be a mode of 
motion. The corpuscular philosophers, led by Bacon and Boyle, examined the 
sorts of agents which could produce heat. In particular they examined the 
heat generated by friction and by percussion, for these were obvious examples 
of the transmission of heat as motion, and they were taken to be fundamen-
tal. This portion of seventeenth-century research on heat was fruitless. In the 
eighteenth century, heat was studied as an entity which flowed from body 
to body, as a subtle fluid, caloric. And these investigations resulted in the 
discovery of specific and latent heat. But in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
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turies, heat was successfully treated as a product of the motion of fundamental 
particles, and this subtle fluid has been abandoned.
But subtle fluids, though modified again and again, are not always aban-
doned in favor of atomistic hypotheses. The modern concepts of light and of 
the electric and magnetic field are products of a gradual evolution of subtle-
fluid thinking. In their present highly mathematical form, these concepts 
have lost all or most of their resemblance to the weightless fluid, inactive but 
tangible, from which they have grown. Perhaps the name “subtle fluid” is 
now as serious a misnomer as the name “atom.” But whatever the name, these 
modern descendants of the subtle fluids remain conceptual entities, distrib-
uted in space, and active agents in the generation of scientific data.
1.  Kuhn inserted by hand “the popular notion” here, perhaps because he realized 
that in some senses electricity can be stored in a jar, as illustrated by electroscopes 
and the Leyden Jar, a simple kind of capacitor, which he discusses later (see note 5).
2.  This quotation comes from Boyle’s essay “The Origins of Forms and Quali-
ties According to the Corpuscular Philosophy.” See Selected Philosophical Papers of 
Robert Boyle, M.A. Steward, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 49–50. Kuhn mistook 
Boyle’s “local motion” for “locomotion.” 
3.  At this point, Kuhn noted but later crossed out by hand: “Qualify discussion of 
substantial form to indicate that there are also some qualities associated by accident, 
but that these are the unimportant ones. Thus two bodies inhabited by the same sub-
stantial form need not be entirely identical.” 
4. Here Kuhn typed two parenthetical notes, which he later crossed out: “Get 
caloric and light into the list of Lavoisier’s elements” and “Modify the quality-bearing 
aspect of your original definition of subtle fluids.”
5.  What follows from this point forward is a shorter version of the lecture’s con-
clusion that Kuhn appears to have typed subsequent to completing an original, con-
siderably longer version of the conclusion. The original, longer conclusion reads as 
follows:
In the eighteenth century, electricity and heat join the chemical principles 
in the list of subtle fluids guiding the direction of scientific research, and in the 
nineteenth century many of these reappear, modified into both the elastic ether 
by which light was supposed for a long time to be transmitted and into the lines 
of force which describe the properties of the electric and magnetic fields.
We are certainly not through with subtle fluids today. In fact, the variety of 
different subtle fluids which have played distinctive roles in the progress of sci-
ence is so vast that I cannot resist one last brief example of the way in which the 
concept of a subtle fluid can simultaneously guide and be modified by experi-
mentation. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the attraction of a glass 
Notes
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rod briskly rubbed with cloth for dust or minute particles of paper in its vicinity 
was generally accounted for by the presence of a subtle effluvium normally con-
tained in the glass and permanently anchored to it. The cloth rubbing the glass 
excited the effluvium and caused it to stream out into the atmosphere where it 
attracted light neighboring particles. The reality of the effluvium could scarcely 
be doubted. If the rod were held close to the face a tickling sensation like that 
produced by cobwebs was clearly distinguished. In 1731 an obscure English 
pensioner named Stephen Gray performed some electrical experiments with a 
large, hollow glass tube in whose ends he had inserted a cork. To his surprise, he 
found that rubbing the tube not only excited the glass but that finally the corks 
themselves gave evidence of emitting the electrical effluvium. By further experi-
mentation, Gray showed that these effluvia could be transmitted over quite large 
distances. Clearly then, it was not anchored to the glass but was in fact a fluid 
originally resident in the glass but which could when excited be made to flow 
away from it. And this fact was also taken to explain the previous observation 
that the rubbed glass rod does not maintain its electrical properties indefinitely 
if it is surrounded by air. Fourteen years later, Pieter van Musschenbroek of Ley-
den tried the law of the electric effluvium in the glass rod or any other charged 
body to the air. What more reasonable than to surround the charged body not 
by air but by some substance known to be a very poor conductor? Accordingly, 
Musschenbroek enclosed water to be charged inside a glass vial and ran a wire 
through the cork of the vial into the water to serve as the medium of transmis-
sion of the original charge. All went well—the water was charged and a friend 
Andreas Cunaeus approached in order to withdraw the wire from the cork so that 
no path would be left for the electricity to escape. On touching the vial and the 
wire simultaneously he received a tremendous shock. Musschenbroek tried the 
same thing and was even more strongly affected. It was like lightning. No such 
artificially generated shock had ever been experienced before. A manner of ac-
cumulating, of storing up the electrical fluid had been discovered. This was the 
famous Leyden Jar. Within a year scientists all over Europe were experimenting 
with the new device. One of these, William Watson, and English Apothecary, no-
ticed that when he grasped the vial with one hand and the wire with the other, the 
shock appeared to affect “no other part of his body but his arm and his breast” 
(Whittaker, page 42). This in turn suggested that the actual shock was caused by 
the transference of the ethereal electric fluid from the wire which was grasped in 
one hand to the vial which he held in the other. And this is fun. Fluid follows the 
easiest, or as he thought, the shortest path. With this hint and on the basis of fur-
ther experiment he elaborated existing theories of the electrical fluid in a manner 
which sounds almost modern. There is, he suggests, in the world a certain total 
amount of the electrical fluid, and this is normally distributed in all bodies with 
equal density. When a body is charged an excess of this fluid is transferred to it 
from some other body and the ability of the charged body to attract the particles 
of dust or paper grows with the amount of excess placed in it. If two bodies 
containing different densities of the electrical fluid are connected, the fluid will 
flow from the one of greater to the one of lesser density until the two densi-
ties become equal. The fluid itself is neither created nor destroyed. With minor 
modifications this is the theory that you and I learned in high school. (Add some 
concluding remarks here depending on how it shapes up when you go over it.)
Kuhn left blank spaces for each appearance of “Musschenbroek” and for Musschen-
broek’s friend and student, Andreas Cunaeus. His reference to Whittaker is likely to 
Edmund Whittaker’s A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity from the Age 
of Descartes to the Close of the Nineteenth Century (London: Longmans, Green, and 




In the first lecture of this series, I advanced, at random, a number of reasons for rejecting the description of the scientist as a man who proceeds without 
preconception to make dispassionate observations about the world in order 
that he may discover invariable sequences. And during the three lectures 
which followed, we examined selected incidents from the history of physical 
science in an effort to provide material from which this point of view might be 
documented and from which a more adequate picture of the scientific activ-
ity might be reconstructed. It is to this discussion of the role of prejudice and 
preconception in science that I should now like to return.
But in beginning this second stage of our lecture series it may be better 
to adopt a slight modification of vocabulary. In the first lecture I called the 
elements whose roles in science we now wish to examine preconceptions and 
prejudices, and this choice was not made without a purpose. At the time I 
wished particularly to emphasize that these elements were, in the first place, 
in existence prior to the beginning of active research and that they were not 
normally drawn from evidence relevant to the particular investigation at 
hand. Second, this choice of terms served to emphasize that these elements, 
or preconceptions, or prejudices, were frequently unconscious; that they were 
not normally the result of deliberate rational consideration of the particular 
problem with which the scientist was engaged.
Finally I hoped that the choice of the word prejudice would suggest that 
the elements under discussion were individual and alterable. For although I 
believe they are normally gained as results of training, scientific and social, 
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and that they are therefore characteristics of professional groups for many 
years at a time, it is equally true that particularly productive steps in physical 
science are frequently or perhaps invariably associated with the application 
of a new and individually rooted prejudice to an old problem. Or, to put the 
same point differently, I wished to emphasize that although these prejudices 
legislated for experience like the mental categories proposed by Kant, they 
were not, like Kantian categories, necessary or a priori.
But the words preconception and prejudice are negatively colored. In their 
normal usage they imply an absence of intellectual activity and a regression 
from rationality. Since I now wish to discuss the role of such elements in sci-
ence, an activity which I take to be intellectual and rational in the extreme, it 
might be best to admit them to a more constructive function and to call these 
elements the points of view of the active scientist or the principles which ori-
ent his perceptions and his judgments about the phenomenal world.1
That there are such points of view underlying and contributing to all re-
search can, I trust, no longer be doubted. We have examined numbers of 
them; and we have seen them acting both as sources of scientific inspira-
tion and as blocks to scientific progress. In the third lecture, for example, we 
noted some of the new physical insight and new laws whose development had 
been facilitated by an adherence to Greek atomism. We saw, among other 
things, that the general principle of inertia was for an atomist a reasonable 
generalization of Galileo’s statement about the infinite motion of a ball roll-
ing on a horizontal plane, but that it was not a reasonable generalization for 
an Aristotelian. And we remarked on the fruitful new problem, the problem 
of impact or collision, which an adherence to an atomistic point of view had 
suggested to the philosopher Descartes. But, examining the other side of the 
coin, we discovered in our last lecture that, for all its suggestiveness to physi-
cists, the corpuscular philosophy had been a real block to chemical progress 
in the seventeenth century. 
We could have duplicated this example if we had studied the development 
of the science of heat. In the seventeenth century the corpuscular philoso-
phers believed that heat was, like other qualities, a mode of motion. Accord-
ingly, they took as their primary subject of study the generation of heat by 
friction and percussion. These were the obvious cases of the transmission and 
generation of heat by motion. But these were, in this period, fruitless experi-
ments. Important theoretical developments in the study of heat waited until 
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the eighteenth century when, under the leadership of Joseph Black, scientists 
studied heat as a fluid which could be stored in bodies and transmitted with-
out loss from one body to another. And from this viewpoint proceeded a dif-
ferent series of experiments which led to the discovery of specific and latent 
heat and to the development of calorimetric techniques.
These are, of course, very restricted examples of a phenomenon which we 
have already observed to be far broader in it scope. A more complete study of 
the role of points of view in the progress of physical science would require a 
detailed taxonomic or classificatory study of the types of orientations which 
have played important roles in the development of physical science. We would 
have to study, in addition, the logical and psychological sources of such view-
points, and we would need a more detailed account of the effects which these 
orientations have upon scientific thought.2 But such study must await further 
research. Here I can only suggest certain preliminary divisions and gener-
alizations which seem useful in the examination of scientific points of view.
We have, for example, dealt repeatedly with what might be called cos-
mological orientation, or cosmological prejudices. These may be described as 
implicit or explicit views about the structure of the universe. Is the universe 
finite or is it infinite? Does the universe have a fixed center, and are their pre-
ferred directions in it? Or, is space everywhere homogeneous—as it was for 
the atomists?3 Again, is the universe made up of atoms? Is the perceptual flux 
to be accounted for by changes in the positions and motions of these ultimate 
particles, or are there quality-bearing principles? Are there subtle fluids?
We have examined numerous effects of such cosmological viewpoints dur-
ing the preceding lectures. But let me illustrate once more, for it will elimi-
nate a simplification which we adopted in the last lecture. You will remember 
that I there attributed the identification of weight with quantity of matter to 
Sir Isaac Newton. It was this identification which finally provided so large a 
problem for the phlogiston theory in the eighteenth century. But the contro-
versy about weight is older than Newton, and Newton’s enunciation is in part 
derivative.
If, as both Aristotle and Descartes believed, the universe is necessarily 
full, or if to possess extension is necessarily the same as to be material, then 
the true measure of matter or of mass is not weight but volume or extension. 
Weight is, in this case, a secondary quality, a product of position and motion 
and impact. Thus weight need not be conserved, it is of secondary scientific 
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importance, and the meter-stick rather than the balance is the pre-eminent 
tool of science. And indeed the metaphysical debate about the fullness of the 
universe is a relevant portion of the intellectual background for the New-
tonian annunciation of the proportionality of mass, quantity of matter, and 
weight.
But not all of the underlying viewpoints which we are considering can 
appropriately be described as cosmological. Certainly we have observed other 
sorts of orientations which may but need not be grounded in pre-existing cos-
mological beliefs. And among these is a type which we may at least crudely 
describe as metaphorical viewpoints, as tendencies to see certain different 
sorts of behavior as similar, or as mutually revealing. Indeed all science is 
dependent upon metaphor though normally the metaphor is implicit and un-
recognized. In the first lecture, when we discussed the hypothetical search for 
a law of the rostrum we assumed from the start that this law when discovered 
would be applicable to all rostra, or at least all rostra supplied to the same 
specifications by the same manufacturer. Without this assumption we should 
not even have started our investigation. But it was an assumption, and it was 
a metaphor. For it took for granted a similarity as regards the end-product of 
our investigation of two objects which were not only philosophically distinct 
but also physically different. 
Perhaps you find this a trivial example, but we have been concerned in 
recent lectures with logically identical examples which do not have the ap-
pearance of triviality. Remember, for example, the consequences to dynamics 
of the reorientation in which motion ceased to be regarded as a change of state 
and was instead grasped conceptually as a state. Or consider the consequences 
of the conceptual unification of linear and circular motion. It was this uni-
fication, you’ll remember, which gave the pendulum a new significance and 
which led both to new observations and to new quantitative laws. And we 
observed similar metaphorical problems in our study of chemistry. Were sul-
fur and gold, because of their common color, to be correlated as bearers of 
a common principle, or was gold to be listed with the metals because of its 
lustre and its texture?
There is a third sort of orientation which appears less clearly in the par-
ticular historical examples which we have already covered, but which is nev-
ertheless of supreme importance. It may be described as a point of view re-
garding the sort of questions which scientists may legitimately ask and the 
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sorts of answers which they may legitimately accept. In the last lecture, for 
example, we observed that the transition from the phlogiston theory to the 
oxygen theory appeared, quite erroneously, to necessitate the elimination 
from chemistry of the question, why do things burn? And we noted more 
generally that nineteenth-century chemistry, by eliminating the qualitative 
principles which had dominated the field during the preceding century, elim-
inated as objects of scientific investigation many of the qualitative properties 
of chemical substances. The quality-bearing principles, like phlogiston, were 
then labeled occult qualities, qualities without scientific explanatory power, 
and the questions which their existence had previously answered were dis-
missed from science. But today we have resurrected these problems and found 
answers to them.
Our ability to label and dismiss as occult older forms of scientific con-
ceptualization has led to a great deal of misunderstanding of the history of 
science. And it has now led to many overly narrow definitions of the nature of 
scientific problems. We scorn as unscientific Aristotle’s pronouncement that 
the planets must travel in orbits compounded of circles, because it elevates 
the circle to a unique position among geometric curves, and we consider that 
this gives the circle an occult property. Yet we applaud Einstein’s pronounce-
ment that the planets must necessarily travel along geodesics. And I think 
that no difference between the logical forms of these two laws can be found. 
We laugh at phlogiston as a weightless fluid which cannot be isolated, yet we 
speak of electromagnetic radiation which, like phlogiston, can be known only 
through its effects.4 I know of no criterion of occultness which will show that 
we have reduced the number of such conceptualizations in science or that we 
could profit by doing so.
Our actual criteria of occultness are prejudices of our own scientific gen-
eration. They lead to far too narrow a notion of the appropriate problem struc-
ture of science. We once, for example, banished with loud huzzas all teleo-
logical problems from physics, and, we thought, from science, but we have 
recently learned from the physiologists how fruitful research on teleological 
questions can be.
I do not believe that the preceding list of types of orientations or points 
of view is by any means exhaustive. Certainly there are other sorts, and I 
suspect that a better list would blur many of the distinctions which I have 
made above. But we have already proceeded far enough to note many of the 
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functions performed by these orientations, and it is these that I should like 
now to re-emphasize.
These orientations are conceptual frameworks which suggest the aspect 
of nature which the scientist ought to investigate. They provide his problems, 
and changes in orientation produce changes in these problems. In addition 
these viewpoints dictate to a large extent the sorts of experiments which may 
be performed in order to discover answers to these questions. And by estab-
lishing metaphorical connections within the phenomenal world they provide 
boundaries within which the scientist must search for his regularities or laws.
But they do far more than this. For as simultaneous directives to prob-
lems and experiments they already contain implicitly a major portion of the 
generalized conclusions which the experimenter will draw from his limited 
and concrete results. They point toward the particular idealization which the 
scientist will find illustrated in his experimental data. And again, as we il-
lustrated with Galileo’s laws, or with Descartes’s derivation of the principle 
of inertia, or with Dalton’s discovery of multiple proportions, changes in the 
orientation will produce changes in the laws derived from existing data.
These points of view, then, provide limitations upon the form in which our 
laws may be cast. They thus narrow the gap between the concrete data which 
can always be interpreted in an infinity of ways and the particular law which 
in fact we derive from those data. And in doing this they enable us to evalu-
ate our data, for though the gap is rarely so wide as we observed it to be in 
the case of Galileo, no experiment conforms exactly to the law derived from 
it. There is always a divergence between the results of scientific experiment 
and the predictions of scientific law, and our orientations, which in this case 
appear quite literally as prejudices, provide5 the ground on which we evalu-
ate the significance of the deviation of the data from the law. Thus Galileo’s 
law was preserved although it diverged tremendously from experiment, for 
it was the only simple qualitatively correct law which corresponded with the 
seventeenth-century understanding of what motion was. But Dalton rejected 
Gay-Lussac’s law, although it corresponded very closely with experiment, for 
if the correspondence was taken to be more than fortuitous it would have 
destroyed the conceptual basis and the utility of atomism which Dalton had 
introduced to chemistry.
These orientations therefore appear as vague and qualitative predisposi-
tions to more exact and frequently quantitative scientific laws. They suggest 
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problems; they suggest the sorts of evidence relevant for the solutions of these 
problems; and they suggest the mode in which the answers to these problems 
must be cast. They are, if you will, predispositions to certain sorts of expla-
nations. But they are not just predispositions toward explanations or toward 
laws; they are equally predispositions toward evidence, toward facts. They 
direct our attention to particular aspects of the phenomenal world, and they 
suppress other aspects. But the sort of law and the sort of fact upon which 
the law can be based are contained in embryo in the pre-existing scientific 
orientation.
This suggests that scientific research is inherently circular, that it does not 
proceed from experimental facts to theories, but that facts and theories are 
provided together, in a more or less inchoate form, by scientific orientations. 
On this view the experiment may add greatly to the precision and the scope 
of the law implicit in the point of view which suggested the experiment. but 
it will not itself provide a law radically different from that implicit in the 
point of view from which it derived. If the experiment diverges too far from 
expectation, and this rarely occurs, it may inhibit or infirm the orientation 
which produced it, but it will not itself produce a different sort of law. And 
this indicates that the quest for physical theory may be well described as an 
attempt with the aid of experiment to apply a given orientation or point of 
view to the perceptual world. To this attempt experiments lend precision and 
detail, but they are not in themselves creative.6 
I believe that this picture of science is clearly confirmed by an examina-
tion of the history of science, and I wish that we could now re-examine the 
material of the last three lectures or of some other portion of the history of 
science in order to display again the correspondence of this description with 
the facts of research. But perhaps you will apply this test for yourselves. Here 
I will simply express my own conviction that science has in fact progressed by 
a series of circular attempts to apply differing orientations or points of view 
to the natural world.
I state this here as a matter of fact, but I think it also a matter of neces-
sity. I do not believe that the human mind can work in any other way. And 
in the next two lectures I will discuss certain reasons drawn from psychology 
and from logic for supposing that science could not advance at all without 
the benefit of such vague and qualitative predispositions to laws. But for the 
moment we need not debate the necessity of these principles of orientation. 
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Whether or not they are necessary, they normally exist. And the very fact 
of their existence is filled with consequences for the progress of all scientific 
research.
This leads me to some remarks on a subject which we may, by analogy, call 
the dynamics of scientific ideas, and this topic may be rephrased as the study 
of the manner in which scientific orientations, and the theories associated 
with them, are altered in time and ultimately replaced by new and radically 
different orientations.
We have just stated that scientific progress arises from a process in which 
points of view derived from older speculative sources, or from common sense, 
or from other parts of science are applied to a particular group of natural phe-
nomena. This attempted application, if it is destined to have any significance 
in the history of science, enters almost immediately upon what has recently 
been called its classical period, a period in which it is eminently successful 
in unifying phenomena previously thought to be disparate and in suggesting 
new observations and new experiments whose results in turn fit the theory. 
During this period the original vague orientation is itself altered, refined, and 
made more precise. It is productive of laws, which may, though they need not, 
be quantitatively formulated.
In short, the classical period of a scientific orientation is characterized 
by the production from a vague and speculative point of view of a more or 
less precise scientific theory whose laws may be stated in scientific texts and 
verified by prescribed operation. And simultaneously the classical period is 
marked by the extension of these new theories to aspects of nature which had 
not originally been considered to fall within their jurisdiction. It is a period 
of triumph in precision and scope; and it is a period in which the orientation 
and the theories that have resulted from it become rigid and normative for 
the profession.
In our discussion of the phlogiston theory, we examined such a period 
in considerable detail. It was the period in which the alchemical element or 
principle, fire, was transformed to the subtle fluid phlogiston, and in which 
phlogiston became not merely a principle of combustibility but equally one of 
metallicity and a subtle effluvium which poisoned air. In this period the clas-
sificatory principles which separated phlogiston-containing substances like 
carbon and the metals from substances like air and the nitrates—which could 
absorb it—was fruitfully extended. They provided, you will remember, an 
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immediate position for the gas hydrogen, as soon as it was rediscovered by 
Cavendish. And they led scientists like Scheele and Priestley to the discovery 
of oxygen and of photosynthesis in the search for dephlogisticating agents.
But scientific theories and scientific points of view never seem to remain 
indefinitely in the classical period. Gradually their fruitfulness is exhausted. 
All the natural phenomena which can be readily assimilated to the theory 
are embraced by it. And so by a transition which is usually impossible to 
mark precisely, the now rigidified professional orientation leads from triumph 
to previously unobserved difficulties. These difficulties may be of a number 
of sorts—they may arise from the more refined techniques of measurement 
whose application displays the existence of deviations from the law; they may 
arise from a series of genuinely new observations which were themselves sug-
gested by the old orientation but which do not seem to fit it; or they most often 
arise from an attempt to embrace within the new theory a set of observations 
which had been known for a long time but which had been ignored during the 
period when there were easier directions in which to pursue research.7 
These difficulties, these departures from the expected behavior of nature 
ought to destroy the theory on which the predictions were based. But, in-
terestingly enough, they never do so. For scientists are always reluctant to 
abandon theories or points of view which have been fruitful in the past, and 
they are always provided with a number of alternatives to such a rejection. 
They may simply dismiss the apparently discordant observations and claim 
that a more carefully performed experiment would have eliminated the ap-
pearance of discord, or that the difficulty, though not understood, is trivial. 
They may accept the result of the experiment but claim that it does not in 
any way invalidate their theory, that on the contrary the failure is in another 
theory which was used in the construction of the experimental apparatus. For 
no single scientific theory can ever be tested without relying upon laws drawn 
from many other portions of science. Science is an interlocking fabric.8 The 
determination of the position of a star by a contemporary astronomer involves 
not only a knowledge of the relevant portions of mathematics and astronomy, 
but also an understanding of the physical optics embodied in the construction 
of his lens system, the mechanical principles embodied in the construction of 
the mount of the telescope, the chemistry which determines the properties of 
his photographic plates, and the electricity which runs the motor which keeps 
his telescope pointed to a certain part of the heavens. A single stray observa-
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tion or a group of consistent stray observations may be produced by or may be 
blamed upon a shortcoming in any one of these. It certainly need not reflect 
upon the astronomer, of which he himself will always feel the most certain. 
Frequently this stubbornness, this unwillingness to admit the existence of an 
error in one’s own theory pays off, for the sources of the error do not always lie 
in the field of the experimenter who first discovers them. It was, for example, 
the astronomer Bradley who by a careful investigation of certain anomalies 
of astronomical information first discovered the aberration of light and con-
vinced the scientific world that light possessed a finite velocity.
But even when further investigation of the possible sources of error fail to 
reveal any shortcomings in the equipment or in the portions of other scien-
tific theories which went into constructing the equipment, the scientist still 
need not abandon his own theory. He can always adopt some small ad hoc 
modification of it. Any theory can be adapted to such new facts without really 
important distortions. 
This was clearly illustrated in our study of the phlogiston theory. After 
the middle of the eighteenth century an increased knowledge of the proper-
ties of gases and an increased conviction that all chemical substances must 
have weight provided numerous problems for any believer in the theory. But 
the theory was not abandoned. Some chemists declared the problems irrel-
evant; other blamed the equipment—as in attributing the gain in weight to 
fire particles let in by the glass; others saved the appearances by introducing 
small modifications of the theory itself. And there were any number of such 
modifications which would do the trick.
This is typical of what we may now call the crisis stage in the progress of 
a scientific orientation. It is a stage during which all professional scientists 
continue to adhere to the point of view and to the theories derived from it; 
it is a period in which the bulk of research is directed by the old orientation. 
But it is equally a period in which the theory itself has become cumbersome 
due to the accretion of numerous ad hoc hypotheses designed to save it, and 
it is characterized by a lack of unanimity among practicing scientists as to 
which ad hoc hypothesis should be adopted to explain the results of particular 
experiments. Everyone believes the theory, but none is quite sure what it is.
Some such crisis stage seems inevitably to precede the overthrow of a 
scientific theory and of the orientation which has accompanied it. For the 
overthrow of the old theory is never accomplished directly by the difficul-
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ties which the theory has encountered, but rather by the suggestion of some 
alternate orientation which it is shown resolves the difficulties. And this new 
suggestion does not necessarily proceed from a new experimental discovery. 
On the contrary, it is more often suggested by a re-examination of an old 
experiment which has achieved a new significance because of the particular 
difficulty in which the old theory is laboring.
We saw this occur in the case of Lavoisier, who, approaching chemis-
try for the first time during a crisis period, started his experiments with the 
combustion of phosphorus and sulfur. It was the large decrease in the volume 
of the gas and the large increase in the weight of the solid product in this 
experiment that suggested to him that combustion might better be accounted 
for by the effect of the fixation of a portion of the air than by the loss of a 
subtle phlogistic principle. Yet these experiments had been performed before, 
and this interpretation of the role of air in combustion was an old one. And 
I would suggest that it is to a great extent the existence of the crisis period in 
the conceptual understanding of combustion processes which accounts for the 
difference in the role played by the experiment at the earlier and the later date 
and for the difference in the reception accorded the interpretation.
We have already remarked that scientific theories are not overthrown by 
internal difficulties but buy new scientific theories and new orientations. But 
here we should also remark that scientific theories are not overthrown at all 
during their classical period, that a scientific theory which to a modern critic 
appears the better or the correct theory is unlikely to be proposed or if pro-
posed is unlikely to be accepted until the theory to which it is in opposition 
has itself run into internal difficulties. And this is true even when all the  evi-
dence on which the subsequent theory is based is already in existence.
But the mere suggestion of a new orientation toward the groups of phe-
nomena formerly handled by the old theory does not automatically lead to 
the overthrow of the older set of conceptualizations. For the new orientation 
must first gain the precision and show the fruitfulness which characterized 
the older theory in its classic period. And meanwhile the theory and its author 
will meet continual opposition from the adherents of the older conceptual 
scheme, an opposition in which few of the techniques of personal vilification 
and social ostracism have not at one time or another been employed. Galileo 
may well be the only scientist who, until the last decade, has been imprisoned 
for pronouncing scientific opinions but he is certainly not the only one who 
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has been vilified and who has lost professional prestige and the opportunity 
for professional advancement.
I find that it surprises most people to discover that scientists behave so 
much like other people when their pet theories are attacked. And this sur-
prise is understandable because from the point of view of textbook science a 
conceptual revolution, the overthrow of an old theory and the establishment 
of a new one, always appears as a simple addition to the sum of human knowl-
edge. The old theory as represented in the textbook enabled the scientist to 
predict and control a certain group of natural phenomena. The new theory 
as described in the new textbook enables the scientist to understand all of 
these phenomena and some new ones besides.9 Before Lavoisier chemists did 
not know how to handle quantitatively the loss in volume of a gas and the 
gain in weight of the solid upon combustion. After the chemical revolution 
they could control everything which the phlogistic chemists had controlled 
and more besides. The revolution had simply added to the stock of scientific 
knowledge.
But from the point of view of a working scientist, a scientific revolution is 
always very nearly as destructive as it is constructive. As I have emphasized 
throughout these lectures, the older theory had proceeded from and devel-
oped with an orientation toward the operation of nature whose effect was 
to suggest the particular importance of certain aspects of the phenomenal 
world and to deny the relevance of others. Further this was a viewpoint which 
emphasized certain metaphorical abstract connections between phenomena 
which from another point of view appeared totally disparate. But the scien-
tific revolution, while preserving the predictive content of the older textbook 
science, did not at all preserve the content of the older point of view toward 
nature. It demanded the destruction of old analogies in favor of a set which 
was new and strange. It may have suggested new sorts of entities underlying 
the phenomena previously studied. And it took as its point of departure a 
detailed study of an aspect of nature which for the older orientation, at least 
in its classical period, presented no problem at all. We may phrase this by 
referring to the completeness of a scientific orientation self-contained. The 
problems it suggests are solved within it. The new problems, from which the 
subsequent orientation will proceed, do not exist for it.10
Let me remind you once more. Lavoisier founded the chemical revolution 
upon the analysis of the weight and volumes of substances entering into and 
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produced by chemical reactions. Since his time no one has doubted the rele-
vance of these techniques to chemical analyses. Yet before his time chemistry 
had proceeded a long way; these experimental techniques had been available 
to it, had been applied at random; but had not usually been considered rel-
evant to the determination of chemical theory. It was only by a long drawn 
struggle in which Lavoisier and his adherents convinced the chemical profes-
sion of the pragmatic value of considering weight relations to be fundamental 
rather than accidental characteristics of chemical reactions that the chemical 
revolution was completed.11 But through the chemical revolution a group of 
experiments whose results had been conceded for centuries became suddenly 
points of departure of a new theory; an aspect of nature previously judged 
secondary became a primary tool of chemical analysis.
I suggest then that it is only in retrospect that a scientific revolution can 
be viewed as a net addition to the sum of human knowledge, and that from 
the point of view of the man involved in it, it is always about as destructive 
as constructive. For it demands the abandonment of the perspective in which 
he has so far viewed natural phenomena; and the adoption of an alternate 
perspective, which to the extent that he has accustomed himself to the old 
one, must always appear as a distortion of scientific vision. And this, I think, 
accounts for the battles which rage at the time of conceptual reorientation in 
science.12 Even here of course one sees large variations in the degree of re-
luctance to accept new conceptualizations, but these variations in degree can 
themselves normally be explained by the variation in the magnitude of the 
conceptual transition required by the revolutionary shift. Dalton’s application 
of atomism to chemistry simply adapted to chemistry a metaphysical mode 
of thought which had provided the foundation for a great deal of physical 
science for a century. Portions of atomism were implicit, and in Lavoisier’s 
case explicit, in the chemist’s description of what we should now call physi-
cal changes, changes of state. And so Dalton’s proposal was almost imme-
diately accepted by the chemical profession except, and the exception was 
again significant, that Dalton’s work was in fact rejected by a group of French 
chemists surrounding Bertholet, who believed that the chemical elements can 
enter into chemical combinations in any proportions. For this belief they had 
found experimental evidence, evidence which we should now say they had 
misinterpreted, just as Dalton had actually misinterpreted the forces at work 
in producing homogeneous mixtures of the gases of the atmosphere. Again 
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by taking different aspects of nature as fundamental to chemistry.13 But Av-
agadro’s hypothesis, which is now just as fundamental chemical thought as 
Dalton’s, violated the fundamental conceptual tenets of all atomism in claim-
ing that the atom was divisible. And this hypothesis had to wait forty years 
to be seriously considered. And that forty year period was one in which the 
difficulties of applying an atomic theory consistently in chemical analysis be-
came so grave that the atomic hypothesis itself was very nearly abandoned. 
No wonder that at the end of the period the necessity of preserving the atom 
involiate seemed less a desideratum.
Now I believe that by focusing our attention on the destructive impact 
of a new scientific orientation, upon the points of view which lie beneath 
the preceding advances in science, we can understand somewhat more clearly 
certain of the recurrent characteristics of the history of scientific ideas. One 
of these was recently noted by Max Planck in his posthumous autobiography. 
He there observed that a new scientific truth does not normally receive recog-
nition by proving to its adversaries either its validity or its value, but that on 
the contrary new conceptualizations enter science only when their adversaries 
have died, and a new scientific generation is enabled to make a fresh start.14 
Charles Darwin put the same point particularly cogently at the conclu-
sion of On the Origin of Species. He said: “Although I am fully convinced of 
the truth of the views given in this volume, I by no means expect to convince 
experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with a multitude of facts all 
viewed, during a long course of years, from a point of view directly opposite 
to mine. A few naturalists,” Darwin continues, 
endowed with much flexibility of mind, and who have al-
ready begun to doubt the immutability of species, may be 
influenced by this volume; but I look with confidence to 
the future,—to young and rising naturalists, who will be 
able to view both sides of the question with impartiality. 
Whoever is led to believe that species are mutable will do 
good service by conscientiously expressing his conviction; 
for only thus can the load of prejudice by which this subject 
is overwhelmed be removed.15 
I find this statement particularly revealing because it points out three sepa-
rate aspects of the problem presented by the existence of orientations. It sug-
gests that people who have dealt repeatedly with the same facts from another 
viewpoint are particularly unlikely to be able to see the pragmatic value of 
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relinquishing their viewpoint in favor of a new one. For the new viewpoint is 
one which sees different significances in the same facts and therefore in some 
sense makes them different facts.
But the statement goes further. It adds that mere open-mindedness or 
mental flexibility will not be sufficient to enable naturalists to see the value of 
Darwin’s new thesis. They must already be convinced of the existence of dif-
ficulties in maintaining the thesis that species are fixed. They must be aware 
of the existence of what I have here called a crisis state. And, says Darwin, the 
most effective means of proselytizing for the new thesis is not to uphold the 
thesis itself, but rather to increase the intensity of the crisis by conscientiously 
expressing the opinion that species are mutable. If the crisis is sufficiently 
severe people will come around by themselves.
Finally, Darwin suggests that it is the youth of the profession, the group 
that have not accustomed themselves to seeing the facts from a particular 
viewpoint, who will be best equipped to weigh the relative merits of the two 
theories. Now the peculiar role of youth in scientific activity has been noted 
frequently in another and even more important connection. It is almost in-
variably the very young members of the scientific profession who make con-
ceptually original contributions to science.
The evidence on this point, at least for physical science, is reasonably con-
clusive though not statistical. Galileo was about nineteen when he first noted 
the isochronous properties of the pendulum, and this observation, you will 
remember, was not simply one more fact but rather a new sort of fact around 
which the truly original portion of Galileo’s mechanics was built. Newton 
was twenty-three and twenty-four during the famous years at Woolsthorpe; 
the years in which he initially formulated his views on the differential calcu-
lus, the theory of color, and the identity of the forces acting upon the apple 
and the moon.16
And in the twentieth century, when scientific education requires so much 
longer, the same phenomenon recurs. Bohr proposed his famous model of 
the atom at twenty-eight; Einstein was twenty-six in 1905, the year in which 
he advanced his theory of Brownian motion, the photoelectric effect, and 
the special theory of relativity. Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics was published 
when the author was twenty-four; and Dirac’s relativistic electron theory was 
published when he was twenty-six.
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Of course there are exceptions: Planck was forty-three when he suggested 
the law for black body radiation. Schrödinger’s wave equation was published 
when its author had reached years of scientific senility—he was thirty-eight. 
But Schrödinger’s most important contribution was the mathematic formula-
tion of a more speculative suggestion provided by his younger contemporary, 
de Broglie.
The pre-eminence of youth in scientific discovery has normally been ac-
counted for by the greater flexibility, the greater openness, of the youthful 
mind. Yet I wonder whether this generalization is truly helpful. For the pro-
verbial conservatism of age does not normally derive from a change of opinion 
on the part of the individual septuagenarian. On the contrary, the grand-
father is likely to have held to the opinion of his youth at a time when his 
grandchildren have adopted more radical opinions. And it is my impression 
as a teacher that what is called the open mind of youth exists, if at all, only 
with respect to those areas of experience to which the young have not yet 
been exposed. Young men are at least as dogmatic as their elders with respect 
to those subjects about which they think they possess knowledge. And, like 
their elders, they suppose they have knowledge about those portions of expe-
rience with which they have to deal.
I wonder whether this may not be the key to the role of youth in science. 
The young man entering science has not had years of experience in viewing 
a selected range of facts in a given perspective. And this permits him, as he 
learns the facts, to choose between perspectives or on occasion to discover 
new perspectives of his own.17 And this lack of commitment to any particular 
perspective is not, I think, at all the same thing as open-mindedness. For 
these students the facts themselves do not exist. As they are acquired they 
will be arranged in some perspective, and once they are so arranged the per-
spective will be difficult to shake.
I would contend then that emptiness rather than openness characterizes 
the youthful mind. And one indication of the validity of this view lies, I 
think, in noting that in those rather rare cases where fundamental new scien-
tific insights are provided by older men, they are frequently provided by men 
who are approaching the field for the first time. Both Dalton and Lavoisier, 
for example, were past thirty-five when they advanced the views for which 
their names are known. Yet both seem to have gotten the inspiration which 
led to their revolutionary theories within two years of the time that they first 
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engaged in chemical research. Until this time they had had little or no knowl-
edge of chemistry.
But we need not stop here in our study of the effects of the dominations 
of scientists by orientations or points of view toward an area of scientific ex-
perience. Many other aspects of scientific progress reflect the same phenom-
enon. If for example I am right in suggesting that the crisis period in the 
development of a particular scientific conceptualization clothes old facts and 
old manipulations with new significances, then one would expect that these 
might equally be periods in which the same forward revolutionary step was 
taken by a number of scientists simultaneously. And indeed the occurrence 
of multiple simultaneous discoveries is too well recognized to require further 
comment here. Galileo and Descartes independently stated the law of uni-
form acceleration. Dalton’s atomic theory was in many respects anticipated by 
Higgins. In our own time, Schrödinger’s wave mechanics and Heisenberg’s 
matrix mechanics were announced to the world in the same year.
Again I think we no longer need be quite so surprised to discover that 
periods of rapid advance in one science are not necessarily periods of rapid 
advance in another apparently closely related science. For we have already 
noted in examining the effects of the atomist cosmology that a point of view 
capable of guiding fruitful research in one field may at that time be highly 
unsuited to scientific advance in another. And this suggests that the so-called 
“unity of science” may not be an unequivocal blessing. Examples like these of 
the role played by orientation or viewpoint in the progress of a particular sci-
ence can be multiplied almost ad nauseum. But perhaps the direction of these 
remarks is already clear. I should suggest that what we are now approaching 
is a clearer understanding of the causes and the nature of the phenomenon 
so often described by the phrase “a scientific discovery must fit the times” or 
“the times must be ripe.”
Of course we have scarcely begun to explore either the nature or the sourc-
es of this phenomenon. Crisis periods in particular sciences proceed from a 
variety of sources many of which we have not touched upon this evening. 
They may, for example, be produced by social forces external to science. They 
may proceed from changes in economic structure which alter scientific mo-
tivation.18 Or they may be produced by changes in political philosophy or in 
speculative cosmology. But these remarks if continued could only serve as an 
introduction to a full-scale study of the sociology of science and of the depen-
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dence of science upon the extrascientific climate of opinion. And I must here 
restrict myself to the considerations already advanced regarding the impact of 
professional orientation upon the professional scientist. These effects, positive 
and negative, are still very much with us.
This brings me (close) to the end of the hour and to the end of this eve-
ning’s remarks. But before you go, I should like to supply you with an optional 
homework assignment. In the next lecture I want to study somewhat more 
closely the anatomy of orientation, and I will commence that study with a 
paradigm which will be more effective if seen in advance. May I introduce to 
you an amusing and illuminating puzzle?19
1. In Kuhn’s script this sentence begins, “So that since . . . .” Another example of 
Kuhn’s efforts to qualify and reduce the strength of these “prejudices” in this lecture is 
to frequently strike his use of the word “metaphysical” in earlier drafts. “Metaphysical 
orientation,” for example, became just “orientation.” Kuhn did not fully retreat from 
the word “prejudice,” however, if only because he quotes Darwin, below, noting “the 
load of prejudice” his theory of evolution faced.
2. Kuhn annotated the text here: “Insert comment on Myerson as precursor of 
such study in final version.”
3. Here Kuhn placed in brackets the sentence, “Are the various positions or 
points of space different in and of themselves or can they be differentiated only by 
the matter which occupies them?”
4. Kuhn annotated his text here, “Get in here later the Moliere doctor.” Kuhn was 
likely thinking of Moliere’s The Imaginary Invalid and its doctor who points to opium’s 
“virtus dormitiva” to explain why it causes one to feel sleepy (Act III, scene 14).
5. Here Kuhn crossed out the qualification “a large portion of.”
6. Here Kuhn wrote, “Add remarks on induction at this point later.”
7. Here Kuhn noted “Logical difficulties, vide the difficulties in the Aristotelian 
categories.”
8. A handwritten edit suggests that Kuhn may have intended “interlocked” 
instead of “interlocking.” Additionally, the remainder of this paragraph is set off in 
brackets, indicating that Kuhn may have considered it optional, though it is not explic-
itly marked as such.
9. Kuhn placed the following two sentences in brackets, possibly for omission, 
and additionally replaced two appearances of the verb “understand” with “control.”
10. Kuhn first typed “within it” but substituted by hand an illegible word which 
appears to be “for.” 
Notes
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11. Kuhn placed this sentence in brackets.
12. Kuhn placed the remainder of this paragraph in brackets.
13. Here Kuhn typed “(       the preceding out),” with the blank spaces perhaps 
indicating that he should elaborate or extend the somewhat telegraphic points made 
in these, and perhaps the following, sentences.
14. See Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, trans. F. Gaynor 
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), 33–34.
15. See Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, ch. 15. I have corrected the 
abbreviated title (given as “The Origin of the Species”) and the quotation where Kuhn 
originally typed “just opposite to mine” instead of “directly opposite.”
16. Kuhn refers to Newton’s family home to which he returned from Cambridge 
University during acute years of the plague. For a more nuanced account of Newton’s 
so-called Miracle Years, see Richard Westfall, Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac 
Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 142–43.
17. Kuhn ended this sentence with a question mark, omitted here.
18. Here Kuhn added, “Attn. Sen. McCarthy,” but crossed this out by hand in his 
typescript.
19. Noting that he should at this point “Ad lib from blackboard,” Kuhn presented 
the so-called mutilated-chessboard problem, usually ascribed to the philosopher Max 
Black. In his book Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946), 157, Black presented the problem among other “exer-
cises in reasoning”: “An ordinary chessboard has had two squares—one at each end 
of a diagonal—removed. There is on hand a supply of 31 dominoes, each of which 
is large enough to cover exactly two adjacent squares of the board. Is it possible to 
lay the dominoes on the mutilated chessboard in such a manner as to cover it com-
pletely?”
A chess or checkerboard with two squares of the 
same color removed from opposite corners.
97
Lecture VI
Coherence and Scientific Vision
At the end of the last lecture, I suggested that we might profitably ap-proach the more detailed study of orientation by means of a mathemati-
cal puzzle, and I should now like to examine the puzzle I then posed for you. 
For this puzzle can serve quite successfully as a paradigm of many of the 
effects of orientation which we have already observed.
I have altered the figure slightly, or more precisely I have colored the al-
ternate squares in the array so that the diagram suggests a checkerboard with 
the two corner squares now missing. The problem, you will recall, was to 
determine if it is possible to cover the checkerboard completely with 31 domi-
noes, each of which will cover any two adjacent squares.1 Now regarding this 
diagram as a checkerboard instead of as a simple array of squares we can solve 
the problem directly. For a checkerboard, you know, consists of 64 squares, 
32 of which are red and 32 black, and you note immediately from the diagram 
that the diagonally opposite squares are always of the same color. Therefore in 
our diagram in which the two corner squares have been omitted, we are left 
with a total of 32 red squares and 30 black squares, and we are asked to cover 
these with 31 dominoes, each of which will cover exactly two squares.
But now we see directly that there is no way of accomplishing this cover-
ing operation, for each domino must cover two differently colored squares, 
one red and one black. If we lay out 30 of our dominoes in any fashion what-
soever, we will cover just 30 black squares and 30 red squares, and we will be 
left with two red squares to be covered by the remaining domino. But there 
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is absolutely no way of covering two red squares with one domino, so this 
problem possesses no solution, and we have proved this result.
There are many other proofs of this result. Most of them are more rigor-
ous than this one and all of them are less simple-minded. They do not involve 
reference to checkerboards. But this one is, I think, the shortest and the most 
direct. It is the proof which most succinctly directs us to the heart of the prob-
lem. And this proof is one which we arrive at by taking a new point of view, 
a new orientation, toward the problem presented by the figure. This point of 
view is not itself suggested by the figure; there is nothing in the original dia-
gram which indicates that we must look at two sorts of different squares. Yet 
until we look at the figure in this way we are at a loss for a method of attack.
And this is entirely typical of mathematical and physical discovery. The 
long proof, the logical proof, the rigorous proof, comes after the discovery; 
its effect is to put the content of the original discovery into a standard text-
book form. But the original discovery is made by a route like that we’ve used 
in proving the checkerboard problem. It is achieved by applying a new point 
of view, a new angle of vision to an existing phenomenon and by gaining 
through this new orientation a totally new notion of the significance of the 
figure which has been there throughout.
Elementary as this paradigm of the checkerboard is, it shares a number of 
characteristics with the more elaborate sort of reorientation that we have ex-
amined in my earlier historical lectures.2 It is in the first place a reorientation 
produced by attention to a new sort of problem. Until we reconsidered this 
problem there was no need to regard an array of squares as a checkerboard. 
Again the source of our new point of view lay in our own previous experience. 
That is, we gained our new insight into this problem by applying to it our 
pre-existing knowledge of the checkerboard, and this conceptual unification 
of two sorts of experience which we had previously seen as separate adds new 
significance to both. We see, because of this unification, new potentialities 
both in the array of squares and in the checkerboard.
Third, this new point of view toward the original array of squares opens 
up to us a whole new set of problems and solutions which were not in them-
selves suggested by the original problem taken alone. For having found this 
technique we need no longer restrict ourselves to two-colored boards or to 
rectangular dominoes. We can color our board with three colors or four col-
ors; we can apply these in various orders; and we can cut our movable pieces 
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or dominoes into figures that are three squares by one or that are L-shaped. 
In this matter we open up a whole new field of research. We have founded a 
new branch of mathematics. And this branch is one that did not exist until, 
under the impact of a particular new problem, we achieved a particular new 
orientation.
The history which we’ve covered has provided us with a number of ex-
amples of precisely this sort of behavior. Remember, for example, Dalton’s 
discovery of the chemical law of multiple proportions. Before Dalton’s time 
chemists had acquired a great deal of data which could have been used for the 
derivation of this law. But they did not see the laws exemplified by their data 
and this is not surprising. Examine for example the following figures.3 There 
are two gases composed solely of carbon and oxygen. The first of these, car-
bon dioxide, has before Dalton’s time been shown to be composed of twenty-
eight percent carbon by weight and seventy-two percent oxygen. The second 
had also been analyzed and was found to consist of forty-four percent carbon 
and fifty-six percent oxygen. We can tabulate these figures and note in them 
no suggestion of simple whole number ratios.
Now Dalton approached these figures with a new point of view, derived 
from a new problem. He was, you’ll remember, concerned to explain the lack 
of stratification of the atmosphere, and he had decided that the uniform mix-
ture of the gases of the atmosphere could be explained if these gases were 
supposed to consist of elementary particles of different sizes and different 
weights. But if, he said, the chemical elements consist of such different el-
ementary particles, then chemical compounds must consist of these same 
elements united in simple whole number ratios. And this suggests that we 
examine the old figures in a new light. If forty-four percent of carbon unites 
with fifty-six percent of oxygen in the formation of this second gas, then 
how many parts of oxygen would unite with forty-four parts of carbon in the 
formation of the first gas?
This is a very simple algebraic problem. Forty-four twenty-eighths of sev-
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figures as follows: forty-four parts of carbon unites with fifty-six parts of 
oxygen to form carbon monoxide; forty-four parts of carbon unites with one 
hundred thirteen parts of oxygen to form carbon dioxide. And one hundred 
thirteen is very nearly twice fifty-six, which gives us just the simple whole 
number ratio, the law of multiple proportions.
Here again we have the new problem created by the recognition that air is 
not a simple, a single gas. This new problem caused Dalton to apply to chem-
istry the old speculative atomistic point of view. The new point of view lends 
new significance to old data, and, I need scarcely remind you, this new point 
of view transformed all of chemical research. It is not restricted to its applica-
tion in Dalton’s original problem or to the discovery of the law of multiple 
proportions. 
And, of course, the orientation serves one further function. For 113 is not 
quite twice 56. Twice 56 is 112. And it is in part the atomic orientation which 
provides a predisposition to the law that Dalton is able to judge that the dis-
agreement is fortuitous, that these data prove the law.4
So far in this lecture I have suggested that the example of the checker-
board and the example of the law of multiple proportions provide us with 
paradigms of the role of orientation in scientific research. But there is another 
respect in which they are not typical, and it is to this that I should now like to 
turn. The examples which we’ve considered so far are perceptually of extreme 
simplicity. Both the array of squares and the numbers which we’ve examined 
on the blackboard were fixed perceptual entities. Changing our point of view 
may have led us to see new significances in the figures, but it did not alter the 
figures which we saw on the board.5 At least this was the case to the extent 
that our change in orientation did not lead us to notice the deviation of the 
sides of the squares from mathematical straight lines or the slant of the sym-
bols I employed for the digits in the tabulation. In these cases we were dealing 
with simple figures, and our perceptions were governed by an unequivocal 
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But when we deal with objects of the external world, with stones or metal-
lic ores or plant specimens, we are dealing with entities of an infinite percep-
tual complexity, and there are no such unequivocal directives for our percep-
tions. In this more general case, there is an increasing body of psychological 
evidence that the point of view from which we approach these entities actu-
ally conditions what we see. That is, we now have reasons to believe that what 
we see when we look at an object is determined not only by the characteristics 
of that object but also by our expectations and our previous experience with 
objects of that sort.
You have all had experiences which will illustrate my meaning. All of you 
have at one time or another awakened from a dream to discover a strange, 
threatening figure crouching in the corner of the room. Yet another look con-
vinced you that the threatening figure was really the familiar easy chair with a 
quilt piled on it. Then the figure lost its threat and you laughed at having been 
fooled. But were you really fooled? Did you really see the same thing on both 
occasions and did you simply misinterpret what you saw when you took it to 
be a threatening figure? Those of you who had such an experience recently 
may have difficulty in accepting the second, more usual explanation. For once 
you had discovered that the apparent threat was the usual chair with a quilt 
thrown on it, you also noticed a number of folds and humps in the quilt which 
ought to have prevented your ever seeing it as a threat. And you may wonder, 
remembering the intensity of your experience, whether you really saw those 
folds at all during the period when you were frightened. Didn’t you really see 
different things in the two cases?
Apparently either of these interpretations may be applied to this psycho-
logically extremely complex incident. You may either say that you saw the 
same thing in both cases, but that you interpreted what you saw differently, 
or you may say that you actually saw different things, that what you saw was 
truly dependent upon what you took the object to be. Yet I think that there 
are reasons for preferring the second statement. Its implications more nearly 
correspond to modern experimental findings. But before examining these re-
cent experiments let us make perfectly certain that we understand the rather 
esoteric difference between the two positions. 
I am now holding something in my hand.6 If I ask you what you see, those 
of you who are not too far in the back of the room will probably say that you 
see an orange, and you’re quite right. It is an orange. But if instead of exhib-
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iting this orange I had held up a reasonable wax facsimile, you would have 
given me the same response—you would have said that you saw an orange—
and in that case you would have been wrong. And this raises a very difficult 
problem. Was what you saw, was the visual image in your mind, the image of 
an orange or the image of an orange-colored wax ball?
There are two normal answers to this question. The first one is the classi-
cal answer, the one which almost everyone has believed since the seventeenth 
century. According to it, you did not see orange in either case. In fact, you 
never see an orange. What you saw, or what was given in your visual image, 
was a spherical shape with an orange color and a certain texture. These ele-
ments you examined, and because of your previous experience with oranges, 
you declared that what you were seeing was in fact an orange. In one case you 
were right, in the other case you were wrong. 
But this is not the only possible interpretation. And according to its mod-
ern alternate we can more accurately describe what has occurred by saying 
that in both cases you really saw an orange, that your visual image was the 
visual image of an orange. For you have seen a great many oranges, you are 
quite prepared to see them, and accordingly there is a wide range of differ-
ent visual stimuli which would have brought to your mind the image of an 
orange, or which at the very least would have caused you to act and react 
precisely as though you had seen a real orange.
And here the very real difference between the two views becomes appar-
ent. The first opinion, the classical opinion, states that what appears to your 
mind is simply a conglomeration of qualities which is in some sense a literal 
reproduction of the stimulus provided by the object, and it implies that you 
retain the privilege of interpreting this conglomeration of qualities to be an 
orange or not. And the second interpretation says that for a wide variety of 
stimuli you will act exactly as though you had seen an orange. You have no 
alternative interpretation. You will see what you are accustomed to seeing, 
and you will behave as though all the interpretation took place before the 
image was formed in your mind. Your visual images are not unique responses 
to unique stimuli.
And now we can examine some evidence which supports the second in-
terpretation. In a recent experiment a number of unprepared college students 
were exposed to a group of silhouettes cut from a neutrally colored cardboard. 
Some of these were silhouettes of objects normally colored red, a lobster claw 
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and a tomato; others were of objects normally colored orange, a tangerine and 
a carrot; and some were of objects normally yellow, a banana and a lemon. The 
subjects were then asked to match the color of the silhouette to that shown by 
a color wheel, a device on which they could make any color appear at will by 
simple manipulation. And the result showed that under most experimental 
conditions the students would select on the color wheel a color which did 
not correspond to the actual color of the silhouette, but which was displaced 
from that color in the direction of the usual color of the object represented 
by the silhouette. The lobster claws were matched to redder colors and the 
bananas to yellower colors. Apparently the subjects’ visual images were in 
part determined by their previous experience with the objects represented by 
the silhouette.
An even more striking result is provided by another experiment in which 
the subjects were exposed to selected groups of five playing cards. In each 
group from one to four of the cards were printed with the color reversed. For 
example, one such group contained a red five of spades and another a black 
four of hearts. Students were exposed to one card in the group at a time. In 
each case they were first shown the card for an extremely short interval of 
time; this interval was gradually increased; and on each exposure the sub-
ject was asked to identify the card exposed. As the exposure was gradually 
increased, a time interval was reached after which the subjects would consis-
tently identify the cards correctly. And on the average the exposure required 
to identify correctly the first incongruous card exposed was fifteen times as 
great as the exposure required for the normally colored cards. As the subjects’ 
experience in identifying abnormally colored, or incongruous cards increased, 
the time required for identification decreased, but the difficulty in seeing cor-
rectly an unexpected or unfamiliar object was marked indeed.7
And it was a case of “seeing incorrectly.” For from our present viewpoint 
the significant aspect of this experiment is not that it took so much longer 
to identify correctly the unexpected than the expected cards, but that, prior 
to the correct identification of the abnormal cards the subject reported that 
they had seen a normal card. In most cases, for example, the red five of spades 
would be identified on short exposure either as a black five of spades or as a 
red five of hearts. The subjects did not claim an inability to identify the source 
of the stimulus. On the contrary, for all but the briefest exposures, they knew 
what they had seen. And what they had seen remained for a long time what 
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they might have expected to see. They saw normal playing cards even when 
exposed to abnormal playing cards. Their perceptions were altered by their 
expectations.
There are many other experiments of this sort, experiments which show 
how our perceptions of size, of color, or of distance are influenced by the sort 
of objects which we suppose that we are examining. One such experiment 
shows that we will judge the distance of a rectangular white spot to be less 
if we are told that it represents a calling card than we will if we are told that 
it represents a package of cigarettes. And other experiments show that our 
perceptions, what we see, depends not only upon our habits, our previous 
experience, and our expectations, but also on our emotional attitude toward 
the viewed object. We have more difficulty seeing the unpleasant and the 
disagreeable than the beautiful. And for this the classic case is, of course, our 
difficulty in seeing anything but the beautiful physical characteristics of the 
one we love.
Experiments like these have led a number of psychologists and philoso-
phers to point out that the world which we see is actually a great deal less 
complex in its structure and organization than the totality of the stimuli 
which produce our perceptions. We see certain objects and relationships eas-
ily, and we see these for any one of a number of widely different stimuli. 
To other sorts of stimuli we do not respond at all. And this is equivalent to 
pointing out that the world of our perceptions is not uniquely determined by 
sensory stimuli but is a joint product of the external stimulation and of an 
activity which we perform in organizing them.
This point of view is frequently expressed by the statement that we all 
live in a behavioral world, which our own activities play a large role in creat-
ing. And this amounts to saying that the world of our perception is a world 
we have simplified in accordance with the needs of our behavior. It is en-
tirely necessary that we do this, for a world in which every different stimulus 
yielded a different perception would be a world without any stable objects. In 
a phrase which William James applied to the world of the infant, the world in 
which every different perception would be just a “bloomin, buzzin confusion.”
In such a world we would be incapable of acting. We would be able to dis-
criminate between the orange and the wax orange and thus we would never 
be fooled. But also we would be forced to discriminate between every real 
orange, for real oranges are also different. And if we provided a unique re-
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sponse for the wax apple and another for the real orange, so we would provide 
different responses for each of the real oranges because they too provide dif-
ferent stimuli. But in such a world every perception would be unique, for no 
two stimuli from the same or from different objects are ever quite identical. 
And if every perception were unique and every response took account of the 
uniqueness of the perception to which it was a response, then we would be 
incapable of responding at all. For we would be unable to apply our awareness 
of the pragmatic content of one perception to another different perception. 
In short, in a world in which every perception is unique, we could not learn 
from experience.
So if we are to act, if we are to respond, if we are to deal with the problems 
presented by our environment, we must order our perceptions of that envi-
ronment. We must cut the perceptual world up into a number of categories to 
which we can produce uniform responses. We must build a behavioral world 
out of the “bloomin, buzzin confusion” by discriminating among the infinite 
variety of stimuli which are presented to us just those groups to which we 
may safely provide uniform responses. And equally we must suppress sensory 
discrimination of differences which do not call for differing responses. We 
must learn to see oranges and lemons as distinct, and we may have to learn to 
see oranges and tangerines as distinct, but we must not discriminate between 
different oranges even though they supply different stimuli. And this, says 
modern experimental psychology, is what we do. We cut up the world of our 
perceptions to fit our needs.
Of course I am exaggerating when I say that we must not see the differ-
ence between oranges. Obviously we both see such differences and we re-
spond to them. We can tell a squashed orange from an injured one, a large 
one from a small one, a navel orange from a normal orange. And we may 
react differently according to these discriminations. But unless we have been 
trained to sort oranges according to their ripeness, their size, and their good-
ness, we are relatively insensitive to their individual differences. A trained 
fruit rancher who has to deal with oranges will see all sorts of distinctions 
which we will fail to see.
Perhaps this seems dubious as regards oranges, but let me suggest an ex-
ample with which you are all familiar. It is commonly said that to a Cauca-
sian most Chinese look alike, and to a Caucasian it is quite natural that they 
should do so. We meet very few Chinese and the overwhelming majority of 
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these are either restaurateurs or laundrymen. An ability to discriminate be-
tween them would be a useless perception and useless perceptions are confus-
ing. On the other hand we must learn to discriminate the physiognomies of 
other Caucasians, for our entire social and economic life may depend on our 
ability to identify individuals and react accordingly. It may, though, restore 
our sense of proportion to remember that for the Chinese the situation is just 
reversed. He has difficulty, unless he has lived in the occident, in distinguish-
ing many Caucasians.
So I believe, that we discriminate only those aspects of experience which 
are behaviorally relevant and that our behavioral world consists of these and 
these alone. Of course in particular instances we are capable of discrimina-
tions which are not relevant to our behavior in these instances. Certainly, for 
example, we can tell a red coat from a green coat although both are effective 
for keeping us warm, and warmth was our presumptive object in purchasing 
them. But there are many areas of experience in which the ability to discrimi-
nate between red and green is important. Telling red apples from green apples 
may save us acute discomfort. Telling red lights from green lights may save 
us a great deal of trouble in traffic court. And in societies where such color 
distinctions as these are not of importance, the ability to make such discrimi-
nations is normally lost. In the life of the Chookchee eskimoes, for example, 
color discriminations are of very small importance.8 Accordingly the Chook-
chee, who have the same physiological perceptual apparatus as ourselves, have 
very poor color vocabulary and are unable to sort strands of wool which we 
find to be strikingly different in color. Yet these people do not lack visual acu-
ity in the matters which concern them. They are reindeer-riding people, and 
they apply twenty-four names to the various patterns which they discriminate 
in reindeer hides. And to a visiting anthropologist most of these patterns are 
completely indistinguishable.
These examples suggest another important characteristic of behavioral 
worlds. They are not unique. The behavioral world of the Eskimo is poorer in 
color but richer in patterns than our own. Behavioral worlds are therefore in 
part determined by the social needs and conditions of the society for which 
they serve, and differing needs may produce differing behavioral worlds. But 
even within a given society there may be considerable difference in the be-
havioral worlds of different individuals and different professions. Remember 
the orange-sorter who responds to differences that are invisible to the normal 
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member of his society. Or consider the naval lookout who is trained to see 
certain sorts of visual stimuli on the horizon. These are stimuli which exist 
for the untrained observer as well but which are not, by him, translated into 
visual images. There are objects in the lookout’s behavioral world that do not 
exist for his lay contemporaries.
The same is true for every specialist—he sees objects and distinctions 
which are not available to the man who does not need them. And this sug-
gests that behavioral worlds may never be criticized for falsity or inaccuracy. 
They are always poorer than the totality of stimuli which they order. They are 
never “true.” They cannot be judged for accuracy, but only for adequacy. Do 
they or do they not contain sufficient ground of discrimination to support 
well-directed activity? Do they or do they not fulfill individual and social 
needs? Are they adequate to life?
Of course behavioral worlds are not always adequate, and when they are 
not we must learn to alter them, make a new sort of discrimination. And 
when we do this, we change our behavioral world. We alter what we see. In 
a famous experiment performed at the Hanover Institute, a subject is seated 
in a badly distorted room, a room in which the walls are not vertical nor the 
corners square.9 And he is provided with a pair of specially designed glasses 
which correct for these distortions, so that the subject, wearing them, reports 
that he is in a normal room, that the walls are vertical and the corners square. 
The subject is then given a pointer and asked to touch first the upper right 
hand corner of the room and then the upper left hand corner. He has no trou-
ble with the upper right hand corner, but because of the unseen distortion of 
the room he keeps missing the upper left. After repeated trials he does learn 
to touch the upper right and upper left corners successively. But when he has 
learned to do this he can no longer see the room as undistorted. In adjusting 
to the new environment he has been forced to change what he sees.
Another experiment performed at Dartmouth provides an even more 
striking indication of the manner in which we may alter our perceptions in 
order to make them conform to the needs of our behavior. In this experiment 
subjects are provided with a pair of glasses or goggles whose lenses complete-
ly invert the visual image.10 The subject wearing such goggles initially finds 
himself seeing everything upside down. But a perception of this sort makes 
action difficult or impossible. A subject reaching for an object at the top of 
his visual field will always miss the object, for without the goggles the object 
108 The Quest for Physical Theory
would have appeared at the bottom. Successful purposive activity requires 
a readjustment to the new perceptual world presented through the goggles.
And this readjustment can be achieved. But when it is achieved the sub-
ject sees everything right side up again. Once he has made the adjustment 
required for activity with the goggles his perceptions are exactly the same as 
they were without the goggles. And this shows once again that many of the 
characteristics of our perception are determined by the necessities of behavior 
rather than by the nature of the stimulus or by the structure of our perceptual 
apparatus.
I have expressed the outcome of all of these experiments by saying that we 
see the same thing or respond in the same way to a variety of different stimuli. 
But these last two experiments make it obvious that I might equally well have 
said that we can respond in several different ways, or see a variety of different 
things, when confronted with a single stimulus. And this double aspect of the 
problem makes clear the great difficulty posed by these experiments in terms 
of a vocabulary which treats the individual perceiver as a camera combined 
with a responder. Our role is much more active than that, and the world of 
stimuli is far more plastic than we normally suppose. We make continual and 
profitable use of this plasticity in creating a behavioral world within which we 
can and do act.
I have dealt at very great length with the perceptual or visual aspects of 
the problem presented by the existence of a behavioral world because I be-
lieve that the experimental investigations in this area are, as far as they go, 
typical, unequivocal, and thoroughly surprising. They illustrate most clearly 
the inadequacy of our commonsense notion of our passivity as perceivers11 of 
objective data about the external world. But there are other sources which 
display equally interesting and rather different effects of our participation in 
the construction of behavioral worlds.
One particularly interesting source of evidence on this point derives from 
the modern comparative study of language. During the last half century 
increasing experience in the analysis of non-Indo-European languages has 
made it increasingly apparent that differences between languages cannot be 
represented as simple differences in the particular signs or symbols which 
are applied in different languages to identical situations. Differences between 
languages may equally derive from different world perspectives: different lan-
guages may refer to different behavioral worlds. So there may be real contrasts 
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between the objects and between the connections between objects in the dif-
ferent behavioral worlds displayed by various languages.
In different languages there are, for example, many differences between 
the perceptual complexes which are seen as objects or things and denoted by 
nouns, and the perceptual complexes which are seen as activities and are de-
noted by verbs. In English we distinguish sharply between nouns like “house” 
or “man” and verbs like “hit” or “run.” Apparently this distinction is based 
upon a difference in the temporal duration of the perceptual complex de-
noted. Man or house endures; the activities, hit or run, are of short temporal 
duration. But this distinction is impossible to make precise. A man is con-
tinually changing. Running can endure for a considerable period. So it is not 
surprising to discover that in other languages the division is accomplished 
quite differently. In the Hopi language, for example, perceptual complexes of 
short duration, which we would denote by nouns, as, for example, “lightning” 
or “wave” or “flame” are all verbs in Hopi. Where we employ lightning as a 
noun, they say “lightning occurs” but with one word. And in the language of 
the Nootka Indians of Vancouver there are no such things as nouns. All these 
perceptual complexes become verbs. What we denote by “house” they denote 
by “it houses” or “a house occurs.”12
Linguistic differences of this sort apparently reflect differences in the be-
havioral world of different societies. More precisely, they reflect differences 
in what we have previously called the metaphorical connection between dif-
ferent perceptual complexes available to different social groups. Situations 
represented as closely parallel by one language are seen as totally different 
when viewed through another. We are willing to compare perceptual com-
plexes denoted by nouns or perceptual complexes denoted by verbs, but we 
will consider a request for a cross-comparison to be an absurd one. Yet ex-
perience with other languages shows that our judgment of the absurdity of 
such a request, our judgment of the difference between the two perceptual 
complexes, is governed by our language, by the way we cut up our world, and 
not by anything given objectively in the perception.
These differences in linguistic metaphor extend to far more complex situ-
ations. The late B.L. Whorf pointed out for example that the two situations 
which we should represent by the phrase “I pull the branch aside” and “I have 
an extra toe on my foot” are represented by almost identical phrases in Shaw-
nee.13 We have the greatest difficulty discovering any similarity between the 
110 The Quest for Physical Theory
two situations. But the Shawnee emphasizes the common form of forkedness 
in the two situations and the common excess over normal situations. And ac-
cordingly the two sentences which are formulated differently in the last four 
of the seventeen symbols required to represent them phonetically.
The Shawnee see a similarity in logical categories where we see none at 
all.14 And of course these metaphorical connections implicit in our behav-
ioral worlds are of tremendous importance in the search for regularities upon 
which we can predicate our behavior. Remember, for example, the transfor-
mation in the study of motion which was correlated with the change in the 
meaning of the word motus from a word denoting a change of state to a word 
denoting a state. Or consider any of the numerous other examples of meta-
phor which we discussed in the last lecture.
Let me supply you with one other example of the differences between be-
havioral worlds. It is drawn from the field of child psychology and therefore 
presents us with a rather different problem than the one implicit in our previ-
ous illustrations. For the words with which the children indicate how they 
cut up the world are adult worlds, and children’s syntax is very nearly adult 
syntax, so it is easy to suppose that children use these words in the same way 
that we do and that they understand by them the same things as we do. That 
is, we are prone to assume that children are just little men and little women, 
and that their behavioral world is like our own.
But you all know that the maturity implied by the child’s choice of words 
and by his syntax is at least very frequently completely misleading. In many 
areas of thought and of perception children operate quite differently from 
their elders, even though they verbalize the end-product of their thought and 
their activity with an adult vocabulary. You have all had illustrations of this, 
for you have all at one time or another found yourself operating at cross pur-
poses with the child’s mind. You have listened to a child’s explanation of a 
given event or behavior and found the explanation meaningless—although 
to the child it was apparently totally satisfactory. Or, you have attempted 
to supply an adult answer to a child’s question and have discovered that not 
only was your answer totally unsatisfactory to the child, but that the answer 
satisfactory to him was one you could not have discovered by any literal inter-
pretation of the words which he used in asking for it.
In those areas of experience to which children apply thought they do not 
necessarily think the way we think. And though to us the mental connections 
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which the child employs may appear nonsensical or the products of ignorance, 
they are for the child an adequate rationalization of his world. But his world, 
that is his behavioral world, is different from our own. As the child grows up 
these modes of thought are no longer adequate to deal with the developing 
complexity of the problems which he meets. The thought process and the 
concomitant behavioral world are changed, and the behavioral world at which 
he arrives is a joint product of the older society in which he is raised and of 
the new problems which he, as a member of that society, may have to face. It 
thus need not and usually will not be quite the same as the behavioral world 
of the preceding generation.15
I will not here attempt a reconstruction of the behavioral world of the 
child, but I should like to supply you with one example of an experiment in 
which children use an adult concept but with a different meaning, and of the 
manner in which the child’s concept is proved inadequate and is changed. 
This illustration is drawn from the work of the famous Swiss child psycholo-
gist Jean Piaget, who has done more than any other contemporary investi-
gator to illuminate the nature of children’s mental processes. This example 
is particularly useful because of the similarity it shows to mental processes 
which we have already examined in our investigations of the history of sci-
ence. Also, it raises a problem about the role of logic in science to which I will 
return next time.
Children use terms like “to go as far as” or “one object travels as far as 
another object.” Under many circumstances the child will apply such adult 
phrases in the same way as the adult does. That is, he will apply them in the 
same cases as the adult does. But it can be shown that he does not normally 
grasp the same aspect of experience in making his judgment of the applicabil-
ity of the term.16 Consider, for example, two pieces of wire in the following 
shapes, each of which has a movable bead on it. 
As the beads are moved from A to B along these two paths, the child will 
usually say that the one goes as far as the other, from A to B, without real-
izing the incongruity presented by the vertical portion of the second wire. 
 
B A 
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That the bead moves on the vertical sections, but does so without nearing its 
destination, is a problem that when pointed out will eventually lead the child 
to refine the concept of “go as far as” by discriminating between the total 
displacement as the beads move from A to B and the unequal distances each 
travels along its wire.
We could dwell at length on the parallels between this example and the 
medieval and ancient understanding of motion which we discussed in the sec-
ond lecture. Here again we see motion grasped in terms of its endpoints; we 
see the logical difficulty presented by the attempt to analyze motion in these 
terms; and we have observed the way in which the modern grasp of motion is 
evolved through successive attempts to grapple with the logical problem. The 
parallelism between Aristotelian and children’s physics is here and in other 
areas quite precise, but I find it impossible to be certain what significance 
we may reasonably attribute to it. Here I would simply point out that the 
parallelism exists and that it illustrates once again the temporary behavioral 
adequacy of an organization of perceptions other than the one which we cus-
tomarily employ.
But though I think that we must equivocate about the significance of the 
detailed parallelism between the child’s world and the Aristotelian world, I 
see no need for a similar equivocation as to the parallelism between what I 
have here called the behavioral worlds and the scientific orientations or points 
of view which we discussed in the last lecture. In spite of the vast gap between 
the sorts of scientific behavior which we have examined in previous lectures 
and the very simple experimental behaviors which we have discussed this 
evening, the similarities are too striking to be without significance. And I 
should like in concluding to provide you with my preliminary evaluation of 
certain of these significances.
We can now say, I believe, that the scientist, too, operates in a behavioral 
world. It is not the everyday or the common social behavioral world which 
we have examined this evening. It is rather one of a number of professional 
behavioral worlds which, in the more advanced sciences, legislates for an area 
of experience foreign to most laymen. But it nevertheless parallels the behav-
ioral worlds we have examined in many important respects.
In the first place all these behavioral worlds are incomplete. The corre-
spondence between the perceptions available in a given behavioral world and 
the mental categories in terms of which that world is treated is so close that 
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all questions presented by the behavioral world can be answered in terms 
of the corresponding mental categories. In the last lecture we phrased this 
for science by stating that all questions arising within a given orientation 
or point of view had solutions within that point of view. And we have seen 
the same characteristic illustrated for behavioral worlds. The subjects who 
did not identify correctly the incongruous cards in the experiment discussed 
earlier this evening did not plead ignorance. On the contrary, they fitted that 
card into a preferred category in their behavioral world. The Eskimos who 
cold not sort strands of wool which to us are clearly different could not see 
any difference between the strands. They did not have the vocabulary or the 
mental categories requisite to the task. Their perceptual or behavioral world 
did not contain the diversity which could necessitate the task. The child who 
uses words differently than we, and who therefore finds no satisfaction in our 
answers to his questions, can nevertheless be given an answer which will be 
to him entirely satisfying. Questions for which no such satisfactory answers 
exist are questions he could not ask.
In the second place, behavioral worlds like scientific orientations can fi-
nally prove inadequate and require change. They too may be forced into crisis 
stages if they prove inadequate to mediate experience or if they prove to be 
possessed of logical inconsistencies. When the exposure to the normal cards 
was too long, the incongruity became apparent to the subjects of the experi-
ment. They had to create a new classificatory category for the cards. But before 
they could achieve this new categorization, they had to go through a definite 
crisis period, a period in which they were aware that something was wrong 
with their earlier classifications but were unable to see quite what it could 
be. The man readjusting to the distorted room in the Hanover Institute ex-
periment goes through a similar intermediate stage, a stage in which having 
recognized the inadequacy of his first perceptions he was unable to describe 
any that would replace it. He was forced to resort to almost pure trial and 
error to complete his task. And the child confronted with logical difficulties 
in reconciling his two notions of the meaning of the phrase “as far as” goes 
through a similar crisis. He first tries to preserve both meanings but to apply 
one and then the other, or he adopts small modifications not quite consistent 
with either in an effort to reconcile the two. And this parallelism between the 
psychological structure of crisis states in science and in behavioral worlds can 
be developed in considerable detail.
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And finally, the transformation in a behavioral world produced by a crisis, 
by the recognition of an inadequacy in the older world, transforms experience 
as well as the mental category in terms of which we deal with experience. One 
can learn to recognize incongruous cards. After that, the category is as read-
ily available as the category for normal cards, and the cards are immediately 
perceived. The man in the distorted room was able to reorganize his percep-
tions. But when he had, he saw a different sort of room. And the child who 
discovered the new use of the phrase “as far as” had to shift his grasp upon the 
phenomenon in order to do so. The same question now directs his attention to 
a different aspect of the experience.
In all of these cases, as in the scientific examples we have examined, the 
effect of the shift in behavioral worlds was destructive as well as constructive. 
The new behavioral world was undoubtedly an improvement. It was more ad-
equate to experience, but it required the destruction of an old and a complete 
way of grasping experience prior to the reconstruction of a new behavioral 
world.
It is because of parallels like this, parallels susceptible of a far more de-
tailed development, that I suggest we equate the notion of scientific orienta-
tion with that of a behavioral world. And it is in part because of the psycho-
logical necessity of some behavioral world as a mediator and organizer of the 
totality of perceptual stimuli that we will never be able to eliminate from the 
scientific process the orientations which originate in experience but subse-
quently transcend it and legislate for it.17
1. Instead of this sentence stating the problem, Kuhn noted only “Restate prob-
lem.”
2. I have adjusted Kuhn’s original phrasing, which was “the past historical lec-
tures.”
3. Here Kuhn instructed himself, “Put these on the blackboard.” I have supplied 
the following tables and noted that (44/28)72 is not exactly equal to 113.
4. This paragraph replaced a longer discussion, the subject of which which, ac-
cording to the parenthetical note that concludes it, was moved from this lecture to 
lecture V. This longer discussion reads: 
Notes
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But this physical example of a reorientation is different in one important 
respect from the geometrical problem which we examined earlier. And this dif-
ference suggests one other important function of a point of view. You will already 
have noticed that even after our manipulation of the data the figures arrived at 
do not exactly confirm the law of multiple proportions. Two times fifty-six is one 
hundred twelve, not one hundred thirteen, and in judging the law it is necessary 
to decide whether this difference marks a true deviation from the law or whether 
it simply notes a minor error due to some failure of the experiment or the ex-
perimenter. And this decision will normally be made upon the basis of the point 
of view which prevailed when the experiment was undertaken. Dalton expects 
the law of multiple proportions to hold; he examines the data and is delighted 
to find that they prove the law, although frequently the observed deviation from 
simple whole numbers is as great as twenty parts in a hundred, far greater than 
in our example.
Yet when Gay-Lussac proposed the law that gases united in ratios which 
provide simple whole-number volume relations Dalton rejected the law as fortu-
itous and pointed to the deviation of the experimental values from simple whole-
number ratios to prove the validity of his rejection. Yet these deviations were in 
almost all cases very much smaller than the ones in the data which Dalton had 
used in proving the law of multiple proportions.
Here we see the point of view acting not as a source of new insight and new 
connection but as a mental or psychological framework which actually legislates 
for the external world. It is our orientation which enables us to say this sense of 
experimental observation shows a true law of nature, although in fact the experi-
ment will always show deviation from what we take to be the law. And it is this 
same mental framework which leads us to reject other experimental evidence 
which though itself inconclusive would lead to a conclusion opposed to our law. 
And though these rejections viewed retrospectively frequently seem like sheer 
perverse conservatism as blocks to the progress of science, they also have an ex-
tremely constructive function. As we have noted again and again in the historical 
portion of this series, there are always facts which will contradict any proposed 
theory, and if one is to develop a new scientific orientation, if one is to explore 
and exploit a new scientific theory, one must simultaneously seek for aspects 
of experience which confirm the theory and find ways of explaining away those 
aspects of experience which seem counter to the theory. (Try to get most of this 
very last material into lecture number 5 and out of this one.)
5. Kuhn continued, but then crossed out, “or at [l]east this was apparently the 
case.” Kuhn’s ambivalence here about whether scientific change is driven by changing 
ideas or changes in the objective world itself (indeed, whether “objective world” is a 
coherent notion) anticipates similar ambivalence in Structure that would invite intense 
criticism of Kuhn’s ideas, continuing in some quarters to this day. See, for example, 
Errol Morris, The Ashtray (or the Man Who Denied Reality) (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2018).
6. Kuhn notes here, “At this point hold up an orange.”
7. Here Kuhn reports on the research paper “On the Perception of Incongruity: 
A Paradigm,” by Jerome S. Bruner and Leo Postman, Journal of Personality 18 (1949): 
206–23, which he later discussed in Structure’s chapter 6.
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8. Kuhn offers no references or sources for this and ensuing remarks about an-
thropological and linguistic research on Eskimo color perception. Later in the lecture, 
however, he refers to and paraphrases linguistic observations of Benjamin Lee Whorf. 
Along with his mentor Edward Sapir, Whorf theorized about interactions between 
language and perception in ways that Kuhn drew on here and later in Structure. See 
John. B. Carroll, ed., Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin 
Lee Whorf (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press and New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956). For a 
critical overview of the Sapir-Whorf thesis and Eskimo color vision, see Laura Martin, 
“‘Eskimo Words for Snow’: A Case Study in the Genesis and Decay of an Anthropo-
logical Example,” American Anthropologist 88(2) (1986): 418–23.
9. This and similar experiments were devised and performed by Adelbert Ames 
at Dartmouth College. See Roy R. Behrens, “Ames Demonstrations in Perception” in 
E. Bruce Goldstein, ed., Encyclopedia of Perception Vol. 1 (Sage Publications, 2010), 
41–44.
10. See George M. Stratton, “Vision without Inversion of the Retinal Image,” 
Psychological Review  4 (1897): 341–60, 463–81. Kuhn cited Stratton explicitly in Struc-
ture, chapter 10.
11. Kuhn used the word “perceptors,” instead of “perceivers.”
12. Here Kuhn paraphrases Whorf’s observations in his essay from 1940 “Science 
and Linguistics,” reprinted in Language, Thought, and Reality, op. cit., 207–19, esp. 
215.
13. See Whorf’s essay of 1941 “Languages and Logic,” in Language, Thought, 
and Reality, op. cit., 233–45, esp. 234.
14. Kuhn bracketed this sentence and the previous paragraph, possibly for omis-
sion.
15. Kuhn bracketed this and the two preceding sentences, possibly for omission.
16. I have constructed this figure and the remaining three sentences in this para-
graph on the basis of the text and Kuhn’s two notes to himself: “Draw a straight line 
and a lower square wave on board” and “On diagram, discuss fact that primary mean-
ing of term is total displacement rather than distance traveled through. Then point 
out that this is not simply a transposition of definition. The child also recognizes the 
activity that necessarily takes place in moving anywhere. That he recognizes incon-
gruity in the particular situation in which the bead is displaced only vertically in the 
square wave pattern, and that the recognition ultimately leads him to use the term in 
the adult manner.”
17. In this sentence I inserted “because of” and the article before “orientations.” 
I removed an additional “I suggest” for added clarity.
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Lecture VII
The Role of Formalism
In the preceding lectures we have talked at considerable length about the nature of the physical sciences without ever discussing those characteristics 
which to many people seem their most unique and essential attributes. I refer 
of course to their use of deductive techniques, to their logical and their math-
ematical structure. These two, logic and mathematics, may for our present 
purposes be grouped together, for, as many of you realize, recent investiga-
tions on the foundations of mathematics have shown that most or all of the 
theorems of mathematics can be derived from the more general principles 
of modern logic. It is to a preliminary study of certain of the roles played by 
logic and mathematics in the physical sciences that I should now like to turn.
The importance of mathematics and logic to the physical sciences has been 
recognized since the beginning of recorded history. Yet even our present lim-
ited and controversial understanding of the nature of the relationship be-
tween them is dependent upon a series of developments within mathematics 
and logic which have taken place during the past hundred years. The effect 
of these more recent studies has been to expand and to generalize the subject 
matter of logical and mathematical studies, and one supreme result of this 
generalization has been the emancipation of logic and mathematics from the 
study of the real or the apparently real world.
This emancipation has had incalculable consequences for science and for 
philosophy. The intellectual revolution which has accompanied it has no par-
allel in the period since the seventeenth century. And, fortunately for us, 
many of the essentials of this revolution can be grasped through the study of 
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elementary examples. The brilliantly elaborated, highly technical, immensely 
abstruse structure of modern logic and mathematics were necessary prerequi-
sites for the modern understanding of the nature of these disciplines. But, this 
insight once provided, many of the lessons learned from the efforts of modern 
logicians can be retrieved in older, more elementary examples. This recovery 
constitutes our program for this evening.
One important caveat is however required. Modern logic and mathemat-
ics constitute an imposing edifice. There is little or no controversy about its 
significance or about its permanence. But we are not going to examine this 
edifice itself; we are rather to inquire about its foundations. And in this inqui-
ry our analogy to the construction trades proves ill founded, for the unanim-
ity about the superstructure does not in this case imply a unanimity about the 
foundation. The edifice of modern logic is unquestionably more secure than 
its foundation. And the foundation remains the subject of controversy. So you 
ought not be misled by the elementary triviality of my examples to the sup-
position that the conclusions are equally elementary; you ought not suppose 
that the stability of the superstructure guarantees the unique stability of the 
particular set of conclusions about its foundation to be discussed this evening.
You are all familiar with the use of logical techniques in at least two con-
texts. The first of these is, of course, the classical syllogistic reasoning, ex-
emplified by the famous syllogistic form Barbara. If we take as premises “All 
men are mortal” and “Socrates is a man,” then it follows from the rules of 
syllogism that “Socrates is moral.”1 This is not the only syllogistic form. But it 
is typical, so we need not examine the others.
An apparently different case is provided by the use of logic in Euclidean 
plane geometry. It is difficult to see the geometry we learned in high school as 
purely syllogistic. But here again we are confronted with a number of axioms 
and postulates or premises from which by logical manipulation a large num-
ber of conclusions about triangles and rectangles and curvilinear figures can 
be drawn. As in the syllogism, we have premises and conclusions. One can, 
for example, deduce from Euclid’s postulates and axioms about the proper-
ties of points and lines the Pythagorean consequence that the square of the 
hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other 
two sides: c2 = a2 + b2.
Neither of these examples has escaped modern criticism. Syllogistic rea-
soning, we should now say, is accurate as far as it goes, but it is far too limited 
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and restricted. The syllogism is valid, but in many cases it is cumbersome. We 
no longer insist upon the desirability or possibility of putting all logical argu-
ments in syllogistic form. We have discovered more suitable and more gen-
eral forms for logical derivations. And with the development of these more 
general logical categories came an attempt to develop mathematical subjects, 
like Euclidean geometry, in more rigorously logical terms. It had always been 
recognized that the connection between Euclidean axioms and Euclidean 
theorems was in some sense logical. But the only rigorous logic known was 
the syllogism, and the connection could not be made by the syllogism alone.
It turned out that Euclidean geometry, as developed in antiquity, or as 
we learned it in high school, is by no means the model of logical rigor that 
we have taken it to be. On closer examination, the axioms and postulates of 
Euclid prove to have little logical significance. Some are redundant, others 
meaningless or useless, and taken as a group they are entirely inadequate to 
the development of the theorems formerly deduced from them. In order that 
they might provide an adequate basis for the logical derivation of the theo-
rems of Euclidean geometry, the axioms and postulates provided by Euclid 
had to be restated, and they had, in addition, to be supplemented by a large 
number of additional axioms which had previously been implicit in the pro-
cedures used in proving the theorems.
But this revision proved possible. New and complete postulate systems for 
Euclidean geometry and for other portions of mathematics were found. And 
this revision, though it clarified much that had been obscure in the origi-
nal development of geometry and though it facilitated many new discoveries 
and generalizations, did not alter the fundamental form in which geometry 
had previously been cast. The axioms were different, both in their form and 
content; the logic was more general; and many of the theorems were new. 
But the geometric proof still proceeded from axioms by logic to theorem and 
theorems were still concluded with the old q.e.d. So in my further remarks 
about geometry it should be understood that I am referring to it in one of the 
twentieth-century revisions which make it complete.
Crude as our present examples are, they illustrate quite adequately two 
extremely important characteristic of all logical or mathematical systems. The 
first of these is the apparent necessity of the connection between the prem-
ises and the conclusions. If you believe that “Socrates is a man” and that “All 
men are mortal,” then you cannot avoid the belief that “Socrates is moral.” 
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Similarly if you accept the revised postulates of Euclidean geometry you must 
accept those theorems like the Pythagorean theorem which follow from the 
axioms. You may reject the conclusions; it may be wrong. But then you must 
reject the postulate as well.
The apparent necessity of the connection between premises and conclu-
sions in logical and mathematical arguments is closely related to a second 
characteristic of these systems. The validity of the conclusions from the prem-
ises is, unlike the validity of a judgment about a matter of fact, entirely in-
dependent of any knowledge we may have about the real world. It does not 
depend upon anything we have learned through our senses, so there can be 
no errors of interpretation. And this aspect of the problem is frequently ex-
pressed by saying that mathematical and logical validity depend only upon 
the form and not the content of the statements which are employed in these 
disciplines. All that is logical in a logical proof can be abstracted from the 
content of the statements involved in the proof. 
The power of the syllogism derives from exactly this characteristic. The 
truth of the syllogism considered as a whole is independent of anything we 
know about Socrates or of what we mean by mortal. The nature of the syl-
logism is equally well and more generally illustrated by writing “All A are B,” 
“C is A,” therefore “C is B.”2 The syllogism is valid or true whatever we take 
A, B, and C to be. If you want to know whether it is true that Socrates is 
mortal, then you must discover whether the premises are true. Then you must 
know something about men and about Socrates. But the syllogism itself is 
independent of any such information. It achieves its generality and apparently 
its necessity by being about nothing at all. It supplies us with no information.
Now mathematics turns out to have exactly this characteristic. In the Eu-
clidean geometry which we learned in school, we spoke of points, lines, and 
planes which we represented on the diagrams which we used in our proofs. 
But the diagrams were certainly no part of the proof. They were suggestive 
and a useful aid to memory, but the validity of the proof was independent 
of the diagram. And the same is true of the commonsense notion of points 
and lines and planes which lay behind so many of our logical manipulations. 
They too can be eliminated. Instead of points, lines, and planes we might 
speak of ziggles, zaggles, and daggles, without any reference to the sorts of 
things which we denote by these words. And this lack of reference or meaning 
then applies not only to the entities of our mathematical systems—the points, 
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lines, or planes—but also to the relationships between them, relationships 
like points lying on a line.
We might for example proceed to develop geometry as follows:3 The entity 
which this subject considers shall consist of one set to be denoted by the lower 
case letters of the Roman alphabet, a, b, c . . . and a second set to be denoted 
by the capital letters of the alphabet, A, B, C . . . These two sorts of entities, 
we then say, may on occasion satisfy a relationship which we denote by the 
Greek letter ∊. Thus a ∊ A is a statement in our system. It will be a true state-
ment for some a and some A and false for others. But we have no idea what it 
means. Yet in terms of these symbols we may set up postulates for our system.
One such postulate would run as follows. If two entities of the first sort 
are distinct, which we indicate by writing a ≠ b, and if in addition there are 
two entities of the second sort, A and B such that a ∊ A, b ∊ A, and also a ∊ 
B and b ∊ B, then it will always be true that A = B.
So far we have said absolutely nothing about what the little letters, the 
capital letters, and ∊ are. And we need not do so; we can continue to add 
other postulates without any such specification. We need only take care not 
to put in any postulates that contradict those we’ve already annunciated, and 
we must put in enough postulates so that the set of postulates as a whole will 
have consequences. Certainly systems of this sort can have consequences. For 
although you have no notion what these A’s, B’s, etc. are, you can readily see 
something which they might be. The lower case letters may denote the sort of 
thing we normally call a point; the capital letters may denote the sort of thing 
we call a straight line; and the Greek letter ∊ may be construed to denote the 
relation which subsists when a point lies on a line. Thus a ∊ A would read: 
the point a lies on the straight line A. With this interpretation the postulate 
which we have already annunciated becomes the one with which you are al-
ready familiar. If a and b are distinct points, and if both these points lie on 
the line A and also on the line B, then A and B must be the same line. Or, in 
the more usual phraseology, only one straight line can be drawn through two 
distinct points.
We see then that we may adopt this particular interpretation of the en-
tirely abstract and undefined symbols which we have been using. If we do, 
we will get back to normal Euclidean plane geometry. But we do not have 
to adopt this interpretation or any other. All of the postulates can be written 
without any interpretation of the symbolic entities or of the relationship be-
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tween them, and all of the theorems can be deduced from these postulates by 
logical operations like the substitution of equals for equals without any effort 
to clothe the symbols with meaning. Geometry thus becomes the study of the 
consequences under logical manipulation of those properties of the undefined 
entities and relations which are given in the postulate system. And all of 
mathematics can be developed in this manner.
We are thus introduced to the notion of mathematics as a purely formal 
study. Mathematics, we now say, has no content. It is not about anything. It 
is simply the study of the logical consequences of supposing that certain un-
defined entities satisfy certain relatively arbitrary restrictions when placed in 
certain undefined relationships. The necessity of mathematical truth is thus 
completely reduced to the necessity of logical truth, and the truths of math-
ematics like the truths of logic are devoid of consequence for our perceptions 
of the natural world.
But although mathematics need have no application to the world of our 
perceptions, it may have such application. We are at liberty to explore our 
perceptions in an effort to isolate entities and relations between these entities 
which will fit one of the mathematical postulational systems. We may, for 
example, specify a straight line in nature to be the path of a light ray, as we 
do when we test the straightness of a stick by sighting along the side of the 
stick. We may specify a point in nature as the intersection of two such lines, 
or by some other device. And we may determine, by experiment, whether the 
natural entities thus defined do in fact satisfy the postulates of our entirely 
abstract system. If they do, if these natural entities are capable of serving as an 
interpretation for the postulates, then the theorems apply to them as well. For 
the theorems are consequences of the postulates whatever the interpretation 
of the entities and relations of the system. And this holds not only for geom-
etry, but for the numbers which we add and subtract and for our algebra. Our 
system of numbers and our normal algebra may be interpreted as applying to 
the distances which we measured with yardsticks or the weights we deter-
mine with scales, for the numbers shown on our yardsticks and scales, when 
these are applied to natural objects appear, as nearly as we can tell, to satisfy 
the postulates upon which our number system and our algebra are based. But 
our number system and our algebra need not be interpreted this way and their 
mathematical validity is independent of the interpretation.
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Historically this newer understanding of mathematics has been of tre-
mendous significance, for it has resulted in the realization that the particular 
postulational set upon which all mathematics before 1850 had been based 
are limited and arbitrary. There are many other sets of postulates whose con-
sequences can be developed by logical manipulation, and the study of these 
other postulational sets has been extremely fruitful. We have developed a 
geometry in which the sum of the angles of a triangle is not equal to 180°, 
and we have developed algebras in which x times y is not equal to y times x. 
Many of the systems developed in this manner remain without physical in-
terpretation, and their interest is in no way dependent upon the existence of 
such interpretations. But for other new postulational sets we have succeeded 
in finding physical interpretations. General relativity utilizes a geometry dif-
ferent from Euclid’s; quantum mechanics utilizes an algebra in which a times 
b is not the same as b times a. And it is extremely doubtful whether these new 
physical discoveries about the world would have been possible without the 
prior understanding of the nature of mathematical abstraction. The physicist 
has profited greatly from the mathematician’s discovery that since in mathe-
matics one is not talking about anything one can provide the object discussed 
with almost any property one chooses. Recent history has made it abundantly 
clear that one of the fundamental roles in science of logical and mathematical 
formalism is the development of abstract postulational sets, without physical 
reference, but with formal consequence, which the physicist may attempt to 
apply to entities abstracted from the natural world. Theoretically the math-
ematician might wait and let the physicist provide him with a set of postulates 
abstracted from nature, and this has occasionally been done fruitfully. But 
more often it has turned out that the system required by the physicist had 
been developed earlier by the abstract mathematician who had no thought for 
its application. And the physicist’s discovery of the possible abstraction from 
nature has normally been dependent upon at least a cursory acquaintance 
with the pre-existing branch of abstract mathematics.
But the application of logic in physical science is not restricted to its role 
in mathematics. The syllogism itself is not mathematical, yet much scientific 
reasoning may be cast in this form or better in the more generalized form 
provided by modern logic. So we must now investigate logic itself somewhat 
more closely.
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Now it turns out that logic itself can also be formalized, that is, it can 
be reduced to a set of postulates completely without reference and to a set of 
statements about the manner in which the entities and relations appearing in 
these postulates are to be manipulated for the generation of logical theorems.
Perhaps an elementary illustration will make this clearer. In logic we may 
deal with a number of undefined entities denoted by symbols like p, q . . . and 
we include as objects of our study a series of connectives by which the p’s and 
q’s can be compounded to yield new entities of the same sort.4 We call the p’s 
and q’s propositions, and we gain new propositions from these with the aid 
of certain connectives. One such typical connective is the conjunction, which 
is denoted by a dot. If p is a proposition and q is a proposition, then p ⋅ q is 
another proposition.
These propositions can, we now say, have one of two values. They may 
be true, which we denote by T, or false, which we denote by F. By using this 
symbolism we can describe the properties of the dot connective completely 
with the aid of a table. In the first column we tabulate values of p, in the 
second values of q, and in the third values of p ⋅ q. The proposition p may be 
true or false, and for each of these values of p, q may be true or false, and the 
four possible combinations are indicated by the rows in the first two columns 
of the table. And the logical properties of the dot will now be completely ex-
hausted if we specify in the third column the values which the proposition p 
⋅ q will take for all the combinations of value of p and of q. This choice might 
be made completely arbitrarily but it is convenient and customary to place a 
T in the first row and an F in all the others. Thus if p is true and q is true, p 
⋅ q is also true. But if either p or q or both is false, then p ⋅ q is false as well.5





With the aid of one more sign we can get a theorem. This sign is called the 
negation sign and is represented by the tilde. It does not connect propositions 
but changes one proposition to another, and its properties are completely 
represented by the very simple table which tabulates the values of p in one 
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column and of ~p or not p in the other. We see that the effect of the tilde is 
simply to change the truth value of the proposition. If p is true, ~p is false, and 
vice versa. Now let us set up a similar table for the compound proposition p ⋅ 




Now we can look back to our old table for the dot connective and discover in 
both these cases p ⋅ ~p must be false. And this is a theorem: p ⋅ ~p is always 
false, or ~(p ⋅ ~p) is always true. It is valid by virtue of its form alone. It makes 
no difference what p is or what the value of p is, ~(p ⋅ ~p) always has the truth 
value denoted by T. And this is a consequence simply of the rules which we 
described in our table. Any theorem which can be developed in this manner 
is known as a tautology. There are many others of which this is simply the 
most trivial.
Not all logical truths are tautologies, nor can they all be derived with the 
aid of tables like the ones we have here considered. But all logical theorems 
share with our trivial example a number of important characteristics. None 
of them need be taken to be about anything. We have called the p’s and q’s 
propositions, but we might equally well have called them “snerlbarks.” We 
have called their values true and false, they are also frequently denoted by 1 
and 0, and any other signs might have been chosen. We have called the dot 
a conjunction and the tilde a negation, but we could as well have stuck to the 
names dot and tilde. We need not know what any of these things is, and we 
can still derive logical theorems. Or perhaps I should say we can still find 
combinations of these undefined symbols whose values are T for all values of 
the components. Thus we need not call this subject logic at all.
Viewed in this manner, logic, or whatever you wish to call it, is just a 
game, like chess. The game is played with certain undefined symbols or 
markers which may be interpreted in the case of chess to be kinds or queens, 
knights and pawns, but which need have no such interpretation, and these 
markers are manipulated according to certain set standard rules which we 
ourselves may select. We did not for example have to put one T and three F’s 
in the column in which we interpreted the properties of the dot connective. 
We could have employed another set. And chess rules have the same char-
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acteristic. Chess does not have to be played according to the standard rules. 
Chess has been played in three dimensions, and it has been played in two 
dimensions on boards that are 8x9, or 8x10, or 10x10 rather than the normal 
8x8. It has been played with extra pieces or with the normal pieces permitted 
to move in abnormal manner. And such variations can be multiplied almost 
without limit without destroying the basic pattern of the game.
But for all this freedom there are certain variations which cannot be per-
mitted if the game is to be played at all. There must in the first place be some 
one set of rules fixed in advance of the game. You cannot change the rules as 
you go along. Nor, if the game is played on an 8x8 board can a piece be em-
ployed which is required to move through ten rows or ten columns at a time. 
Nor, to take an extreme example, may a chess piece be permitted to move 
from any square to any other square at will. With this modification white 
would always mate on the first move. And the same sorts of limitations apply 
to the rules of our formal game of logic. The rules themselves must be fixed 
in advance, and certain sorts of connectives must be barred. The dot, for ex-
ample, would be useless if the table which described its properties contained 
a solid set of T’s or a solid set of F’s in the third column.
To this point I have suggested that the p’s, q’s, dots, and tildes, as well 
as the T and F of our logic need not be interpreted, that they are developed 
purely formally and without any reference. But of course we can find an inter-
pretation for them. In fact, we have developed them in this particular manner 
in order that they might be capable of the interpretation which we are going 
to supply. For of course we may take these p’s and q’s, the propositions, to be 
the normal declarative sentences of our language. They may be everyday sen-
tences like, “The apple is red,” or they may be the symbolic sentences of math-
ematics like our older “a ∊ A,” or a ≠ b, or A=B. Similarly, the dot conjunction 
may be interpreted as the “and” used to join simple declarative statements into 
compound declarative statements. From “the apple is red” and from “the sky 
is blue,” this conjunction makes the compound declarative “The sky is blue 
and the apple is red.” Again the tilde or negation sign supplies the function 
of the not in everyday language. From “The apple is red” the tilde makes “The 
apple is not red” and so on for the other undefined symbols which a fuller 
treatment of logic would develop.6 
So far the identification is arbitrary, but it turns out that it can be usefully 
extended. For if we now identify the T and the F of our table with the true 
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and false of normal discourse, then the statements that our table shows to be 
tautologously true are among those general forms or compound statements of 
ordinary discourse whose validity or falsity is uniformly granted. Thus in p ⋅ 
~p always being false, we see a symbolic summary of the universally admitted 
truth that compound statements like “the apple is red and the apple is not red” 
or “the point lies on the line and the point does not lie on the line” are always 
false. And again this procedure can be extended to include those other lin-
guistic compounds whose validity or falsity seem everywhere to be admitted.7 
It was certainly not clear in advance that these universally acknowledged 
truths, like the syllogism, could be reduced to a pure formalism, to a game 
played according to relatively arbitrary but completely binding rules. And the 
possibility of such a reduction provides an important clue to the apparent 
necessity of all such logical truths. For the rules of our formalism are now 
seen to correspond to rules implicit in our language. They represent relatively 
closely certain of our linguistic conventions, and if complete they should in-
clude all those conventions which are independent of the meanings of the 
words employed in language and which derive from the form in which these 
words are arranged for communication. And the impossibility of doubting 
the validity of the syllogism or of some other logical derivation presumably 
derives not from any particular characteristic of the external world or of our 
minds, but rather from a set of conventions which we have adopted in order 
to be able to talk about the world, in order to be able to communicate at all.
The rules of formal logic or of formal language are conventions. They are 
the rules of the game which we play with other human beings when we com-
municate. In themselves, they are no more necessary than any other adequate 
set of rules, but without some such set no communication or very little com-
munication would be possible. We are not then obliged to admit the necessity 
of the syllogism, but an announcement that we will not do so is an announce-
ment that we will not bide by the rules of the game, that we will not play. It 
is therefore in the most literal sense antisocial, it carries the penalty of other 
antisocial acts, and it deprives us of the privilege of learning certain things 
from the experience of others.
I confess that this view that the truths of logic are products of linguistic 
convention is not by any means free of difficulty. It is probably true that it 
raises as many questions as it answers, and the problems raised have led a 
number of philosophers and logicians to reject it. I adhere to it at this time in 
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spite of my inability to resolve all the difficulties simply because the difficul-
ties seem not more severe than those which arise in the attempt to root logical 
necessity in the external world or in the innate categories of the mind. Yet the 
difficulties cannot be simply dismissed, for they indicate directions in which 
further clarification must be obtained.
In the first place, the methods of formalizing logic which we have dis-
cussed are circular. In setting up our truth tables and describing their utiliza-
tion we required language. Yet we suggested that the regularities embodied 
in the tables underlie all our language. And we should therefore have liked to 
suppose that the formalism was prior to the language for which it legislates, 
that it could be constructed independently. But although it is reasonably clear 
that this circularity cannot be eliminated, it is by no means so clear that it 
constitutes a real difficulty; or just what the difficulty is if it exists. We have 
already noted that the procedure of cutting up the world in science or in ev-
eryday life is a circular process through which increased precision of the cut 
is obtained, and there is no apparent reason why the same should not be true 
of linguistic convention.
A further difficulty may reside in our use of the word linguistic. It may 
not be either necessary or desirable to associate these conventions with purely 
verbal communications. There are other more primitive forms of communi-
cation, like the gesture, and these too may have their own conventions and 
therefore their own logic. It may further be suggested that our association of 
logical convention with communication is itself an error since the conventions 
seem requisite to thought even though the thought is not communicated. But 
this consideration involves us with the extremely controversial question as to 
whether thought itself is possible in the absence of a socially forged symbol-
system. And today it appears impossible to say more than that the two are 
surely not independent.
Far more important than either of these difficulties is our present lack of 
understanding of the extent of our freedom in the choice of the conventions 
which underlie logic and language. Are our conventions the only ones? Is our 
logic the only logic? Or might we abstract other conventions if we considered 
languages radically different from our own? To what extent is the structure 
of Indo-European language responsible for the highly developed state of our 
mathematics and our science? Such questions suggest the further possibility 
that our logical conventions themselves as well as the entities to which we 
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apply them may be related to the manner in which we form the behavioral 
worlds discussed during the last lecture. And this, if true, would necessitate 
a qualification of our initial remark of the independence of logic and expe-
rience. Logic would remain independent of particular experience. Logical 
truths cannot be invalidated by experience. But the logical conventions might 
again be involved in the categories to which we subject our experience so that 
if the conventions are not unique, changes in them might be associated with 
changes in the behavioral world and therefore with changes in experience.
These speculations need answers, but our uncertainty about the answers 
does not bar the possibility—or to my mind the probability—that logical and 
mathematical truths are grounded in conventions. And these conventions, 
though more or less arbitrary in their particular form, are in some form nec-
essary preconditions of communication, of learning, and perhaps of thought 
itself. The recognition of the existence of such conventions has led to a per-
sistent proposal that we reduce all language, or at least all scientific language, 
which some philosophers take to be the same thing, to a purely formal system 
supplemented by a set of rules determining the meanings in the perceptual 
world of the undefined elements of the formalism.
The nature of this proposal for the formalization of scientific language 
will be clearer if we revert to our earlier example of geometry. There you will 
remember we dealt with a group of entities with no reference, our a’s and our 
A’s, and with certain relations between them among which was the one which 
we denoted by ∊. These entities and relations had no referents, but they did 
have certain properties which were completely described by a set of formal 
postulates, and there were a number of different pure postulational systems 
which could be prescribed for them. Further, these postulational sets had 
consequences derived from them by considering a ∊ A and similar compounds 
to be propositions, to be the p’s and q’s of formal logic. And applying to these 
compounds the conventional logical manipulations, the formal consequences 
of the postulational sets were discovered.
It then turned out that the a and the A could be interpreted as the point 
and the line of a variety of different abstract geometries. One of these ge-
ometries was Euclidean, others were non-Euclidean. But among the many 
geometries generated by different postulational sets was one which we can 
call the geometry of actual space. And we discover which of the geometries 
this is by equating straight lines with the path of a light ray, a thing we de-
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termine by experimental manipulation and by equating distance in geometry 
with the result of a series of operations performed with a yardstick. That is 
to say, from among all the possible abstract geometries constructed by apply-
ing the conventions of logic to postulate systems involving the a, the ∊, and 
the A and other referenceless symbols, we select one which can be applied 
to the real world. And the criterion determining this applicability is that for 
this geometry we can describe a set of manual operations which determine 
entities and relations like straight lines and distance in such a manner that 
these entities and relations will satisfy the postulate set or at least will satisfy 
it arbitrarily closely.
This geometry is then the geometry of real space. The theorems in it apply 
to real space, and we have found physical referents for the previously unat-
tached symbols of the abstract mathematical system. In this way, our knowl-
edge of the space of the world, of the space provided by our perceptions, is 
reduced to an understanding of a purely conventional formalism and of the 
consequences of this formalism, together with an understanding of a set of 
operations by which the abstract entities of the formal system are given refer-
ence to entities abstracted from the perceptual world.
The program for the formalization of scientific language calls for the ap-
plication of this technique to other portions of science and to the language of 
scientific communication. And scientific language is for this purpose taken to 
be the entire language in which we discuss our perceptions. In everyday terms, 
it is the language in which we discuss facts or events or the relations between 
events. It is a language used not only by the scientist but, more loosely, by the 
layman. And it is this language which we are now asked to formalize.
The general direction in which such a program should proceed ought now 
be reasonably clear. We must introduce, in addition to the a’s and the A’s 
which we may interpret as points and lines, additional abstract symbols and 
arrangements of these symbols which we intend later to be able to interpret 
as temperatures, forces, masses, and so on. Just how many such symbols we 
require is not clear, but we must have enough for the complexity of our per-
ceptions. We next set up pure formal relations between these abstract entities, 
and we investigate by logical convention the consequences of our postulates.8 
This is the purely formal component of our scientific language.
But we require in addition a set of rules enabling us through our percep-
tions and our manipulations to correlate these abstract entities of the formal 
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system with entities abstracted from the world of our perceptions. These rules 
determine the meanings of the formal entities of the abstract language. The 
application of the rules determines in the perceptual world a group of enti-
ties and relations satisfying an appropriately chosen postulate set; and these 
entities of the perceptual world are the referents of the abstract entities of the 
formal system. So all scientific language, all science is reduced to conven-
tion and its consequences plus meaning-relations. And the ultimate outcome 
of this program would be to separate entirely the empirical portion of our 
knowledge from the portion due to the conventions we employ in gaining 
and formalizing it.
It is by no means clear how far this project can be carried. The efforts in 
this direction are still in their preliminary stages, and it is far too early to 
reach any final judgment upon them or upon the projects from which they 
derive. But certain preliminary remarks are surely called for. I am myself 
considerably less optimistic about the possibility of completing this research 
effort than the majority of contemporary students. And I shall dwell at some 
length, both this evening and in the early portions of our next lecture, on 
what I consider to be the limitations of a completely formalized language. But 
first we should clearly recognize that whatever the ultimate limitations of the 
effort, the attempt to formalize limited areas of existing scientific knowledge 
has been and will continue to be a useful tool of research. 
We have already noted the manner in which physics profited by the for-
malization of geometry. Even while incomplete, this formalization resulted in 
the recognition of the existence of many geometries different from Euclid’s, 
and this recognition increased the freedom of scientific thought about the 
characteristics of physical space. Here clearly is an example of a scientific 
situation in which the separation of empirical and formal elements of knowl-
edge provided the scientist with increased freedom of conceptualization. For 
the Euclidean formalism which had previously been thought necessary was 
shown to be only one of a number of alternate formalisms, and the scientist 
was directed to new aspects of experience in an effort to choose among pos-
sible alternates.
The history of science is filled with examples of the fruitful application of 
logical formalism to mental concepts like those of matter, of motion, and of 
space. Logical necessity and empirical necessity are all too frequently con-
fused. Their separation normally, as in this this case, results in the recognition 
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of new possible formal categories and directs experiments to new aspects of 
the perceptual world. We have already noted the important effect of succes-
sively more adequate logical solutions of the Parmenidean problem upon the 
science of antiquity and of the seventeenth century. If we had the time we 
might equally well have examined the effect in the nineteenth century of the 
formal analyses of the Newtonian laws of motion, for these together with 
the analysis of space conducted during the same period led once again to the 
recognition that the empirical basis of Newtonian mechanics could be com-
patible with other formalisms, and this recognition is an important portion of 
the intellectual background of our radically differing modern physics.
In these examples we see the application of formalism to a limited area of 
knowledge as a tool which by creating greater conceptual freedom aids in the 
resolution of crisis states in individual sciences. But the application of logical 
formalism can also create such crises. We discussed an example of this sort 
in considering the scholastic contributions to Galileo’s reformulation of the 
problem of motion. One part of this work, you remember, was completely 
independent of any observational material, old or new. It was a study of the 
logical categories adequate to the consideration of any change, and we might 
paraphrase the outcome of this study by saying that it led to the recognition 
of the logical or formal incompatibility of the existing concept of motion with 
the formal categories applied to the analysis of motion. Conceptually the mo-
tion was grasped as a whole; analytically it was equated with its endpoints. 
And, as we noted again in studying the child’s view of the problem of motion, 
these two approaches lead to conflicting formalisms.
So formalization can be a source of scientific crisis or it can be an aid in the 
resolution of such crisis. And it has one even more important function. It con-
ditions the structure of our texts, the manner in which we organize scientific 
knowledge, and the manner in which we transmit it. The structure of a text, 
as we discussed it in our first lecture, was a formal structure. The laws were 
stated in abstract, possibly mathematical terms; formal deductive techniques 
were then described; and finally a set of operations was proposed by which 
the formal consequences of the law could be compared with experience. These 
operations constituted the meaning system of the formalism.
Of course this description is an idealization. No existing body of scientific 
knowledge has as yet been reduced to a formalism paralleling in its complete-
ness or abstractness the formalism to which we have reduced most of mathe-
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matics. Nevertheless it appears likely in principle that such formalization can 
be achieved. But whether the meaning system for such a formalism could be 
adequately described is less clear. The modern philosophy of science known 
as operationalism bases much of its program upon the supposition that it can 
be. But no adequate illustrations of such a scientific meaning system have 
yet been provided. To say as we have up to this point that distance is simply 
the result of an operation performed with a yardstick is in itself inadequate 
in precision. Certainly one must also describe the material of the yardstick, 
the temperature at which it is to be maintained, and the manner in which it 
is to be moved if the length to be measured is greater than the length of the 
stick itself.9 The failure to prescribe some such unique operation for the deter-
mination of distance makes synonyms of various different operations used to 
define the single term distance. And this is equivalent to making certain sorts 
of synonymy depend upon previous scientific experience which is surely not a 
satisfactory characteristic of a meaning system. But the alternative provided 
by the unique definition is too narrow for practical application. Certainly our 
texts do not even attempt to approximate such an ideal.
So it is possible that our texts, including meaning systems, cannot be fully 
formalized, but they can and do approximate however inadequately this ide-
al. And even so limited an approximation is useful. It permits a tremendous 
condensation of the content of scientific knowledge and, by separating even 
partially the formal and empirical elements of knowledge, it facilitates verifi-
cation of the end-products of scientific conceptualization. The condensation 
of the empirical content of science is, if you will, simply a mnemonic device,10 
but from it proceeds much of the cumulative character of scientific knowl-
edge. The separation of the logical from the empirical elements in the text 
increases the freedom of scientific conceptualization by partially eliminat-
ing the effect of the orientation from which the theory was derived and thus 
makes easier further advances in scientific theory. But, as we noted, there is 
real question how far even this separation can be carried.
All of these examples of the fruitful application of formalism have one 
important characteristic in common. In all cases formalism was applied to an 
existing organized body of scientific information and scientific theory. But 
the proposal for the construction of a scientific language greatly transcends 
these limited applications. Basically it is a proposal that not only the products 
of research but the research itself be designed and expressed in terms of a 
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formal language plus a meaning system. Fundamentally, it calls for the con-
struction of a language adequate to deal unambiguously with infinite variety 
presented by the totality of our perceptual experience. And this I think is 
clearly impossible.
At the start of the next lecture I shall discuss the effects of the comple-
tion of such a program upon the language of everyday discourse. For we can 
learn a great deal about the limitations of formalism from such an elementary 
discussion. At that time I will suggest that such a language would either be 
infinitely complex and therefore totally unmanageable, or alternatively that it 
would be incapable of dealing with new experience. But in the few minutes 
remaining this evening let me simply suggest the difficulty of reconciling 
such a program with what we have already learned about the nature of the 
scientific process.
If one were to commence such a project of complete formalization, one 
would undoubtedly start with the language employed for existing scientific 
knowledge. Perhaps the program could be completed; certainly existing text-
books provide a preliminary step in this direction. But supposing the project 
completed, its results would be to freeze scientific attention upon just those 
aspects of nature which are embraced by contemporary science. It would pro-
vide a place in its meaning system for aspects of nature now considered tech-
nically relevant and no place for others. As a result it would not be a language 
adequate to embrace new conceptual developments in science. If the new lan-
guage were developed to fit present-day science we should have to change it 
with every change in scientific theory. For we cannot tell in advance what 
aspects of nature will prove important to our forthcoming scientific theories. 
So we require a broader language than the language of contemporary sci-
ence. We need a language broad enough to embrace aspects of experience not 
now considered scientifically relevant. Certainly we can make the language 
somewhat broader, but our knowledge of behavioral worlds, discussed in the 
last lecture, may make us wonder whether we can broaden it enough. For 
we have reason to suppose that our perceptions themselves simplify the total 
perceptual flux, and that this simplification can only be altered when and if it 
proves behaviorally inadequate. And surely unless our ability to discriminate 
among our perceptions is fixed once and for all, we cannot design a stable 
language to deal with them all. A formal language adequate to deal with 
changes in the behavioral world would demand an advance knowledge of the 
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totality of all our future perceptions, and we have every reason to suppose that 
there is no basis, theoretical or empirical, upon which such knowledge could 
be grounded.11 Yet the scientist himself lives in a behavioral world. Changes 
in scientific theory are associated with changes in the behavioral world of 
the scientific profession. And they are therefore presumably associated with 
changes in perception with which no fixed language can deal.
To this point we shall return in the final lecture.
1. Kuhn noted to himself here, and for the example in the next paragraph, “Put on 
Board.” “Barbara” is one of several mnemonic names for different forms of deductive 
syllogism. Here the three a’s in “Barbara” represent the three quantifiers “all,” as in: 
“All Greeks are human,” “All humans are mortal,” therefore “All Greeks are mortal,” of 
which Kuhn’s version about the singular Socrates is an adaptation.
2. Kuhn instructed himself to put these formulas on the blackboard.
3. Kuhn instructed himself to put these formulas on the blackboard.
4. Here again Kuhn directed himself to the blackboard.
5. Kuhn’s scripts do not include the following two truth tables, which I have in-
serted for illustration.
6. Here Kuhn inserted by hand, “set up if time” the following formula:
If (a ≠ b ⋅ a ∊ A ⋅ b ∊ B ⋅ b ∊ A ⋅ b ∊ B) then (A=B)
He labeled the arguments and conclusion, respectively, (p, q, r, s, t, and u). Kuhn had 
discussed this argument previously in the lecture.
7. Here Kuhn’s text reads, “Among these would be the syllogism Barbara, which 
in its full linguistic form would be exemplified by ‘If Socrates is a man and all men 
are mortal, then Socrates is mortal’.” The first six words, “Among these would be the 
syllogism” are typed and the rest in handwritten. Kuhn may have forgotten that he 
introduced the syllogism form Barbara at the beginning of this lecture. Accordingly, I 
have removed this second introduction from the main text.
8. Kuhn parenthetically typed, but then crossed out, “Insert remark about intro-
ducing sufficient symbols to give us all words of our language.” 
9. Next to this discussion of operationalism, Kuhn noted in the margin, “Expand 
if possible.”
10. Here Kuhn inserted by hand “we need state only postulates.” 
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I should like to continue this evening the discussion begun in our last lecture of the difficulties inherent in the formulation of a completely formalized 
language for all of scientific research. Some of these difficulties are displayed 
particularly strikingly in a discussion of the effect of formalism upon natural 
language, the language which we use every day in describing what goes on 
about us. I do not of course mean to suggest that scientific language and 
natural language are synonymous. Scientists alter and refine the common 
concepts and words they use, and they introduce new words and concepts pe-
culiar to their own disciplines. But as we have noted again and again, natural 
language and everyday concepts provide the starting point for all scientific 
investigation. If scientific research can profit by the complete formalization 
of language, then this formalization would have to affect natural language as 
well. And it will, I believe, be clear in what follows that the particular prob-
lem of linguistic formalism which we are now to consider must necessarily 
carry over from natural language to any more scientific which shares with it 
the task of mediating past and future perceptions.
One sine qua non of any formalized language is a precise and unambiguous 
meaning system. For every symbol of the formalized language there must be 
given a set of rules implicit or explicit which uniquely determine the percep-
tual complexes which this symbol correctly denotes. This set of rules pre-
scribes, or perhaps itself constitutes, the meaning in the perceptual world of 
the symbol or word in question.
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Now there are in theory two distinct manners of setting up such a mean-
ing system. The first of these might well be called definition by enumeration 
or by pointing. We point to one or more objects in the external world and 
recite simultaneously the phrase, “These objects and only these objects shall 
be denoted by such and such a symbol or word.” The best example of this pro-
cedure in practice is the allocation of proper names. “You Tarzan, me Jane,” 
said a famous heroine to her new-found jungle friend. And the name or label 
stuck.
But there is another and more usual manner of providing a meaning sys-
tem. The meaning of a term may be prescribed by the description of a set of 
criteria which uniquely determine the applicability of a given symbol or group 
of symbols to a given perceptual entity. Thus, a bachelor is a man who has not 
been through any one of a set of procedures which result in matrimony, or, 
who having gone through such a set, has followed it with another set which 
culminates in divorce. With a fuller description of these procedures, we are 
in a position to determine whether or not a given individual is a bachelor. 
We may interrogate him, or if this is unsatisfactory, we may examine legal 
records.
It is quite clear that at least in theory these two methods are entirely dis-
tinct. For words which are, by enumeration or pointing, applied to the same 
perceptual complex may be so applied by virtue of quite different criteria. Thus 
descriptive phrases like “the author of WAVERLY” and “the author of IVAN-
HOE” refer to the same entity, but they are applied to it by virtue of different 
criteria. It is usually said that these two phrases refer to the same individual or 
that they have the same “referent,” but that they have different meanings. The 
term “meaning” is thus reserved for the criteria which determine the applica-
bility of the term in question, and it is observed that synonymy of reference 
and synonymy of meaning are two quite different relationships.
So two different methods of setting up meaning or reference systems are 
distinct. Either of them, taken alone, is capable of providing a systematic 
relationship between a formalized language and the situations to which it 
applies, but their application results in two rather different ways of cutting up 
the world. In practice we appear to use a combination of both.
These two methods are, so far as I know, the only two capable of providing 
precise meaning or reference for those symbols of daily discourse which we 
normally call nouns. Yet I do not believe that either singly or in combination 
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they could be employed quite as described in the construction of a language 
capable of adequately mediating the entire world of our perceptions. This is 
particularly obvious as regards the first, the one which we called definition by 
enumeration. For there is not normally sufficient time to permit enumeration. 
To discover how to use the word “elephant” we cannot go about and point to 
all the elephants in the world. By the time we had finished our first trip there 
would be more elephants. We should never be able to use the word. Appar-
ently for words like this we must rely on some description of the criteria ac-
cording to which the word is to be applied. We may learn of these criteria by 
experience with a few objects to which the word applies. But we must learn 
such criteria for the word may have to be applied to a particular individual 
which we have not already seen.
Definitions by enumeration or pointing are possible only in the case of 
proper names, and even here a real difficulty is present. The infant to whom 
we give the name John Smith changes as he grows older, so we would seem to 
require some criterion beyond the initial pointing if we are to continue to call 
him by the same name. So finally definition by enumeration seems useful only 
in a world, or in a part of a world, which contains a finite number of entities 
and in which we can be perfectly certain of the perceptual stability of these 
entities. Such a stable universe, occupied by a finite number of distinct and 
perduring entities, is surely not the sort of universe mediated by our natural 
language or by the language of science.
The limitation of the alternate means of prescribing a meaning system are 
less apparent, and we will more profitably approach them by discussing the 
manner in which we actually arrive at meanings and then considering the 
manner in which the nature and function of language would be changed by 
an adherence to a more precise meaning system. We learn words in a number 
of different ways. We learn them from dictionaries and from other people. 
We learn them by observing the situations in which other people use par-
ticular words and as children we learn at least some of our words by random 
experimentation with sounds accompanied by the observation of the effect on 
other people of particular sounds. And of these procedures the last two are 
more basic. We learn our basic vocabulary through use, our own use or other 
people’s use. So it is this acquisition of meaning through use which I should 
particularly like to consider.
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How, for example, do we acquire our notion of the meaning of the word 
“dog”? We see pictures of a number of dogs, we watch as our parents or our 
friends point to objects to which they apply the word, and we gradually learn 
how to correlate the word with our perceptions. Our first notion may be very 
crude—we may apply it indiscriminately to cats, dogs, and horses. But gradu-
ally we learn to discriminate linguistically among these elements of our be-
havioral world. Certainly our linguistic discriminations become more precise; 
probably there is an accompanying increase in the precision of our percep-
tions. Gradually we have categorized the world; we have cut it up into boxes 
containing dogs, horses, cats, and so on.
You will recognize that this is an extremely crude heuristic procedure. 
But for most and perhaps for all purposes of everyday life it proves entirely 
adequate. We do learn in this manner to use a large number of words in the 
same way that other people use them under the same circumstances, and this 
is all that’s required for purposes of social communication.
But obviously this manner of learning words does not lead to anything 
that could properly be called a precise meaning system in either of the senses 
of meaning that we have already discussed. We may repeatedly use the word 
dog correctly with respect to particular animals which we have never seen 
before. But this does not imply that we can produce or demand a set of criteria 
which govern the applicability of the word to particular perceptual complex-
es. If you examine your own concept of dog you will, I think, find that you 
apply it and use it without any corresponding knowledge of the criteria which 
make it applicable. So that if meaning is to be equated with an understanding 
of a meaning system, then many of the words of daily discourse can be and 
are applied without our knowing what they mean.
Our lack of a clear understanding of the precise meanings of the words we 
use has many disadvantages which we will want to discuss. But first it would 
be well to be entirely clear as to the difficulty which will confront us in any 
effort to remedy the situation. For although relatively clear criteria of applica-
bility can be provided for certain of the words of natural language, there are 
others like “dog” with which it is peculiarly difficult to deal.
It is quite easy to provide a criterion which will distinguish horses and 
dogs. Horses have hooves, dogs have padded feet and claws. But the distinc-
tion between dogs and cats is not so easy to make. Some lap dogs have ex-
ternal appearances very much like those of certain breeds of cats. Some wild 
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cats are very near in their appearance to some of the larger breeds of dogs. But 
again a criterion can be found. Cats have retractile claws, dogs cannot retract 
their claws. This is inconvenient as a criterion. No one wants to examine the 
claws of strange animals. But it will serve.
However, when we come to the attempt to distinguish dogs from animals 
like wolves, foxes, and jackals we have an extremely difficult time. Here we 
appear to be dealing with members of the same biological genus. Neat dis-
tinguishing features like the one based upon types of claws are not available 
to us. Instead we are likely to resort to a discussion of the normal habitat of 
these various breeds, of the possibility of domesticating them, or their normal 
food, and so on.
But these criteria are different from the ones that we’ve imposed so far, for 
these, though quite good enough for the purpose of normal discrimination, 
might very well be violated. Wolves have occasionally been domesticated. 
They then act very much like certain sorts of dogs. Besides wolves and dogs 
can crossbreed, and we can by judicious interbreeding produce a virtually 
continuous spectrum of animals from the wild wolf to the domestic dog. And 
then where will we draw the line between them? And to this question the 
answer is obvious. We may draw it anywhere we please. It could not make 
less difference. It is not one of the jobs of everyday language to distinguish 
between these cases that might occur, but are supremely unlikely to occur. 
So after all this effort we may well conclude that the job was not worthwhile. 
The vague definitions implicit in our usage of words are normally just about 
as precise as they need be for our practice.
So it is difficult to describe any precise meaning for the word dog. I have 
used the word frequently. So far as I know I have always used it correctly, 
but I had to go to the Encyclopedia Britannica in order to learn even the little 
bit about dogs which was requisite to the above attempt at definition. And 
even with that knowledge we fell short of complete precision. Nevertheless at 
the expense of being occasionally arbitrary, we could achieve such precision.1 
We may illustrate our precise definition with the aid of a diagram. Here is a 
rough circle. At its interior we say lie all animals which are four-legged and 
have non-retractile claws. Thus the area included within the circle includes all 
dogs, but it also includes some other animals—wolves, jackals, etc., and we 
want to get rid of these. To do this we provide the most precise description 
possible of the animal and we draw little circles representing these descrip-
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tions. These animals are to be removed from the class of four-footed animals 
with nonretractable claws. The remaining area provides our precise definition 
of dogs.
Of course in providing the descriptions by which we drew little circles we 
may have made some mistakes. We may, for example, have drawn these little 
circles in such a way that the offspring of two animals which clearly fell in 
the class of dogs falls in the class of wolves and is not therefore a dog. To this 
extent we have been arbitrary. These are the cases that are not going to make 
any practical difference. We can choose to apply the word as we please, and 
we have made one particular choice.
In this way we’ve gotten a precise definition. But we now have to recognize 
that the precise definition is relatively useless to us. In itself it will not supply 
the function of what we normally take to be the meaning of the word dog, for 
by dog we mean a great deal more than this, and we do not mean quite this. 
For we do not look at claws. We apply the word by other criteria. Dogs are 
things which bark and frequently bite. They are good household pets, man’s 
best friend next to his mother, and they are clever—they can be trained to 
do tricks and perform useful functions. All of these things are involved in 
what we ordinarily mean by dog. If enough of the expected characteristics 
apply then we use the word. So, to get back from our precise definition to our 
normal concept we will have to add to the definition a group of laws about 
dogs, and we can list some of these. “Dogs bark”; “dogs bite”; “dogs can be 
domesticated.” But this one gives us some difficulty: perhaps some dogs can’t 
be domesticated. We’d better substitute, “most dogs can be domesticated.” 
As another law, we may write “dogs are fur-bearing animals.” Ah, but this is 
surely wrong. There is at least one breed known as the Mexican hairless which 
is not fur-bearing. So we must write this, “All dogs except . . . are fur-bearing” 
and for the ellipses we substitute a description of the Mexican hairless. And 
we can extend this list at some length.
But already you see what is happening. Normally our concept of dogs con-
tains all these elements together though not necessarily explicitly or precisely. 
Our concept is thus vague. We can make our notion of dog precise, but in so 
doing we rob it of most of its pragmatic value. The application of the precise 
word “dog” tells us very little about the thing to which it is applied. In order 
to substitute for the knowledge which we have sacrificed in making the word 
precise, we must annunciate empirical generalizations about the class of enti-
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ties embraced by our now precise definition. But as soon as we start such a 
precise annunciation, the vagueness of the old concept reappears as vagueness 
and lack of precision in the generalization. Our knowledge, our experience is 
simply not adequate to permit us to be precise about the two simultaneously. 
The vagueness which first appeared in our description was an index of igno-
rance, not of sloppiness.
Actually this distinction between the definition and the empirical gen-
eralization about the defined entities is highly artificial. We do not even ap-
proximate such a situation in our use of natural language. There is no one 
characteristic or set of characteristics by virtue of which we apply a name. We 
do not say “individual X is defined as the author of WAVERLY, and empiri-
cally we know that he is also the author of IVANHOE,” any more than we say 
“individual X is by definition the author of IVANHOE and we know by experi-
ence that he also wrote WAVERLY.” Theoretically we could define the indi-
vidual in either way. Actually we defined him neither way or both ways. In 
our definition the arbitrary and the experiential are inextricably intermingled.
This is seen even more clearly as regards our example “dog.” Certainly if 
we want to know whether a given entity should be called a dog, we do not 
look first to see whether the claws are retractile. We are far more likely to look 
first at certain of the characteristics predicated of dogs by our general laws. 
Roughly we may describe our concept according to the following diagram. 
At its center is what we may call our hard core of meaning, the attributes of 
which we are relatively certain. Dogs bark, they bite, they have four legs and 
nonretractile claws. In a ring outside of this center come the attributes of 
which we are relatively certain: dogs are fur-bearing for the most part, dogs 
are normally tameable. You notice that I include here as part of the mean-
ing of dog “fur-bearing,” which I know is occasionally violated. But it is still 
usually a useful way of judging whether what I see is a dog. I simply must 
be prepared to be mistaken in using this criterion alone, and I won’t use it 
alone. In still a third and larger circle we include a number of attributes about 
which we are even less certain. For example, our expectations that dogs are 
actually tame, that they can be trained, that they have a name to which they 
will respond.
That we actually do use words in some such way contributes a number of 
important characteristics to language. In the first place, although by social us-
age and the necessities of behavior there will normally be a very considerable 
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measure of agreement about what I’ve called the hard central core of meaning 
of a particular word, there may be a very large measure of disagreement about 
the vaguer fringe of meaning. This disagreement may arise from divergent 
previous experience, differing professional needs, or from many other fac-
tors. Its result is that many people who have always used a particular word in 
the same way may have considerable disagreement as to what the word really 
means. They may agree uniformly about its application to objects that they’ve 
experienced up to the present time, they may disagree about its meaning, and 
they will therefore disagree about its application to a new object of experience 
which they may not yet have met.
Thus we can have violent arguments about matters of definition, even 
though definitions understood in another sense are entirely arbitrary. And 
these arguments about definitions, which are quite independent of the fact 
that we apply the given word in the same way, are important because the par-
ticular definition to which we adhere will determine in some future case how 
we act in a new situation. We may argue violently as to whether a hypothetical 
animal which looks exactly like a wire-haired terrier but which has retractable 
claws ought to be called a dog or a cat. But if we meet such an animal we will 
behave somewhat differently depending upon which side of this question we 
are committed to. This example is of course trivial for we are virtually certain 
that we will never experience such an animal. But the history of biological 
classification demonstrates that not all such cases are trivial. New experiences 
do force us to change the meaning of older words, and the debates which arise 
at times of shifts of meaning are in large measure products of the differences 
in the criteria which we have previously considered most central to the appli-
cability of the term. So arguments about definition are possible and they are 
important, even for words which are applied in the same way by everyone. For 
it is only through such arguments that we can make our definitions uniform. 
And differences in definition will affect future behavior. 
It must be obvious by now that these vague meanings, in which are em-
bodied much of our experience and many of our expectations as to future 
experience, would be of no use at all in a world other than the one we live in. 
We can employ our vague notions of dog only because in practice the world 
of our perception does not contain a complete spectrum of animals. There are 
no intermediates between the dog and the cat as regard certain distinguish-
able characteristics or between the dog and the horse as regards others. The 
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concept of the dog represents a cut or a box in the perceptual world and its 
boundaries may remain relatively vague because the perceptual world presents 
us with few or no entities lying near the boundary. If the world were continu-
ously populated, if all conceivable entities existed, our language system would 
be totally useless.
But although the world is such to permit our using language in this way, 
and although this is the way we actually use it, it would be foolish to pretend 
that there are not grave dangers involved in the use of the vague sort of mean-
ing system we have here described. Such vagueness of meaning makes us 
extremely liable to errors of prediction. We see something we take to be a dog. 
With dog we associate a relative tameness, so we venture closer. But this turns 
out to be an undersized grizzly bear, and we lose an arm. Not infrequently 
we read of children who have made this mistake and lost their lives. It is pos-
sible to say that our mistake in this case is not a mistake in the use of words 
but is a mistake in the interpretation of what we have seen. But this was the 
terminology we examined and rejected in our discussion of behavioral worlds. 
Our words and our meaning system, like our senses, discriminate perceptual 
entities primarily with respect to the differences in behavior called for by the 
various entities. Dogs call forth one sort of behavior, bears another, and these 
behaviors are implicit in the meanings which in practice we give to these 
words. If we lose an arm to a bear thinking it a dog we change the meaning 
of “dog” to avoid the repetition of this mistake.
The dangers inherent in the loose use of language are of course even more 
severe in our political and social life. It is against these dangers that we have 
been so frequently warned recently in writings on the tyranny of words.2 
Words like radical, reactionary, or communist are encumbered with all sorts 
of associations whose conjunction has little reference to our experience. We 
label a man communist because of one relevant or irrelevant aspect of his be-
havior, and we then assume that he possesses all the other attributes which we 
associate with the name. And we do ourselves grave injury in this manner.3
The presence of such dangers in our use of language has led to an in-
creased recognition of the necessity for great care and responsibility in our 
use of words. Words, as recent history has shown, are weapons. We must 
exercise extreme caution in manipulating them. But there is also a large body 
of opinion that insists that responsibility alone is not enough, that the only 
way we can really get away from these dangers is to demand absolute precision 
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in our use of words or to employ only formalized languages with rigid and 
unambiguous meaning systems. It was of course languages of this sort that we 
discussed during our last lecture.
Now this I think is an impossible demand to impose upon any language 
which is to serve us in everyday life, or for that matter in scientific research. 
We can of course design such a language, but in the course of doing so we 
necessarily deprive them of their utility. And there are a number of reasons 
for this.
The first of these we have already hinted at in our discussion of the precise 
definition of a word like “dog.” In making it precise we emasculated it. We 
deprived it of those components of its meaning which determined our reac-
tions toward the entities with respect to which we employ it. These former 
components of meaning then had to reappear as generalizations about the 
entity dog now precisely defined, and as soon as we tried to state these gen-
eralizations, the vagueness which had formerly been inherent in the meaning 
of the word appeared in our generalization. We had therefore gained nothing 
by making our definition precise. To get rid of this vagueness, we should have 
had to reject all the generalizations except those about which we were abso-
lutely certain. But to reject these somewhat uncertain generalizations would 
have been to deprive ourselves of a set of heuristic rules which, however inad-
equate they may be, do determine our activities. We cannot wait for the final 
experimental test in order to act. If you see a bear, you’d better run away. You 
can’t afford to wait to see if by some chance it may turn out to be a dog.
This suggests a sense in which we can gain nothing by increasing the pre-
cision of our definitions, assuming of course that we have been responsible in 
applying experience to the determination of our original vague definitions. 
But I would suggest that the situation is even worse than this. Beyond a cer-
tain point an increase in precision is actually harmful. And this can be seen 
in the following fashion.
We have already seen that our language represents a manner of cutting up 
the world. It is closely associated with our cutting up of the behavioral world 
which we discussed in the sixth lecture. And among the boxes at which we 
arrived in cutting up the behavioral world is the one which contains dogs.4 
Now let us once again employ a diagram. Suppose that the entire area of 
this blackboard represents that portion of our perceptions which we would 
describe as perceptions of four-legged animals. It is thus part of the total 
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universe composed of all things we might perceive. To represent the balance 
of this universe we should have to add a number of other boards, one for 
two-legged animals, one for plants, another for artifacts, and so on almost 
indefinitely.
Now we may proceed to divide further that portion of our perceptual world 
containing four-legged animals. At one point we draw a circle containing the 
particular combination of qualities and behaviors to which we expect to apply 
the word “dog.” This circle is of course not precisely defined. Near its center is 
the hard core of meaning representing the attributes like nonretractile claws, 
meat-eating, and barking which we feel perfectly certain are associated with 
dogs. Nearer the periphery are attributes like tamed or tameable about which 
we are somewhat less certain, and of course the attributes marked in this pe-
ripheral area will display variations from one individual to another.
Now, our perceptions of four-legged animals contain more than just this 
one box. We’ll have a similar somewhat imprecisely defined box for our per-
ceptions of cats, another for cows, another for horses, still another for el-
ephants. We will also have a box for wolves which in practice displays a slight 
overlap with the box for dogs. This indicates that under certain conditions we 
do not know how to tell a dog from a wolf if our particular perception is of 
an object lying in the fringe area of vague meaning. But generally there will 
be few such overlaps. In fact the totality of boxes which we erect in the area 
of our perceptions corresponding to four-legged animals by no means fills up 
the area of possible perceptions of four-legged animals. We have no name 
for an animal that is half-dog and half-horse, for we don’t expect to see any 
such thing and do not take it into behavioral account. So we may say that the 
world of our possible perceptions contains some entities which we name with 
certainty, some for which we have no name and no corresponding behavior, 
and some intermediate perceptions about whose names there is disagreement 
and to which we should apply names only tentatively.
There are an infinite number of precise cuts with which we may replace 
this vague meaning system implicit in our natural language. Let me start by 
suggesting two extreme cases. We might begin by restricting meaning to 
those aspects of perception with respect to which we had absolute certainty. 
This would be equivalent to stating that the meaning of the word “dog” is to 
include just those perceptions of dogs which we have already had, and so forth 
for cats and other animals. And this means in effect that we narrow each of 
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these circles representing meaning to some small portion of the hard core of 
meaning located near their center. This supplies us with complete precision in 
our use of language but it gives us a language applicable only to the percep-
tions which we have already had or to those future perceptions identical with 
these. It leaves the bulk of the world of possible perceptions without names, 
and we are bound to encounter such new perceptions which our narrowly 
precise language system will be unable to mediate. In gaining precision by 
removing the vague areas of meaning from our concept this language has 
lost much of its utility for us. It can be applied only to what we have already 
experienced.
But we need not attain precision by narrowing the meaning; we are equal-
ly at liberty to broaden it. In this case we arbitrarily eliminate the overlap in 
our diagram, we extend the outer rings on our circles so that they fill up the 
entire board without overlap, and we insist that any complex of perceptions 
shall be given the name corresponding to the box into which it falls. And 
there will always be such a box for it.
As compared with our previous cut, this alternative gives us the great ad-
vantage that it supplies the name for any perception, but it has an equally 
disastrous consequence. The meanings associated with these new precise cuts 
are so broad as to be behaviorally almost without significance. For in broad-
ening the meaning of dog so that it includes not only the particular percep-
tual complexes which we have already experienced but also a large number 
of others which we have not experienced and probably never will experience, 
we have deprived the label dog of just that characteristic which made it a 
useful component of our language. It no longer provides us with a behavioral 
expectation. Certainly all dogs will still be four-legged. Certainly they will 
all bark, certainly they will all have nonretractile claws. But the application of 
the broader term “dog” no longer carries any significance whatsoever regard-
ing domesticability, tameness, or adaptability to household tasks. In provid-
ing a language which will embrace all of our perceptions, we have deprived 
ourselves of a language which will tell us very much about what we see.
Between these two extremes there is an infinity of alternate choices which 
preserve precision. We need not draw our circles of precise meaning so small 
that they are restricted by our past experience, nor need we draw them so large 
that they exhaust the entire universe of possible perceptions. But the effect of 
these compromises is simply to combine in varying degrees the two extreme 
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disadvantages we have already considered. To the extent that they are too 
large they deprive the application of a name of its behavioral significance. For 
some names, let me repeat, are not simply artificial and arbitrary labels. They 
are focal points about which crystallize our expectations about the perceptual 
worlds, and the act of naming a particular perceptual complex is a positive 
act. It is a statement of belief about the future history of the named complex.
It therefore appears that many names, as mediators of the perceptual 
world, are not precise and cannot be made precise without depriving them 
of their utility as mediators. Names are not that sort of thing. And from this 
polarization between precision and behavioral utility derives both the power 
and the danger of names and more generally of language.
But the statement that many words of natural language cannot simultane-
ously preserve their utility and possess a precise meaning has one very impor-
tant exception which we have already observed. This exception is provided by 
the words of the ideal scientific text, which we discussed in the last lecture. 
There you will remember we discussed the ideal text as a purely formal struc-
ture in which scientific laws appeared as postulates determining certain of 
the formal characteristics of referenceless symbols. And this formal structure 
was combined with a meaning system which determined the reference in the 
perceptual world of these abstract symbols in terms of which the laws were 
stated. Experience or experiment entered in the choice of the particular pos-
tulate set and in the corresponding choice of a meaning-system. The remains 
of the structure was formal or conventional in the sense we discussed. And 
the effect of the formalization was to extract from the meaning system all 
those portions of the earlier commonsense concepts which were in the vague 
fringe of meaning, and to restrict the criteria determining the applicability 
of the term to a set about which our knowledge was sufficient to permit the 
construction of a postulate system.
In this process the meanings of words are changed, and narrowed. Fre-
quently they lose their behavioral adequacy during the process. For the world 
of science, at least to date, is poorer than the world of everyday life. We can-
not direct our behavior on the basis of scientific knowledge alone. But the 
loss of behavioral adequacy is compensated by a gain in precision and scope 
whose values are too apparent in the world about us to require further com-
ment here.
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But in practice we do not achieve this complete formalization of our text. 
And historically it appears extremely fortunate that we do not do so. We do 
leave vague meaning fringes on scientific terms, and our research is always 
conducted within the area determined by these vaguer fringes. It is in these 
areas alone that questions can arise as to established theories. The effect of 
full formalization is to make a theory impregnable except in so far as precise 
measurements may display deviations from the postulated laws. And this is 
not the most usual source of scientific advance.
If for example the phlogiston theory had been fully formalized, weight 
relations in chemical reactions would have been made totally irrelevant to 
it. Matter as it enters into the formal structure of the phlogiston theory does 
not retain weight as one of its necessarily associated qualities, any more than 
the precise and formal definition of dog can retain fur-bearing as a necessar-
ily associated quality. Motion as formalized in Aristotelian physics is not an 
abstraction to which acceleration is relevant. Differences in acceleration do 
not formally correspond to different motions in the Aristotelian formalism 
any more than differences in the material of which the measuring rod is com-
posed correspond to different distances in the formalization of Newtonian 
physics. And, as we have seen, it was because of the extraformal associations 
of matter and weight or motion with change of speed that these difficulties 
were recognized at all and became problems for these sciences.
Thus the vague and behaviorally determined meaning systems of natural 
language are one of the most important vehicles for what we have previously 
called scientific orientations. The area of stable meaning is an area of what we 
take to be certain knowledge. In this area no questions arise. The area outside 
our meaning system is an area which can be mediated neither by our language 
nor our perceptions. Prior to a shift of meaning systems no questions can arise 
here, either. It is only in the area provided by meaning fringes that scientific 
questions can arise and that scientific exploration can occur.
This exploration may proceed in one of two directions. It may result in 
increasing the scope and precision of the existing meaning system. And this 
is what occurred during the period which we previously described as the clas-
sic period in the development of a scientific orientation.5 Or, in a more in-
teresting sense, this exploration may result in the total destruction of the 
pre-existing meaning system. It may result in a rejection of the old criteria 
of meaning and the establishment of new ones for the same word and the 
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same perceptual complex. Or it may lead to regroupings.6 And this occurs in 
a period previously described as a crisis state in scientific development. The 
stage which terminates in scientific revolution. These are periods of disagree-
ment and debate about meanings. They are periods in which the significance 
of equating different meanings with words whose application has previously 
been identical becomes apparent. They terminate with new precise criteria 
for scientific meanings and frequently with new central cores of meaning for 
natural languages. They are simultaneously destructive and creative of scien-
tific orientation, behavioral worlds, and meaning systems.
So the study of language and of formalism brings us back to the recogni-
tion of the same pattern in the language process that we have discovered in 
our study of the history of science and from the psychology of perceptions. 
And I would conclude my remarks this evening by suggesting that these three 
facets of the search for knowledge can only be separated artificially as we 
have done here for the purposes of our discussion. Whether we are scien-
tists or laymen these three are inextricably intermingled in our daily practice. 
They represent simplifications of the flux of perception based on experiences; 
they embody our implicit knowledge; and within them we find our science. 
Our linguistic apparatus, our involuntary yet alterable organization of our 
perceptions provide us with our science in embryo. They are the vehicles of 
that inevitable predisposition to theories of a certain sort which, as we have 
noted again and again, govern our experiments and the conclusions which we 
draw from our experiments. By increasing abstraction and increasing preci-
sion we can create within the pre-existing patterns of language and percep-
tions a summary of our most certain knowledge which we call science. And 
in the process we can gain some additional knowledge. It is this which we 
embody in scientific texts. But it is not knowledge of a different sort, nor is it 
gained by an essentially different procedure, from the more primitive experi-
ence embodied in the organization of our language and perception. Without 
this more primitive organization, we cannot proceed to act or to do research.7
But, and this is the source of the difficulty which we have encountered 
again and again during the course of these lectures, this underlying organi-
zation provided by our perceptions and our language are not permanent and 
immutable. They arise from experience, they legislate for experience, but they 
may prove inadequate to experience. When they do, they must be altered, 
and the process by which they are altered is destructive as well as construc-
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tive. Thus the patterns of organization from which science proceeds limit it. 
Without them there would be no science. Within them there can only be 
certain sorts of science. So continuing progress in research can be achieved 
only with successive linguistic and perceptual re-adaptations which radically 
and destructively alter the behavioral worlds of professional scientists.
1. Here Kuhn instructs himself, “go to board.” The illustrations he offered his au-
dience are evidently similar to those he later published in his essay “Second Thoughts 
on Paradigms,” in The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 
293–319, 311.
2. See, for example, Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words (New York:  Brace, 1938).
3. Months after Kuhn wrote this, a similar semantic criticism of anticommunism 
appeared in the philosophical literature. See Victor Lowe, “A Resurgence of Vicious 
Intellectualism,” Journal of Philosophy 48(14) (1951): 435–47. 
4. Here Kuhn directed himself to the blackboard.
5. In Lecture V, Kuhn called it the “classical period.”
6. Kuhn inserted this sentence by hand, and place it in brackets.
7. Kuhn inserted by hand a short, illegible word at the start of this sentence, pos-




“The Prevalence of Atoms”: 
Kuhn’s Original Outline*
Notes: Lowell Lecture III: 3/9/51
THE PREVALENCE OF ATOMS
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Last lecture studied the transition in the attitude of Western scien-
tists and philosophers toward a single problem: that presented by the 
study of motion of terrestrial bodies.
a) More precisely—examined two different points of view toward 
a single problem, motion, and showed how particular limited 
inadequacies in the first of these had led to a complete refor-
mulation of the problem and to a new set of laws.
2. Tonight I should like to attack our problem somewhat differently. 
Instead of a single problem, we shall examine the application of a 
single approach to a variety of problems:
a) Manner in which one metaphysical notion about the structure 
of the world has provided new insights to science and scien-
tists.
3. This notion is the one commonly called ATOMISM.
a) Belief that world is made of infinite number of microscopic 
particles in constant motion in an infinite void.
*This transcription of Kuhn’s outline for his third lecture, “The Prevalence of Atoms,” 
reproduces his typed outline with basic corrections of grammar and spelling, expan-
sion or regularization of Kuhn’s abbreviations, and typographical corrections shown 
in brackets. His outline includes three marginal notations not included here: “Omit if 
past 2[?] min.” at §V, 6–7; “Omit if necessary” at §XI; and “read” at §XII, 6.
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b) And this idea about the structure of the world is one which, 
AT LEAST HISTORICALLY, we owe to the Greek philosophers 
Leucippus and his student Democritus who flourished in the 
5th century B.C.
4. I say, “at least historically,” for I should like this evening to find a 
middle ground between two extreme views which have been held 
regarding the relation of modern scientific atomism to the atomism 
of the Greeks.
a) First is the truly absurd view that the Greeks, by sheer power 
of mentation, anticipated many or most of the conclusions 
produced by the combined efforts of XIX and XX scientists.
b) Second view is equally absurd. States that resemblance be-
tween Greek and modern atomism is purely fortuitous. That 
it’s simply a rather disagreeable accident that a lucky guess by 
some obscure Greek philosophers should have seemed so simi-
lar to the totally different theory provided by careful experi-
mental and mathematical research during the past 150 years.
5. As an alternative—the question is misphrased—science since begin-
ning of XVII cent. has believed in and made use of a number of 
different atomisms.
a) There is no one scientific atomism.
b) Different fields of science have occasionally employed incom-
patible atomisms at same time.
c) But these various atomisms have evolved through the attempt 
to employ an older atomism in a new scientific context. And in 
this attempt the basic notion of an atom has itself changed.
d) But if atomism has not been unaltered in its contacts with sci-
ence—neither has science. The continued association of science 
and atomism has been fruitful. If we trace the matter back.
e) And the first philosophical atomism to which science owes an 
important debt is that of the Greeks.
II. GREEK ATOMISM
1. Greek atomism in large part a produce of the same set of dialectic 
problems examined at beginning of last lecture.
a) Parmenides: everything which exists is eternal and changeless.
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b) Thus the vacuum, whose very name implies the absence of all 
being, cannot exist. For how can non-being exist.
c) So there is only one thing, the real universe. And it is com-
pletely full, self-contained, and forever changeless.
d) This is first of the historically important phil. monisms.
2. Aristotle’s response. Agree that there’s no void. Universe is full.
a) But fullness doesn’t imply absence of change—motion can oc-
cur by anti-peristasis. Motion of the fish.
3. This answer dominated thought in Europe until well into XVI cen-
tury. Not surprising. Built into physical system giving commonsense 
world.
4. But it was not the only way of preserving change from the onslaught 
of Parmenides.
a) Alternative provided even before Aristotle.
b) And this was contained in Leucippus’s denial that there was 
anything self-contradictory in the notion of the void.
c) On the contrary: the void exists, and so do little bits of micro-
scopic matter which move about in it.
d) The flux of appearance is provided by the motions of these 
corpuscles.
5. but for dialectic reasons similar to those which led Parmenides to 
keep the all indivisible, the Greeks held that these particles could 
not be divided.
a) Atom means undivided.
b) Thus of the Parmenidean monism they made a monadology.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES
1. This view of the nature of reality had  number of psychological conse-
quences of great importance for later scientific thought.
2. There are holes in nature. A vacuum can exist.
3. The universe is infinite. Extends forever in all directions.
a) Contrast with ARISTOTELIAN UNIVERSE bounded by finite 
sphere.
b) For what can bound it except atoms & the void.
4. More important—all the changes, all the variable qualities we ob-
serve in nature are produced by the changes in positions and relative 
motions of the fundamental particles.
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a) In the words of the later atomist Epicurus: “We must suppose 
that the atoms do not possess any of the qualities belonging 
to perceptible things, except shape, weight, and size, . . . . 
For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change at all, 
since there must needs be something which remains solid and 
dissoluble at the dissolution of compounds, (something) which 
can cause change; . . . changes affected by the shifting in posi-
tion of some particle, and by the addition or departure of some 
other.”
5. This is a very interesting statement, for the ideas which it expresses 
have been a continuing source of two fundamental ideas about the 
universe, which have been a continuing source of both inspiration 
and trouble for later sciences.
a) The atoms are sensuously neutral. They possess only size & 
shape: i.e. extension.
b) Thus to understand the variety and sensory luxuriance of the 
world exhibited to our senses we must study not these sense 
impressions themselves, for these are scarcely trustworthy, but 
we must search for the arrangement & motions of the cor-
puscles which underlie the appearances.
c) This is beginning of the tremendously important division 
between primary & secondary qualities.
6. Even more important is the notion of the world as a machine which 
lies behind the description of the atomistic universe.
a) All the universe is made up of the same sort of stuff.
b) Once the atoms are given their initial motions they go on 
by themselves. After its start the atoms go on by themselves, 
under their own laws.
c) This is notion of universe as a giant machine, a piece of clock-
work.
IV. DEPENDENCE ON THE GREEKS
1. This idea of the universe as giant machine is frequently thought to 
be a consequence of the Newtonian philosophy which so dominated 
XVIII century thought.
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a) Newton thus described as a man who single handed gave the 
world notion of world as a machine—a notion in which he did 
not entirely believe himself.
2. This is not far wrong if we are concerned with wide popularity of the 
notion. With the notion as thoroughly dogmatic belief which influ-
ences not just science and philosophy, but also politics and art.
3. But for many working scientists notion is 3/4 of a century older than 
publication of PRINCIPIA.
a) And here its source is unequivocally Greek.
4. At beginning of the century FRANCIS BACON had written a defense 
of the works of Democritus and other Greek atomists.
a) Throughout his life he proclaimed that one of the fundamental 
tasks of the new science was study  of motions which underlie 
the qualities present to our senses.
b) Illustrated both in his own abortive researches, chiefly heat, 
and with many examples drawn from Roman atomist Lucre-
tius.
5. Only slightly later Rene Descartes, French philosopher whose work 
so influenced the continental science of the XVII century, provided 
a complete model of the world as a machine, governed by invariable 
God-given laws.
a) And the building blocks of the Cartesian universe were little 
corpuscles, acting only by impact.
b) In fact, Descartes in the beginning was accused of simply crib-
bing his philosophy from the Greek atomists.
6. I will not multiply names, but the notion was extremely prevalent.
a) In fact the very name which was attached to the major scien-
tific tradition of the XVII century—“the New Philosophy” 
or “the Mechanical Philosophy” seems in large part to have 
denoted an attempt to reduce all phenomena to the motion of 
such elementary corpuscles with the aid of experimentation.
7. ROBERT BOYLE, in so many ways the leader of the movement for the 
New Philosophy, etc. was admittedly indebted to the Greek atom-
ists.
a) Describes universe as “a self-moving engine,” “a great piece of 
clockwork.”
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b) His major work is an attempt to apply these notions to chem-
istry.
V. SOME EFFECTS ON PHYSICS
1. So far have dealt with atomism as purely speculative cosmology.
a) Drawn by free creative power of human mind from the consid-
eration of logical or pseudo-logical problems.
2. To such speculative, cosmological thinking you may wish to deny the 
name of science. May wonder why I go into it in lectures devoted to 
the study of problems in scientific method.
3. I think you’d only be partly correct in denying the name of science 
to this material. But I am not now prepared to argue it. Reserve this 
discussion for fifth lecture.
4. Now just want to point out that  whether it is science, it has impor-
tant effect on researches that are indubitably scientific.
a) Now turn to an examination of some examples.
5. First of these is drawn from material of last lecture: Foundations of 
Dynamics. Should like to point out an important effect of the recov-
ery of a limited portion of the atomistic viewpoint upon the study of 
motion.
a) Aristotle: Universe is full; motion is through plenum.
b) Thus always two forces involved in a motion. Pusher & me-
dium. This holds until the XVI century.
c) But XVI cent., though not marked by scientific adherence to 
full-scale atomism of Democritus, does show a large-scale 
rejection of Aristotelian plenum.
d) Many scientists believe on philosophical grounds that there are 
tiny vacua in things. These account for condensation & rarefac-
tion. Very light substances like air are highly rarefied. They are 
almost all vacuum.
e) Thus motion thru air is very like motion thru a vacuum and 
this suggests that motions in which there is no resistance are 
profitable subject for scientists to consider.
f) Motion under one force becomes a worthwhile abstraction.
g) This is the background for the new acceptance of Galileo’s ar-
gument about the two bricks which had been tried and rejected 
at times when the medium was thought to play a different role.
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6. But effect of new attitude toward the void is not felt just in dynamics.
a) Idea that there are vacua and that their size can be altered by 
finite forces suggests a new problem presented by an old phe-
nomenon: the problem of pumps.
b) Known for more than a century before Galileo’s time that 
pumps in mines wouldn’t raise water large distances. Generally 
less than 30 feet.
c) Not surprising—pump shaft of wood etc. crude boring.
d) People continued happily to design, on paper, pumps which 
raise water hundreds of feet.
e) Idea that there’s an inherent limitation here doesn’t arise. Can 
be no vacuum, so if plunger is drawn up water must follow in 
absence of leaks. And the leaks certainly existed.
f) Faced with this situation today we’d eliminate most of the 
leaks, discover that this scarcely increased pump effectiveness.
g) Galileo can’t do this very well. Thirty-five foot leak-proof 
tubes can’t be fabricated.
h) But even without them, believing that a vacuum could con-
ceivably be made by a finite force he is able to suggest that 
perhaps that’s what’s happening in the pump. Water breaking 
away from plunger under its own weight and leaving vacuum.
7. Parallel to pendulum: new point of view changes significance of an 
old observation. It aides in the creation of a new problem.
a) Doesn’t do this single-handed. Several generations of trying to 
improve pumps also an important factor.
b) And it doesn’t solve problem. Galileo was wrong. Correct ex-
planation awaits Torricelli and mercury barometer experiment. 
But Torricelli was a pupil of Galileo’s, and his experiment is a 
consequence of Galileo’s isolation of the problem.
VI. EFFECTS OF THE FULLER ATOMISM
1. Need not restrict ourselves to this partial atomism, which, since it 
does not hold for fundamental particles perhaps ought not be called 
an atomism at all.
2. The effects of the full atomism of Democritus are equally clear.
3. For example, Galileo had suggested that a ball rolling on a horizontal 
plane will continue with a constant velocity in a straight line forever.
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a) This is very close to what we now call the principle of inertia, 
but it misses it. For it holds only for horizontal plane.
b) Not surprising. Can’t get this notion from experiment; balls 
roll slower up and faster down inclines. Only on horizontal 
planes do they go on for some time. Even here can’t get rid of 
friction. So the law is an idealization and an unlikely one for 
Galileo because—
c) Galileo is still in many respects Aristotelian. He has rejected 
natural motion vs. violent motion distinction. But horizontal 
vs. vertical motion still seems different. UP & DOWN VS. SIDE-
WAYS. Motions are relative to earth.
d) But in atomistic universe there are no UPS & DOWNS. Funda-
mental motions are those of elementary corpuscles, swimming 
in an infinite void. And an infinite void has no directions.
e) Atomist Descartes first enunciates principle in full generality, 
with background of sorts of considerations which lead Galileo 
to limited case.
4. But atomism leads Descartes still further. It provides him with an 
entirely new sort of dynamical problem.
a) Since all change of this linear motion is through impact, we 
must study impact. What happens when two elementary 
particles collide? How is motion transmitted from one to the 
other.
b) Descartes enunciates bad laws.
c) These are corrected later. Lead to conservation of momentum.
d) Problem is not in literature before. It has no apparent impor-
tance. Dynamics was something else.
e) Not it is almost the pre-eminent dynamical problem. The prob-
lem of billiard balls. But it didn’t arise that way.
5. Examples of this sort could be multiplied almost indefinitely.
a) Not only dynamics, but Heat, Light, Chemistry.
b) Instead let me simply remark on the extent to which these de-
velopments culminate in and are given a new form by the work 
of ISAAC NEWTON.
6. Have already suggested one sense in which atomism provided a mo-
tive and a direction to Newtonian research: World Machine.
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a) Universe like watch, composed of same sort of material every-
where, and these materials operate in essentially same manner 
throughout.
b) This as much as watching the apple, lies behind search for 
“universal gravitation” for a force which would be the same for 
the apple and moon.
7. But adjective “universal” has still another meaning which is, I think, 
even more thoroughly atomistic.
a) We learn universal gravitation as attraction inversely propor-
tional to distance between center of bodies.
b) Newton pronounced himself dissatisfied with this formula-
tion. He demanded and found a proof that if all little particles 
within a body acted this way then total effect would be the 
same as though entire mass of larger body were concentrated at 
its center.
c) But this demand that forces acting between heavy bodies be 
the net results of identical forces acting between the micro-
scopic bits of matter which compose those bodies is a new one. 
Kepler etc. quite content to find forces acting between bodies 
themselves.
d) This insistence upon force laws which work between bodies is a 
new one; and I think its source is in the notion of an atomistic 
world machine. Descartes, whose system was not success-
ful, had imposed same demand, but I know of nothing which 
parallels it before the popularity of atomism.
8. Newton’s fruitful application of atomism not restricted to the Dy-
namics.
a) Boyle’s law
b) Optics: reflection, refraction, and simple diffraction, etc.
9. So after Newton everyone was an atomist.
a) But a new sort of atomist. Elementary particles moving under 
influence of forces acting between them. 
b) And the notion of forces acting at a distance was new and radi-
cal. Until this time only impact had produced change.
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10. This was new: Led to notion that object of science was to discover 
new sorts of forces between bodies, and to determine the effects of 
such forces.
a) Much BUT NOT ALL of the science of the XVIII & XIX 
centuries is given motive and direction by this new sort of 
atomism which itself derives from the Newtonian synthesis.
VII. TRANSITION TO DALTON
1. Since Newton’s day there are too many fruitful applications of atom-
ism & too many modifications of atomism to permit our continuing 
even so superficial a sketch. Too much & too technical.
a) Instead will reserve for the end of the hour a few more general 
remarks on the subject of modern atomism.
2. Will now try a more detailed illustration of way in which atomistic 
ideas to a particular set of problems can suggest new significances of 
old data, and of manner in which atomism is itself modified by the 
application.
3. For such a purpose could scarcely find more central or typical figure 
than English chemist John Dalton.
a) His work at beginning of last century brings genuine atomism 
to chemistry.
4. Better say shows fruitfulness of atomism for chemistry, for even 
before his time a number of influential chemists believed that sub-
stances with which they dealt were built up of atoms.
a) This was an atomism borrowed directly from the physicists of 
the period and its use was to explain that group of properties of 
natural substances which we should now call physical.
5. DRAW PILE OF SHOT MODEL ON BOARD
a) Pile of shot model: space filling atoms
b) The individual particles are themselves composed of two dif-
ferent substances. Core & Caloric.
6. DRAW CORE & CALORIC sheath.
a) Core accounts for weight & nature of substance.
b) Caloric is weightless fluid providing a jelly in which particles 
are set. It provides the forces between them.
7. Utility of model.
a) Difficulty in compression.
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b) But expansion by heat—and Caloric is just heat.
c) So uniformity of expansion on heating.
d) And change of state.
e) And different heat capacities.
8. Not quantitatively useful—but reduced many divergent phenomena 
to order.
a) But not chemical phenomena. No notion that these particles 
enter into reactions a such.
b) Hydrogen particles, Oxygen particles, Water particles. But 
this is static model.
VIII. DALTON’S PROBLEM & ITS SOLUTION
1. John Dalton, man who bridged this gap, was not a chemist but a 
physicist. Deeply influenced by Isaac Newton’s atomism.
a) More precisely his own work was almost entirely in meteorol-
ogy and heat.
2. As a meteorologist he was much concerned with a chemical discovery 
made while he was in his teens.
a) Air is not simple but compound. It’s a mixture of two gases—
Oxygen, Nitrogen. Plus some water vapor.
3. This raises very serious difficulties.
a) Two gases are different in weight—why don’t they form strata? 
Heavier Oxygen at the bottom.
b) And problems of Gas absorption.
4. Dalton’s attempts. Different ways of stacking—different sizes for 
Caloric sheaths, etc.—different sorts of force laws.
a) Did convince himself that no one force law could account for 
lack of stratification and absorption etc.
b) But managed to convince himself that force law could be 
worked out if and only if atoms (with sheaths) were of different 
sizes and weights.
c) No point in examining details of theory. It would not have 
worked—in fact it’s unusually absurd—but it provided a new 
problem. Find sizes and weights of the ultimate corpuscles.
5. Dalton’s great genius lay in pointing out that this could be done on 
the basis of existing chemical data.
6. The assumptions:
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a) Substances made of atoms.
b) All atoms identical—otherwise we’d have two sorts of Oxy-
gen, etc.
c) Then with reasonable assurance can compute relative weights 
and volumes of the fundamental particles.
7. Example
a) 8 pts by weight of Oxygen combine with 1 pt by wt. Hydrogen 
to form water.
b) If this is one particle to one particle, then weight of Oxygen is 
just eight times that of Hydrogen, because . . .
c) Could be two atoms to one—then weight relation would be 
sixteen to one. But wisely refuses to complicate the situation 
more than is required.
8. By examining other compounds gets weights of other atoms, and not 
only weights but also relative volumes of the corpuscles.
a) I[f] atoms are space filling and you know relative densities and 
relative weights of fundamental particles, can discover relative 
sizes.
9. So he got a whole list of relative weights and relative sizes of the 
atoms. The sizes were different and he convinced himself that his 
mechanism for the atmosphere would work out. HE WAS DELIGHT-
ED.
IX. DALTON AND THE CHEMISTS
1. If this was all that there was to Dalton’s theory no self-respecting 
chemist would have paid any attention.
a) Atmosphere mixing wasn’t a very big problem, and it took 
very little perspicacity to see that Dalton’s theory of the forces 
between the particles wouldn’t really account for anything.
b) The notion of atoms uniting with each other to form new 
atoms was pretty thoroughly speculative. And in any case why 
should they unite this way.
c) Why not 2 Oxygens to one Hydrogen or conversely, or 7 to 11, 
or something else.
2. But though Dalton had designed his theory and done his work to 
take care of atmosphere and absorption etc. it turned out that his 
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speculation, useless for his own problems, could do a great deal for 
chemists.
3. For example, Great debate about whether substances can combine in 
any old proportions.
a) Hydrogen and water show only one proportion. But copper and 
oxygen seem to combine in almost any proportion you choose.
b) If Dalton was right there were only certain proportions in 
which elements could combine. This meant that others must be 
mixtures.
c) Thus had a clear criterion for chemical vs. physical & this was 
of very great importance.
4. But Dalton’s work had other consequences even more striking for 
chemists, and I should like to illustrate one of these.
5. Dalton had applied his method to substances which combine in more 
than one ratio to form more than one compound.
a) Many such reactions had been known before his time and the 
analytical data was available to him.
6. Dalton suggests that for such cases one compound must be binary 
and two ternary—
a) Application to the nitrogen oxides—ON BOARD
7. Similarly for the oxides of carbon, etc.
8. Thus law of multiple proportions: A given amount of one element 
will combine with weights of a second element which bear to each 
other simple whole number ratios.
9. But the data for this had been available for years.
a) Just at Dalton’s time a number of chemists were about to an-
nounce the existence of such a regularity for a few particular 
compounds.
b) Dalton supersedes them—by showing mechanism and gener-
ality. Many of them don’t even publish their results.
10. So a new law has entered chemistry and a new guiding principle to 
be used in all chemical manipulations, for a completely irrelevant 
source.
a) For gas problems with which Dalton was concerned were not 
relevant to chemists and Dalton hadn’t solved them.
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b) The central parts of the discovery from the point of view of 
chemists were asides for Dalton. They had relatively little 
significance to the central portion of his work, which was, at 
least initially, the search for forces between the fundamental 
particles.
X. DALTON & GAY-LUSSAC
1. Just how irrelevant Dalton’s considerations really were is shown by an 
immediate sequel to his discovery. A sequel which actually destroyed 
the theoretical underpinning of his discovery.
2. In 1809, just two years after Dalton’s announcement of his theory, 
the French chemist Gay-Lussac discovered another regularity of 
chemical reactions.
a) Law of combining volumes. Illustrate.
3. This was immediately accepted with rejoicing by all chemists. And 
they believed it a beautiful proof of the atomic nature of their sub-
stances and their reactions.
4. But Dalton couldn’t believe it. He not only doubted its generality, but 
he accused the brilliant experimentalist Gay-Lussac of twisting his 
figures to produce the apparent regularity.
5. This isn’t strange.
a) Dalton’s insistence upon differences in volumes meant an insis-
tence upon different numbers of particles per unit volume.
b) But simplest interpretation of Gay-Lussac was equal numbers 
of particles or at least integral ratios of numbers of particles. 
And this wouldn’t fit Dalton’s data at all.
c) Within two years of his proclamation of it the theory was 
destroyed. Though he held out until the end of his life.
6. But it wasn’t destroyed for Chemists.
a) They weren’t committed to his theory of forces or to his com-
putations of sizes.
b) They simply rejected the part for which Dalton had done the 
work and held on to his asides.
c) And they drew and still draw great profit from this.
XI. AVOGADRO’S HYPOTHESIS
1. But the chemists were still not out of difficulty.
2. Examine Hydrogen and Oxygen reaction. Must mean H2O.
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3. But then where do the extra Oxygens come from for the extra volume 
of steam?
4. Two ways of solving this problem.
a) Only half as many water particles per unit volume. This works, 
but it leaves a certain arbitrariness in chem formulae. Perhaps 
then the same is true of Hydrogen and water is still HO.
5. A better method was suggested by Italian physicist Avogadro two 
years after Gay-Lussac’s discovery.
a) Preserve equal particles for equal volumes.
b) But these particles aren’t ultimate. They can be broken down in 
chemical reactions. APPLY TO WATER.
6. This works fine, but it’s absurd.
a) When is an atom not an atom?—“atom” means undivided.
b) If you can break them in two, why not in three, for five, or into 
a hundred fragments? What is the good of the notion at all?
7. In fact Avogadro’s proposal was scarcely even taken seriously for 
almost fifty years.
8. Can’t retrace the story here—but would like to note for future refer-
ence that
a) Rejection caused great difficulties—Everyone wrote atomic 
weights and molecular formulas differently. What was the 
formula of water and what the weight of Oxygen.
b) The result was very serious difficulty for all of chemistry. No 
agreement in formulas on nomenclature.
c) By mid-century as the number of known compounds prolifer-
ated the situation became almost unbearable. It became dif-
ficult for one Chemist to read another’s paper without a table 
of the atomic weights used by that chemist.
9. As a result atomic theory itself was almost abandoned by many 
chemists.
a) And with the theory itself shaken to its foundations, it was a 
great deal easier for chemists to relinquish the inviolability of 
the atom in order to gain a unanimity in their tables of weights 
and formulas.
b) This return to the modern view was finally accomplished in 
1858, by Cannizzaro.
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10. But this again meant a new sort of atom.
a) It could be broken.
b) it was not space filling—no pile of shot.
c) No caloric sheaths to explain the physical properties so nicely.
X[II]. CONCLUSION
1. Clearly these chemical atoms of the late years of the XIX century 
were different from any we’ve met so far.
a) They were not all made of the same sort of stuff as the atoms of 
Democritus were.
b) They could be split up in chemical reactions.
c) Nor did they have any function in explaining the physical 
properties of the substances into which they entered.
2. The function of explaining physical properties was taken over at this 
time by a quite different sort of atom developed by the physicist.
a) The atom of the kinetic theory. Very small compared with 
space for it in a gas.
b) In continuous rapid motion through vast empty space, etc.
c) Hard little ball which rebounds with perfect elasticity when it 
hits another atom.
3. In fact the possibility of reconciling the two sorts of atom seemed so 
remote that there was at the end of the century a widespread rebel-
lion against all atomism.
a) It was admitted that atoms might be useful devices to think in 
terms of.
b) But it was said that science had shown the notion of such fun-
damental particles from which the universe was constructed to 
be absurd.
c) Believing in them, we were as bad as the Greeks for we were 
indulging in the same sort of futile speculations.
d) Useful or not in the past, the science of the future should 
purge itself of such notions.
4. Fortunately the movement was not successful
a) In the past twenty-five years and only then we’ve succeeded in 
reconstructing an atomism which will account for both physi-
cal and chemical properties of the atoms.
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b) It will even tell us a good deal about the qualities of the atoms 
in an aggregate.
5. But once again it’s a new sort of atom.
a) The planetary atom—electrons and a hard nucleus.
b) And nucleus itself can be split into an increasing number of 
different sorts of particles.
6. What our notions on the subject will be fifty years from now is al-
most impossible to predict—but they will be different.
a) And the new ideas about fundamental particles will be 
achieved by the only tools we know how to use:
b) The application to the new problems of the nucleus of our ex-
isting and inadequate conceptual tools gained from an exami-
nation of the planetary atom.
c) For just as in preceding reshaping of atoms, it is in the course 
of such application of our old tools to new problems that the 
discovery which will reshape our notions of atoms and of the 
nucleus will be made.
